

## NAUKI O BEZPIECZEŃSTWIE / SECURITY STUDIES

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### **TERMINATION OF WAR: FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME (IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR)**

#### **Introduction**

It is easy to begin a war, but very difficult to stop one, since its beginning and end are not under the control of the same man. Anyone, even a coward, can commence a war, but it can be brought to an end only with the consent of the victors<sup>1</sup>. Any leader sets expectations for what he will gain from the war and assesses the resources at his disposal to achieve it. Considering that most wars involve two parties, one of the parties is defeated because of an incorrect assessment. The war is deemed “over” when the outcomes come up to the expectations of the victorious party. Regarding the theories presented by Jack S. Levy<sup>2</sup>, Armenia was more concerned with the formation of alliances (namely CSTO) and the avoidance of Azerbaijan’s hegemony in the region, since Baku had all possible tools to realize it. According to Armenia, equilibrium of military capabilities would maintain the status quo. All these expectations are covered under the balance of power theory. However, Azerbaijan dashed all these expectations, made Armenian side sign an act of capitulation, established a new geopolitical reality in the region and implemented the hegemonic (power transition) theory. Although much study has been devoted to the factors affecting

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<sup>1</sup> R.J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War: War, Power, Peace*, Beverly Hills, California 1979.

<sup>2</sup> J.S. Levy, *The causes of war and the conditions of peace*, “Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.” 1(1998), p. 139–165, <<https://bit.ly/3r0aseC>>.

the outcome of warfare, the number of studies on the outcome of the Second Karabakh War is almost limited. However, several prominent researchers touched upon different aspects of the presented problem. Arthur A. Stein and Bruce M. Russett's research work is also devoted to the assessment of the outcomes of wars<sup>3</sup>. Tansa George Massoud discussed three critical, common factors which affect the termination of the war: military dimension, costs and terms of settlement. The findings show that although there exists no one theory or consensus on why and when wars end, there is a group of causes. However, the significance of each cause is likely to vary depending on the specific conditions of each war<sup>4</sup>.

Colin S. Gray points out the following levels of statecraft and war: political, strategic, operational and tactical. These levels overlap; their boundaries are sometimes so vague that they are not easy to clearly define. The researcher states that, failure at any level may negatively affect the other levels of war and lead to total defeat for a nation<sup>5</sup>. In this paper, we will focus on the first two levels (political and strategic) in order to get to grips with the factors that affect the outcome of the war. Retrospective analysis and synthesis are two main qualitative methods for developing this paper.

## **Comparative analysis of parties' pre-war strength**

Before the war breaks out, heads of states possess special information about the capabilities of their army. On the other hand, the intelligence agencies of the opposing party have almost no information about it. Sun Tzu also asserted that calculations are essential and necessary before the war is waged. The word "calculations" is better translated as "estimates" especially at operational and strategic levels. If estimates indicate the plan is not workable or too risky, then, the decision maker should not take any of necessary actions before all issues of risks are properly solved out. If not, he will put his force in jeopardy and will ruin his nation<sup>6</sup>. However, as the fighting continues, this secret information is revealed. At the same time, a specially trained team conducts continuous analysis of the daily activities of the opposing party, as well as changes in the political elite. The joint activity of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan with law enforcement agencies during the war can be considered a successful example of the work of such a team. The results of these analyses on the information front inevitably have an impact on subsequent events. From this point of view, the information and facts provided to local and foreign

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<sup>3</sup> A.A. Stein, B.M. Russett, *Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences*, in: *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research*, ed. Ted Robert Gurr, New York 1980, p. 399–422.

<sup>4</sup> T.G. Massoud, *War Termination*, November 1, 1996, <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033004009>>.

<sup>5</sup> Li-Sheng Kuo, *Sun Tzu's War Theory in the Twenty First Century*, Master's thesis U.S. Army War College 2007.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

audiences in Azerbaijan did not allow creating a gap in the information war and thus fake news, which was the main weapon of the Armenians, did not fill that gap. It should be noted that, the partially successful struggle of the Armenian government in the field of information for many years also failed in this war<sup>7</sup>. On the day, Armenia signed the capitulation act, a spokesman for the Defense Ministry said that he had deceived the people and that he had done so at the request of the ministry and therefore resigned.

Depending on the outcome of each battle, the conditions and requirements proposed, the head of state has an idea of the strength of the other side. Based on this idea, the leader makes assumptions about what steps the other side will take. The complexity of the matter is that all leaders know this process and try to use it at a strategic level. The Armenian government tried to achieve its goal by applying the same strategy. Thus, for many years there had been a tendency in Armenian society that Azerbaijanis did not claim to liberate their lands by war and tended to wait for the outcome of the negotiation process. The inadequate behavior of the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, irritating the Azerbaijani leadership and society was intended for it. Pashinyan was extremely self-satisfied. However, he could not imagine that his actions would have resulted in such a catastrophe. Asymmetric data on the strength of the parties can be obtained on the basis of unobserved factors (military capability, efficiency and reliability of the allies). As American Revolutionary War patriot Thomas Paine stated: *War involves a train of unforeseen and unsuspected circumstances that no human wisdom could calculate the end*<sup>8</sup>.

In an environment with a lack of information, trust (in the state, in the leader) it is also very important to determine the maneuvers of the state. Since it is not possible to measure confidence mathematically, researchers try to increase information resources based on the hypotheses of various local institutions or the observed abilities of the opposing party. According to Uzi Rubin, in comparison with Armenia, Azerbaijan had 50% superiority in tanks and there was an equality between the respective air forces in number and degree of obsolescence of their manned aircraft fleets. However, Azerbaijan had a clear edge in UAVs. While Armenia operated some Russian and locally made ISR UAVs, its unmanned fleet was no match for the variety, quantity and quality of Azerbaijan's UAV fleet, which was composed of numerous ISR types and at least two types of ground attack UAVs a Turkish missile-firing aircraft and an Israeli suicide drone, which Armenia had none<sup>9</sup>. According to the Global Fire Force 2020 Index, Azerbaijan had 5 times superiority in tanks and 50% in other systems, such as Air Defence, self-propelled artillery, towed artillery, MLRS and APC<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> K. Iskandarov, P. Gawliczek, *The impact of social media on the war. Case study: The Second Karabakh War*, in: *Information, Media, Security Environment*, edited by M. Banasik, P. Gawliczek, A. Rogozińska, Warsaw 2020, p. 162–178.

<sup>8</sup> Ch.M. Uesteehoff, *Military Air Power: The Cadre Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts*, Maxwell AFB, Air University Press 1990, p. 60.

<sup>9</sup> U. Rubin, *The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Milestone in Military Affairs*, "Mideast Security and Policy Studies" 2020, No. 184, <<https://bit.ly/3fTV0KG>>.

<sup>10</sup> *Global Firepower 2020*, <<https://www.globalfirepower.com>>.

Comparing the parties on the basis of abovementioned factors, we see that the Republic of Azerbaijan was significantly stronger. However, an assessment based on observable factors can be deceptive. The ArmedForces.eu claims that, the Armenian army had 529 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles and 436 guns and howitzers, and given the total number of enemy equipment destroyed, these figures seem more realistic. Security experts Thomas Baranec and Beskid Juraj state that, 170 tanks, 250 armored vehicles, and more than 360 guns and howitzers of the Armenian army were stationed in Karabakh<sup>11</sup>. According to the statistics of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2020, the number of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia was 44,800. It is estimated that, about 20,000–22,000 of the personnel were stationed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. It should be noted that, from the beginning to the end of the war, the Azerbaijani Army had destroyed about 400 tanks and other armored vehicles, 1,000 guns and howitzers, 80 air defense systems of the Armenian armed forces, most of which were illegally brought to the country<sup>12</sup>. Therefore, due to unobserved factors, there is a high probability of imbalance between the parties in the war. Armenians believed that they would win Azerbaijan at the expense of an illegal arsenal. However, the Azerbaijani Army dashed their hopes and destroyed most of the equipment they brought to the battlefield and took some as trophies.

### **Factors determining Azerbaijan's victory in the Second Karabakh War**

What factors affect the duration and termination of the war, once it is initiated? According to Rudolph J. Rummel, the war ends when a new balance of powers has been determined. A new balance is therefore a necessary and sufficient condition for termination. Rummel tries to answer the question of “What constitutes this new balance of powers?” in his research. According to him the first is a mutual balance between the interests of the conflicting parties – between wants, desires; between goals and intentions, as concrete as whose flag will be raised over a specific territory. A new balance then means that both parties better perceive their mutual interests and are willing to live with whatever satisfaction of interests that result from the confrontation. The second is the capabilities of each party to achieve their interests. Of great importance is the function of the conflict in measuring these relative capabilities: what previously was ambiguous, uncertain, is now clear as a result of this reality-testing. The third is the mutual appreciation of each other's wills or in

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<sup>11</sup> H. Pirişev, R. Tahirov, X. İskəndərov, *Müharibənin bitmə müddəti və sülh şərtləri (İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsinin nümunəsində)*, “Hərbi bilik” 2020, No. 4, p. 5–13.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

the case of force, capabilities and interests. Rummel states that this is the most elusive and ambiguous psychological variable<sup>13</sup>.

Three groups comprise the actors in war: the people, the government and the military – the Clausewitzian trinity. For war to be a viable policy means, the policy, the military instrument and the will of the people must be in consonance. Clausewitz maintained that a theory which ignored these elements would be useless<sup>14</sup>. Regarding the Clausewitzian trinity, in general, there were four facts that the political and military leadership of Armenia misjudged in this war:

**1. Political will of the Azerbaijani leadership.** During the tenure of all leaders, the Armenian Army attempted to seize additional land by conducting provocative operations. Armenians have always hoped that even if their provocative measures fail, foreign supporters would impose pressure on the Azerbaijani political leadership to thwart any counter-attack. After the outbreak of the counter-offensive operations on September 27, 2020, even the Azerbaijani public was concerned that the Azerbaijani Army would stop after liberating some certain areas. However, the political will demonstrated by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev from the first days of the Second Karabakh War resonated not only in the Armenian community, but also throughout the world. Having considered that Armenia is a CSTO country, Yerevan expected support primarily from member states, especially Russia. However, the Russian leadership, acknowledging that the operations were carried out on the territory of Azerbaijan, was satisfied only with the provision of weapons and equipment to Armenia. In fact, the neutrality of the Russian leadership from the beginning to the end of the war was the result of Azerbaijan's successful diplomacy. Historical examples show that global powers can take a different approach to the conflicts of the same nature. Kosovo is a typical example. The fact that the Republic of Armenia itself had not dared to recognize the "independence" of "Nagorno-Karabakh" was also the corollary of the successful policy pursued by Mr. Ilham Aliyev. It should be noted that Michael Saakashvili, who had the direct support of a global power, such as the United States, failed to achieve the same aim and after the August 2008 war, Russia recognized the "independence" of the separatist regimes in Georgia. Under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the glorious Azerbaijani Army has written a history that reflects the elements of a new generation of war. As Mr. President himself said: *We have created a new reality. Everyone must take this reality into account*<sup>15</sup>. Thus, President Ilham Aliyev presented a strategy for the modern world history in which diplomatic and military skills are perfectly synthesized. Having highlighted the miscalculations of the Armenian leadership, Svante E. Cornell stated: *Armenian leaders appear not to have understood that Aliyev's more assertive approach would affect Azerbaijan's most pressing problem, the unresolved*

<sup>13</sup> R.J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War: War, Power, Peace*, p. 165.

<sup>14</sup> M.C. Griffith, *War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice*, School of Advanced Military Studies 1992, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> H. Piriye, R. Tahirov, X. İskəndərov, *Müharibənin bitmə müddəti və sülh şərtləri (İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsinin nümunəsində)*, p. 5–13.

*conflict over and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, although Aliyev had many times signaled his great frustration over this situation*<sup>16</sup>.

**2. Military potential of the Azerbaijani Army.** One of the most successful steps taken by Azerbaijan in the arms trade in recent years has been to increase the range of weapons and diversify arms import. In general, based on mutual national interests, President Ilham Aliyev has formed a model that reflects multi-vector cooperation with the United States, the European Union, GUAM and CIS countries, Turkey, Iran, Israel and Pakistan. As a result of such a strategy, Azerbaijan has been able to obtain effective weapons systems not only from Russia, but also from developed countries such as Israel and Turkey. According to the analysis of 77 wars conducted by Steven Rosen, a country with a strong military (high revenue) has a 79% chance of success<sup>17</sup>. In the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan's military potential allowed it to achieve the best outcome – victory with minimal losses. If in traditional wars, the attacking side mobilized three times more forces, in this war the personnel of the Azerbaijani Army managed to advance to the depths, breaking the resistance of the enemy in a ratio of 1:1. In other words, it is not right to consider Armenia weak in terms of military power. If we look only at the number of weapons and equipment destroyed, we can substantiate this argument. The Azerbaijani Army won because it was much stronger and better prepared. Therefore, if there is no significant difference between the parties in terms of military power, the side with high-tech is very likely to win. From this point of view, one of the main reasons for Azerbaijan's victory was the presence of high-tech weapons systems in its arsenal, which the opposing side did not properly assess. The Washington Post writes: *The Karabakh war is the best example of how small and relatively cheap attack drones have changed the nature of traditional ground battles and air power-dominated wars*<sup>18</sup>. It should also be noted that as early as 2009, former US President Barack Obama adopted a strategy that reflected the joint efforts of the air force (including drones) and Special Forces units<sup>19</sup>. However, the military, which favored motorized infantry operations, was skeptical that the strategy would work. Therefore, although this strategy was adopted, it was not possible to implement it. Azerbaijan became the first country in the world to put this strategy into practice.

**3. The determination of the Azerbaijani soldier.** In general, after the First Karabakh War, the conventional wisdom among the Armenian society was that the Azerbaijani Army was not able to carry out large-scale operations. However, at the very beginning of the Second Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani Army broke through the enemy's 30-year-old fortifications in the occupied

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<sup>16</sup> S.E. Cornell, *How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan*, <<https://bit.ly/3BpUgXv>>.

<sup>17</sup> A.A. Stein, B.M. Russett, *Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences*, p. 399–422.

<sup>18</sup> *Azerbaijan's drones owned the battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh – and showed future of warfare*, <<https://bit.ly/3fihioj>>.

<sup>19</sup> H. Strachan, *Learning lessons from Afghanistan: Two imperatives*, "Parameters" 49(2019), No 3, p. 5–10.

territories, “the Ohanyan Line”, which was considered “impassable”, dismantled the ambush and advanced to Shusha in about six weeks in difficult terrain and climate. The Russian media described the Azerbaijani soldier who entered Shusha as follows: *It is difficult to say whether there has been such love for a state and homeland?! The Azerbaijani army rose to the top of the mountain, fighting with the dead comrade on the shoulder, covered in blood and sweat. They did not miss the wounded or the dead. They climbed up to Shusha without breathing...*<sup>20</sup>. Thus, based on the hypothesis put forward by Steven Rosen in the 80s of the last century, the selflessness of the Azerbaijani soldier in the victory perfectly complemented the military power. According to Rosen, there are two important elements for a country to win any war: military strength and the dedication of the soldier<sup>21</sup>. In other words, a country may have enough military power, but it can be defeated by a weaker country with more selfless soldiers. In one-fifth of the wars studied by Rosen, the weak (low-income state) party became victorious, 45% of which was due to the selflessness of the soldiers<sup>22</sup>. It seems that in some cases, the dedication of a soldier leads to victory by compensating the military power. After the Second Karabakh War, the victorious Azerbaijani soldiers were able to engrave their names in the list of the most selfless soldiers.

**4. Solidarity of the Azerbaijani people.** In history, no country without a unity of people and government has won a war. There are numerous historical cases in which the public appears all too eager for war, from the American Civil War to the eve of World War I in Europe to contemporary “identity wars”. There is substantial evidence that the outbreak of war, particularly victorious war, generally leads to a “rally round the flag” effect that enhances popular support for political leaders. Leaders often anticipate this “rally” effect and are sometimes tempted to undertake risky foreign ventures or hardline foreign policies in an attempt to bolster their internal political support<sup>23</sup>. That is exactly what happened in the Second Karabakh War. The unity of the Azerbaijani people in the war by stimulating operations on the frontline was a strong signal not only to the Armenian public, but also to their supporters. During the clash in Tovuz, which took place about two months before the outbreak of the Second Karabakh War, the fact that the people unequivocally supported their army and young citizens emboldened by the call of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief flocked to the offices of State Mobilization Service to register voluntarily was not properly assessed by the enemy. Thus, taking into account all the above facts, in any war, a country with stronger military strength will definitely win. The winner is the party that mobilizes more human resources than countries with similar military capabilities, which have high technology and no asymmetry in terms of technological capabilities. Only in some cases, high-level self-sacrifice and

<sup>20</sup> H. Piriyyev, R. Tahirov, X. İskəndərov, *Müharibənin bitmə müddəti və sülh şərtləri (İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsinin nümunəsində)*, p. 5–13.

<sup>21</sup> *Peace, War and Numbers*, ed. Bruce M. Russett, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications 1972.

<sup>22</sup> A.A. Stein, B.M. Russett, *Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences*, p. 399–422.

<sup>23</sup> J.S. Levy, *The causes of war and the conditions of peace*, p. 139–165.

endurance compensate for the weak military strength and lead to victory, which Armenia did not have such a chance during the war.

Svante E. Cornell states the above-mentioned factors in the following way: *The sheer scale of the territories Armenia occupied ensured that neither Azerbaijan's leadership nor its society would come to terms with the situation. Instead, a powerful sense of revanchism built in Azerbaijan and Baku invested a serious portion of the country's windfall oil revenue into the country's military. The growing disparity between the two countries became increasingly untenable: it was like a string that can only be pulled so far without breaking. Armenia responded by deepening its military dependence on Russia, which it saw as a guarantor of its military advances*<sup>24</sup>.

James Schneider adds a media to the Clausewitzian trinity as the fourth actor. This aspect of the Second Karabakh War has been scrutinized in different papers<sup>25</sup> <sup>26</sup>. It should be noted that, Azerbaijan used the media to build popular support by keeping the public informed and boosting their patriotism, it successfully thwarted the disinformation campaign waged by Erevan and its foreign supporters, provided reliable counterarguments and cemented its position in the international arena through feeding the media with updated information. If Azerbaijan had not been able to prevent or at least mitigate the effects of Armenian disinformation campaign waged through media during the Second Karabakh War and afterwards, the repercussions for Baku would have been unimaginable<sup>27</sup>.

Having considered the perennial fortifications and terrain, the pace of progress of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in the Second Karabakh War can be compared with the progress of the coalition forces in the First Gulf War (January–February 1991) and the first phase of the Iraq War (March–April 2003) and the effectiveness with the “Six Days” War (Third Arab–Israeli) (June 5–10, 1967) amongst the 40 wars over the past 120 years that we analyzed in our research. From this point of view, the 44-day Second Karabakh War will be studied for many years and will be shown as an example to future generations.

Regarding the outcomes of the war, the most distinct question is, whether the parties met the expectations in the Second Karabakh War or not. It is clear-cut that Armenian side had high, at the same time delusional expectations about the war, since they claimed more territories. However, Armenian strategy came to naught. Azerbaijan is a victorious party. In any case, the question arises, whether it was the victory that Azerbaijani leadership and people wanted.

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<sup>24</sup> S.E. Cornell, *How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan*, <<https://bit.ly/3BpUgXv>>.

<sup>25</sup> K. Iskandarov, P. Gawliczek, *The impact of social media on the war. Case study: The Second Karabakh War*, p. 162–178.

<sup>26</sup> X. İskəndərov, *Ermənistanın dezinformasiya kampaniyasında medianın yeri və rolu (İkinci Qarabağ Müharibəsinin nümunəsində)*, “Hərbi bilik” 2021, No 3, p. 40–50.

<sup>27</sup> K. Iskandarov, P. Gawliczek, *The impact of social media on the war. Case study: The Second Karabakh War*, p. 162–178.

James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer suggested the following requirements for effective termination:

- effective political control;
- clear and limited political objectives;
- Force postures to confine the activities of the adversary;
- war-fighting concepts and strategies intended to encourage early termination<sup>28</sup>.

We may add “the technological superiority” as the fifth requirement to the list. It is abundantly clear that, Azerbaijan successfully met all these requirements and pulled off the termination of war after 44 day active fighting. The changes in strategic aims are needed to guide the war to termination, either through achievement of success in battle or through negotiations reaching an overlap between one side’s minimum acceptable gains and the other’s maximum acceptable losses<sup>29</sup>. Azerbaijan’s victory is decisive, however by involving the third party (namely Russia) in the negotiation process simply precipitated the termination of war.

Wars are terminated by one of two means: through a negotiated settlement or through unilateral action. Paul Pillar allocated these two means into six more specific categories as shown in Table 1<sup>30</sup>.

**Table 1.** Means of war termination

Means of war Termination	Explicit Agreement	Status of Peace
Negotiated before Armistice (NB)	By both belligerents	Both parties remain
Negotiated after Armistice (NA)	By both belligerents	Both parties remain
<b>Negotiated by Third Party (NIO)t</b>	<b>By both belligerents</b>	<b>Both parties remain</b>
Unilateral – Capitulation (C)	Imposed by victor	Both parties remain
Unilateral – Extermination/Expulsion (E)	None	One party remains*
Unilateral – Withdrawal (W)	None	Both parties remain**

t Agreement drafted by third party (either another state or an International Organization like the UN).

\* Both parties remain at the end of the war, but conditions may impose removal of defeated government.

\*\*The defeated political entity and force are destroyed or expelled as frequently occurs in civil wars.

States may negotiate directly with each other or through a third party. A negotiated armistice or cease-fire may occur before or after the termination of hostilities. Unilateral action may take the form of capitulation, extermination/expulsion or withdrawal<sup>31</sup>. For instance, in World War II, the termination of war

<sup>28</sup> J.L. Foster, G.D. Brewer, *And the clocks were striking thirteen: The termination of war*, The Rand Corporation and Yale University 1976, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> M.C. Griffith, *War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice*, p. 8.

<sup>30</sup> S. Allotey and et al., *Planning and execution of conflict termination*, Air Command and Staff College 1995, p. 15–16.

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem.

was predicated on total defeat and unconditional surrender of the enemies<sup>32</sup>. With regard to the Second Karabakh War unilateral action is excluded, since it ended on November 10, 2020 with the signing of a tripartite ceasefire statement. Therefore, our focus is on the third version. The statement was signed by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation. The BBC's Orla Querin notes that *the ceasefire statement of 10 November 2020 was a victory for Azerbaijan in general, a capitulation agreement for Armenia*<sup>33</sup>. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, stated that this statement was unimaginably painful for both himself and his people<sup>34</sup>. Nine provisions are reflected in the statement<sup>35</sup>. Most of these provisions have been implemented and the rest are in the offing. Emphasizing the geostrategic importance of the statement, former US Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza said: *The statement can contribute to peace, prosperity and stability in the entire region by ending one of the world's long-standing conflicts and stimulating a number of other diplomatic and economic agreements*<sup>36</sup>. It can be concluded that all this was possible due to the military victory of Azerbaijan. As noted by President Ilham Aliyev, our military success has allowed us to make our demands in the political arena. Even the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan once said that "there was no diplomatic solution to the conflict"<sup>37</sup>.

## Conclusion

A plethora of factors affected the outcome of the Second Karabakh War and facilitated its termination. The Clausewitzian trinity delineated in the paper, as well as James Schneider's media factor was crucial for Azerbaijan in achieving a decisive victory. Even though this war shattered Armenia and exhausted its army, the outcomes promise more prosperous future not only for Azerbaijan, but also for the whole region. All countries in the region can take advantage of the opportunities arising from the statement of November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2020, which will serve to expand regional cooperation and increase mutual trust. The absolute victory in the Second Karabakh War not only resulted in the restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but also contributed to the growth of its prestige in the international arena and the strengthening of its geostrategic position. Now what Azerbaijan needs to do, is to consolidate this victory and eliminate any threat, which undermines its territorial integrity and international status.

<sup>32</sup> M.C. Griffith, *War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice*, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> H. Piriye, R. Tahirov, X. İskəndərov, *İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsi. Hərbi-siyasi təhlil*, Bakı 2022, p. 118.

<sup>34</sup> *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia sign Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal*, <<https://bbc.in/3tp9Iil>>.

<sup>35</sup> *İlham Əliyev xalqa müraciət edib*, <<https://bit.ly/3nHNqHU>>.

<sup>36</sup> M. Bryza, *Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal could be the diplomatic breakthrough the region needs*, <<https://bit.ly/2YKJk4A>>.

<sup>37</sup> H. Piriye, R. Tahirov, X. İskəndərov, *İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsi. Hərbi-siyasi təhlil*, p. 120.

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**TERMINATION OF WAR: FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME  
(IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR)**

SUMMARY

Termination of war has become one of the most important aspects of modern warfare for the last couple decades. There are a number of factors presented by the historians, military analysts and defence policy critics, which affect the outcome of the war. The presented paper describes the comparative analysis of pre-war strength of Azerbaijan and Armenia, indicates the factors leading to Azerbaijan's resounding victory and Armenia's defeat in the Second Karabakh War. The authors highlight four generalized factors in order to shed light on Azerbaijan's victory. The paper examines the means of war termination and associates only one of them – "Negotiated by Third Party" with the outcome of the Second Karabakh War.

**KEYWORDS:** "War termination" theory, armed forces, victory, defeat, concession

