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Hope Restored: the United Empire Loyalist Settlement in British North America, 1775–1812

Słowa kluczowe: Lojaliści, Kanada, prowincje, wojna o niepodległość, przesiedlenia, Zjednoczone Królestwo

History is the version of past events that people have decided to agree upon.

Napoleon Bonaparte
than about the Patriotic one. Another point of interest may be the hesitation (reluctance?) with which the Canadians treat the United Empire Loyalists as the “founding fathers” of their state.

The paper addresses the following research questions:

1. What were the numbers of Loyalists who arrived and settled in Canada?
2. What was the racial, social, economic and political make-up of the “Canadian” Loyalists?
3. Why did they choose Canada as their destination?
4. What was the approach of the Canadian authorities and the UK government to the United Empire Loyalists’ relocation and settlement initiatives?
5. Were the Loyalists in any way assisted in their exodus to Canada? If so, by whom and why?
6. Where did they settle in Canada, how and why there?
7. How did the Loyalists accommodate themselves among the locals? Did they integrate?
8. How were the Loyalists organised in their new destinations?
9. What influence did the Loyalists have on the then contemporary Canada? What long-term impact did they exercise on Canadian social, political and economic realities?

Introduction

The American War of Independence of 1775–1783—a.k.a. the American Revolution—is a commonly well-known course of events. Its outcome is well-popularized, especially by the American side of the conflict. The motives and motivation of the American Patriots striving for the United States’ independence have quite explicitly been analysed and examined academically, not to mention the countless pop-culture and Hollywood creations dwelling on the topic. Still, in the thirteen colonies, there were people much less supportive and enthusiastic about the independence from Britain. Even more so, a significant proportion of the colonists openly demonstrated their loyalty to the King and actively participated in the restoration of the status quo ante bellum. They became known as the United Empire Loyalists. As the Patriot faction won, the presence of the Loyalists in the newly-emerged United States created a highly uncomfortable situation. First, they could contribute to the split of the “society under construction”. Secondly, their scepticism towards the new

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direction in the history of the land, criticism towards republicanism, sentiments for the Crown and discrepant political and social views – overtly manifested during the war – did not promise harmonious cooperation with the victorious Patriots.

In such a complicated socio-economic-political situation, both factions had to make difficult decisions and hard choices. Besides, the loyalist attitudes were not limited to the Anglophone, white, protestant males; such conduct applied to other, non-Anglophone, colonists (e.g. of German or Dutch stock), women, Native tribes and even Blacks.

Eventually, most Loyalists – despite common stigmatisation, discrimination, stalking and persecution from the Patriots\(^2\) – decided to remain where they lived. They hoped for normalisation after the peace treaty. Many were too deeply rooted and/or too-well accommodated to leave their lives and belongings behind, or so they thought. Some, however, did decide to relocate. The most prosperous among the emigres headed for the United Kingdom and the Caribbean Islands hoping to restore their businesses, fortunes and connections\(^3\). Others – usually of more modest status, income or business and life prospects – headed for Canada. They constituted the largest and most influential group among the UEL exiles.

1. The United Empire Loyalists in Canada

1.1 Destinations and statistics

As regards the racial make-up and numbers of the Loyalists who left the thirteen colonies, the statistics are loose and not entirely reliable. In the final decades of the 18\(^{th}\) century, the mode of registering people coming to and living in North America was far from explicit and exact. Additionally, the information available as for the nationality or religious affiliations of the Loyalists is based on their own declarations rather than anything else. Thus, the margin for speculation and uncertainty is substantial and researchers differ in opinion on the matters\(^4\).

Nevertheless, certain general statistics can be established. Figure 1 presents the rough national and racial composition of the United Empire Loyalists.

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\(^4\) Cf.: the data provided by Christopher Moore’s *The Loyalists: Revolution, Exile, Settlement*, Maya Jasanoff’s *Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire* or Edgar McInnis’ *Canada: A Political and Social History* and *The Unguarded Frontier: A history of American-Canadian Relations*. 
As indicated above, the ultimate majority of the UELs were of European stock (approx. 80%). The Blacks and Natives constituted margins of ca. 10% each. Among the Loyalists of the European origin, the English were the largest group (ca. 60%); nevertheless, not as decidedly dominating as in the ratio between the whites and others. The remaining – significant – proportion (ca. 40%) were the Scottish-Irish, German, Scottish and Dutch Loyalists. Regarding the Black Loyalists, the fact 92% of them were free seems the most striking. As for the Loyalist Indians, The Iroquois Confederacy constituted – by far – the largest group. The figures suggest it was the Blacks and Iroquois Indians, plus the above listed nationals, who – aside the English – supported the British monarch most loyally.

In numbers, it is roughly estimated the Loyalists may have constituted 20–25% of the thirteen colonies’ original population. Assuming the colonies had around 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 inhabitants, the Loyalist population may have oscillated between 400,000 and 625,000 people. Out of those, only around 100,000 decided to leave the United States during and immediately after the American War of Independence. Figure 2 illustrates the key Loyalist immigration destinations.

Figure 2: The main Loyalist immigration destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>ca. 13,000 (incl. 5,000 Blacks)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>ca. 5,000 whites</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jamaica &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>ca. 6,000</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>British North America: Nova Scotia &amp; New Brunswick Quebec Prince Edward Island (St John Island then)</td>
<td>ca. 36,000 ca. 6–10,000 whites + ca. 5,000 Iroquois ca. 2,000</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>ca. 77,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 W. Stewart Wallace, The United Empire..., 62–63.
Hope Restored: the United Empire Loyalist Settlement...

The two outstandingly eminent destinations appear the British North America (ca. 53,000) and the United Kingdom (ca. 13,000). However the disproportion between the two is substantial, let alone the other destinations – ca. 11,000 in total. They – together – constitute a number below the UK immigration. After the war, in 1790s, around 20–30,000 so-called *Late Loyalists* poured into the Province of Upper Canada (Ontario). In several respects, those ‘Loyalists’ – apart from being emigrants from the United States – had quite little in common with the wartime emigres in the racial, social or professional senses.

The statistic informs about the economic, financial and social standing of the UELs. The richest, best-connected and most influential 16% fled to the UK; the mid-level, more local business-people, tradesmen, merchants and artisans moved to the south – Florida, Jamaica and the Caribbean. The majority, 68%, of the less wealthy, more locally-rooted and racially diverse Loyalists immigrated to Canada. They did not have chances, perspectives, prospects or opportunities to start a more successful life in the faraway UELs’ destinations. Alternatively, they proved to be the most ‘North American’ among the UELs by nature. The 36,000 Loyalists who arrived in Canada did make a difference. They constituted a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of British North America. Assuming Canada had ca. 166,012 people, the UELs made approx. 22% of the land’s population in 1784.

1.2 Canada as a Loyalist destination

The reasons for which Canada became a popular and common Loyalist end point were manifold. They prove the complexity and multi-facetedness of the Loyalists’ repatriation. The geographical proximity to the Loyalists’ places of origin appears the most arresting among the motives. The repatriated were primarily British subjects originally settled in Pennsylvania, New York and Vermont. Assuming the war situation was temporary, and hoping the British would win the conflict, the UELs sought secure places to wait until the matters would get back to normal.

Additionally, numerous Loyalists took active part in the struggle against the Patriots. Hence, they either joined the British army or created loyalist militia units. Obviously, the main purpose of such activities was to fight the American rebels to protect the Loyalists’ estates and belongings; naturally, with the hope of the future return. Hence, they needed

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to operate in the closest vicinity of their homes. Canada served such purposes perfectly. She provided shelter and willing support of the locals – afraid of the American invaders and in need for reinforcements to defend the provinces. From the military viewpoint, the Loyalists knew the area well, which made the combat easier, safer and more convenient for them and for the British alike. Moreover, the UELs made well-motivated, experienced and eager military people.

Another reason for the Loyalist relocation to Canada was logistic. Comparing to the other immigration destinations, e.g. the United Kingdom or Caribbean Islands, travel costs, chances of maintaining contact with the left-behind relatives and friends, hometown sentiments, adaptation to the new circumstances and conditions etc. made Canada an ultimate favourite. It was closer, and the surroundings were similar; so were the relations, customs, climate and language.

Once it became evident the British would lose the war, the Loyalists received a clear signal from London that – in Canada – they would be materially, financially, politically and economically supported to a much greater extent than elsewhere\(^\text{10}\). Much as Britain or the Caribbean were attractive to the wealthiest UELs, Canada offered brand-new opportunities and possibilities to the – decidedly more numerous – less affluent. The vast, unexplored, uninhabited Canadian frontier offered unmatched acreage of land available to a practically unlimited number of emigres\(^\text{11}\). Additionally, such a solution spared London the need to accommodate in Britain substantial groups of underfunded and desperate immigrants. Apart from the financial and logistic aspect, waves of UELs arriving at the British ports would be bad for the morale of the society – already strained by the lost war with the US and France.

Furthermore, the newcomers from the thirteen colonies, as used to self-governing, active and energetic people, could hope for opportunities to organise their new places of settlement in their own ways, values, political stances and future plans. That was impossible, or at least significantly harder, in the well-established, populous Central American colonies, let alone the United Kingdom\(^\text{12}\). In an obvious way, the UK Parliament, King George III, as well as the governors of the Canadian provinces bordering with the rebelled colonies, realised the above reasons and Canada’s attractiveness for the Loyalists. The political decision makers knew Canada would need to absorb by far the largest number of the UELs and – in a longer perspective – assimilate them as “new Canadians”.

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Soon – in all destinations – the Loyalists started lobbying for damages and compensations for the property lost during the war. As the Paris Peace Treaty provisions did not oblige the American party to provide any refunds, the UELs – naturally – turned to the British government. The lobbying proved effective; shortly, a special British act was passed to address the issue of compensations. It was largely composed as a sublime incentive for the Loyalist settlement in Canada. A “Loyalist ranking” was developed to establish the issue of land grants, size and extent of assistance etc.:

**First Class.** Those who had rendered service to Great Britain. **Second Class.** Those who had borne arms for Great Britain. **Third Class.** Uniform Loyalists. **Fourth Class.** Loyal British subjects – residents in Great Britain. **Fifth Class** Loyalists who had taken oath to the American States, but afterward joined the British. **Sixth Class.** Loyalists who had borne arms for the American States, and afterwards joined the British navy or army.

Additionally, a special board was established to investigate particular cases individually and appropriate corresponding grants and refunds to those eligible. The total number of the Loyalists who claimed for remuneration for the lost property was 5,072. However, 924 had to resign for they failed to provide appropriate grounding for their claims. The amount the British government assigned to compensations was staggering £3,294,452. Yet, the procedures took time and the Loyalists had to wait (sometimes for years) to receive the money. Nevertheless, the sums themselves, London’s swift reaction and the following – slow but sure – execution of the damages proved the British government’s loyalty, good intentions and serious treatment of the Loyalists.

Apart from all the above, and perhaps most curiously, the main motive for those who remained in North America, i.e. the vast majority of the Loyalists – be it in the British North America or the United States – was quite unique and, fascinatingly, uniform for most UELs, regardless their social standing, wealth etc. As Jack L. Granatstein put it:

The Loyalists [...] were [...] North Americans (emphasis mine – M.B.), citizens of the New World, [...] who were in every way the same as those who had driven them off their

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lands. Their exile […] was a testimony to their determination to have the best of both worlds – loyalty to the empire and a place in the New World […] so full of opportunity\(^\text{18}\).

The Loyalist repatriation to Canada was a win-win solution for all the three interested parties – the British government (demonstrating care and easy, low-cost accommodation of the loyal émigré subjects), the Canadian provinces (population boost, provision of ready-made border defenders) and the Loyalists themselves.

2. Loyalist settlement in Canada

2.1. Nova Scotia

Nova Scotia – the most popular with the UELs Canadian destination – was in a tough position. Until the last phase of the war, there had been no larger groups of Loyalists there. It was on the conclusion of the *Paris Peace Treaty* (1783) – when it turned out for many the relocation was necessary – that the Loyalists flooded the province\(^\text{19}\).

The situation was becoming urgent; in 1783 alone, Nova Scotia experienced a colossal – on the local scale – rate of the Loyalist shipment\(^\text{20}\). Most predictably, the majority directed themselves to the already-inhabited and colonised peninsular areas of the province. Bearing in mind the population disproportions (ca. 6,000–10,000 Loyalist newcomers and only ca. 17,000 locals), little wonder the Nova Scotians did not like the state of affairs, did not trust the Loyalists and were afraid of an alteration to the social configuration of the province. Also, the locals feared the loss of their political power and economic domination in their own colony\(^\text{21}\). Therefore, the governor of Nova Scotia, John Parr, did face a true challenge.

It was instantly apparent the newcomers could not share the already colonised and settled area as it was physically unable to accommodate them. The common, straightforward hostility of the locals and ostensibly demonstrated distrust and suspicion towards the Loyalists did not help either\(^\text{22}\). To head off the social unrest looming ahead, Governor Parr needed to find a way to “generate” new land to settle the Loyalists. If he had not, the province would have disintegrated and collapsed due to the animosities, hostility and lack of development opportunities for both the locals and emigres. Fortunately for the province, John Parr – a most energetic administrator – had been nominated to his post.


\(^{19}\) W. Stewart Wallace, *The United Empire…*, 91.

\(^{20}\) Ibidem, 55.


\(^{22}\) Ibidem.
in 1782, i.e. before the great Loyalist influx actually happened. Therefore, luckily, he had some precious time to prepare for action.

The solution the Nova Scotia Governor found was the escheat procedure. It was, legally:

a) a situation in which property or money becomes the property of the state if the owner dies without a will and without legal heirs;

b) property or money for which no owner can be found and for that reason becomes the property of the state;

c) [in English feudal law] the reversion of lands to the lord of the fee when there are no heirs capable of inheriting under the original grant;

d) the reversion of property to the crown in England […] when there are no legal heirs.

John Parr realised there was quite an acreage in Nova Scotia left alone and unused for years – particularly in the continental part of the colony. In numerous cases, the owners or tenants had died, left for the thirteen colonies or elsewhere, or vanished without a trace. Due to the escheat procedure, over 2.5 million acres of land were made available for the land-hungry Loyalists.

Nova Scotia saw the first great fleet of ships transporting the Loyalists on 4 May 1783 in Port Roseway. Regardless of Gov. Parr’s preparations, the local administrators were actually taken aback by the landing; hence, they kept gathering the resources to proceed with the townships for the Loyalists until 20–23 May 1783, when the plans were ready. Unsurprisingly, Port Roseway soon became bigger than Halifax, the province’s capital. Before long, due to The Loyalists’ intensive and extensive efforts, John Parr’s administrative skills and financial and material support from Britain, the landscape of Nova Scotia changed drastically. New Loyalist townships kept emerging one after another. Pioneering Shelburne was soon followed by Windsor, Antigonish, Digby and others.

As London approved of the escheat, the land was becoming swiftly regained. In the spring of 1783, the Governor started swift preparations for the Loyalists’ arrival. In consultation with the British government, J. Parr introduced generous plot grants for the newcomers. Every family head was supposed to receive 100 acres (81 ha), plus extra

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25 Christopher Moore, op. cit., 163.
27 Christopher Moore, op. cit., 166.
28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem.
50 acres for every family member. If the family members were involved in the pro-British military, depending on the ranks and merits, extra acreage was added. Hence, an average 2+3 family could hope for ca. 300–500 acres (240–400 ha)\(^{30}\). The offer was far more lavish than the Loyalists could originally expect. Importantly, the acreage was frequently larger than the immigrants’ plots back in the US\(^{31}\). Finally, the future was to prove the colony administrators’ honest and earnest intentions, and the land titles were genuinely and properly secure. Unfortunately, not always and not everywhere was it a common practice.

The plot grants were followed by further incentives; this time, directly from London as the British government, had realised Nova Scotia’s economic potential was unsatisfactory to serve the UELs needs. Due to the lack of capability to handle the Loyalists effectively, the province became known under the nickname “Nova Scarcity”\(^{32}\). Hence, London obliged itself to assist the Loyalists with food, tools, seeds, timber, clothes and other necessities for the first year of settlement until the first harvest in the new place. Interestingly, the UELs settlement started unbelievable economic boom of the province. Local industries and services flourished and prospered on an unprecedented scale\(^{33}\). It applied specifically to the food-processing (e.g. farming, fishing), logging businesses and associated services. Accountancy, transportation and craft services also thrived\(^{34}\).

Governor Parr’s handling the issue of the Loyalist immigration proved how effective the local administration was in that critical situation. London also manifested its good will to assist the newcomers and the Loyalists proved a desired and valuable new element in the province.

2.2. The making of New Brunswick

However, the Loyalist settlement in peninsular Nova Scotia did not provide enough room for the further waves of newcomers. Hence, they decided to explore and settle in the continental areas of the province, in the west, towards the St John River and Bay Fundy\(^{35}\). Originally, the initiative was favourably received by the Governor and the Nova Scotians alike. In that area, the Loyalists were perceived as a welcome buffer between the locals – Canadians – and the hostile Americans\(^{36}\).

The St John River area soon proved attractive; the land was abundant and fertile, the climate tolerable and the – infrequent – Natives not overly hostile\(^{37}\). As Britain equipped

\(^{30}\) Ibidem, 164.

\(^{31}\) W. Stewart Wallace, *The United Empire...*, 56.

\(^{32}\) Laura Neilson Bonikowsky, op. cit.

\(^{33}\) W. Stewart Wallace, *The United Empire...*, 57–60.

\(^{34}\) Ibidem.

\(^{35}\) Ibidem, 57.

\(^{36}\) Ibidem, 168.

\(^{37}\) Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, op. cit., 51.
and assisted the new colonists in their St John River quest, by the autumn of 1783, the area had been settled by ca. 14,000 Loyalists; others were still arriving. Curiously, the place appeared attractive to the Nova Scotians, too. More and more frequently, they started settling the newly acquired lands alongside with the UELs.38

Nonetheless, after the initial enthusiasm, the firm establishment of the Loyalist element in the St John River and Bay Fundy areas, the emigres became perceived by the Halifax authorities as a certain threat. Nova Scotians quickly noticed the Loyalist newcomers had their well-defined political profiles and ambitions. Among others, they aspired to governmental positions; John Wentworth, one of the Loyalist activists, was promoted by the emigres as a candidate to the governorship. As the UELs became the majority in the province, it may have meant the irreversible makeover of the local social and political arrangement.39 Such a situation was – imaginably – most uncomfortable for the province’s authorities.

Uncomfortable as Governor Parr’s situation was, the Loyalists themselves comprehended well a long-range, fruitful, harmonious and trouble-free co-existence with Nova Scotians under one flag was unlikely.40 The Loyalists lobbied in London for the creation of their own – “exclusively Loyalist” – province. The moment could not have been better-chosen. The UELs’ lobby in Britain was actively supportive. Gov. J. Parr had no objections either; contrary, he seized an opportunity to regulate the Nova Scotia population matters in favour of the locals and restore the old order of the matters; thus securing his own political position too.

The British parliament proved positively disposed towards the province-making initiative.41 At that juncture, London took the stance a larger number of small colonies in British North America would be easier to administer, control, tax and defend. Additionally, Governor Parr found it more and more distressing that – owing to the limited assistance Nova Scotia could provide the Loyalists with and the delays in shipments and land grants – he was swiftly becoming unpopular among the continental Loyalists in his own province.42 Thus, by June 1784, the Loyalist province of New Brunswick had been established.43 Spem Reduxit (‘Hope was Restored’) became the New Brunswick motto.44

39 Christopher Moore, op. cit., 169.
41 Edelgard E. Mahant, Graeme S. Mount, op. cit., 21.
42 W. Stewart Wallace, The United Empire..., 78.
44 Tories in the Revolution..., 9.
The same year, the elections to the provincial Legislative Assembly – dominated by the Loyalists – took place. The name of the province was chosen to honour King George III (among others, Prince-elector of Brunswick-Lüneburg)\textsuperscript{45}. Thomas Carleton became the province’s first governor. Soon, in 1789, he regulated the land titles inheritance and the census matters with \textit{Lord Dorchester Declaration}, which assured the Loyalists their land property and future of their families were safe\textsuperscript{46}. Still, much as the Loyalists had been distrustful and reluctant towards Nova Scotians so far, they proved surprisingly open in New Brunswick. Numerous Canadians, alongside the UELs, were nominated to governmental positions\textsuperscript{47}.

The first decades of the province’s history brought swift and intensive economic growth, mainly owing to timber industry and shipbuilding. Although the harsh climate and hardships of the frontier realities discouraged many – around 10% of the 14,000 New Brunswick Loyalist settlers eventually decided to return to the United States – the population grew significantly, largely due to migrations from the other parts of Canada and the US as well as from Scotland and Ireland (esp. in 1840s and 1850s). By 1812, the original population of ca 14,000 settlers grew to ca. 36,000 inhabitants (+150%).

The establishment of New Brunswick, its development and continuity until nowadays prove a number of points. Firstly, Governor Parr – again – turned out a visionary politician and administrator. Agreeing to and supporting the Loyalist attempts at their own province, he regulated the social issues in Nova Scotia, secured his own political position and stabilised the province in the “old ways”. Secondly, the Loyalists proved determination, consequence and excellent organisational and administrative skills. They built a brand-new Canadian province from scratch, introduced their own ways there and secured the province’s economic and social stability for the years to come.

Finally, the British government, showed the necessary flexibility, good will and initiative. London ceded the procedures on Gov. Parr and Nova Scotia not to get rid of the problem. Contrary, it was done to demonstrate the Crown’s trust in the local administrators and to send a signal the locals know best what was good for them. Such an approach was to prove fundamental in the later shaping of the Canadian independence and the relations with the UK. The British politicians learnt the lesson from the American War of Independence all too well.


\textsuperscript{47} W. Stewart Wallace, \textit{The United Empire...}, 79.
2.3. Quebec

From the beginning of the American Revolution, the Loyalists from the colonies of New York, Pennsylvania and Vermont – commonly re-settled to the Mohawk Valley – were actively involved in the military operations against the Patriots. As the UELs were pushed out of their settlements, under the leadership of Alan Maclean, they started pouring into the Province of Quebec. Interestingly, it was a mutually welcome situation since the Quebec Governor, General Sir Frederick Haldimand, needed all the available resources and reinforcements to guard his land against the American raids. And Maclean’s Loyalists were eager to join the Quebeckers in their stand against the Americans. The same can be said about the Iroquois, also pushed by the Patriots north from their lands, which made them all-too-natural Loyalists and Quebeckers’ allies48.

Thus, since 1776, the Quebeckers were assisted by the growing Loyalist militia rangers and Iroquois’ parties in checking the American efforts aimed at invading Canada. Throughout the conflict, such an assistance proved significant as the Loyalist-Indian provincial troops engaged quite a portion of the US Continental Army, making it impossible for the units to be used elsewhere. Initially, General Haldimand did not believe in the quality of the Loyalist militia and their Iroquois allies. Nonetheless, by 1783, he had concluded their contribution was actually decisive, which disposed him positively towards the difficult decisions concerning Loyalist refugees after the conflict49.

Throughout the whole war, both the Loyalists and Indians hoped to regain their lands, i.e. Mohawk Valley and the Iroquois Country respectively. However, in the light of the Paris Peace Treaty (1783) provisions, the return home proved unlikely50. The document did not mention the Loyalists or their case in any place, which immediately started the Loyalists to petition London, with little effect, however51. The only provisions within the Peace Treaty indirectly concerning the UELs’ property were the Articles 5th and 6th, in which the US Congress was urged/suggested to oblige itself to lobby among state legislatures to consider compensation for the British subjects:

_Article 5th:_

It is agreed […] Congress shall […] recommend it to the […] States to provide for the Restitution of all Estates, Rights, and Properties, which have been confiscated belonging to real British Subjects; and also of the Estates, Rights, and Properties of Persons resident

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48 Ibidem, 171.
51 Ibidem.
in Districts in the Possession on his Majesty’s Arms and who have not borne Arms against the said United States. And that Persons of any other Description shall have free Liberty to go to any Part or Parts of any of the thirteen United States and therein to remain twelve Months unmolested in their Endeavors to obtain the Restitution of such of their Estates – Rights & Properties as may have been confiscated. […]

Congress shall […] recommend to the several States a Reconsideration and Revision of all Acts or Laws regarding the Premises, so as to render the said Laws or Acts perfectly consistent not only with Justice and Equity but with that Spirit of Conciliation which on the Return of the Blessings of Peace should universally prevail.

[…] Congress shall […] recommend to the […] States […] the Estates, Rights, and Properties of such last mentioned Persons shall be restored to them, they refunding to any Persons who may be now in Possession the Bona fide Price […] which such Persons may have paid on purchasing any of the said Lands, Rights, or Properties since the Confiscation.

Article 6th:
That there shall be no future Confiscations made nor any Prosecutions commenced against any Person or Persons for, or by Reason of the Part, which he or they may have taken in the present War, and that no Person shall on that Account suffer any future Loss or Damage, either in his Person, Liberty, or Property;52

Obviously, the Americans agreed to such a wording and terms eagerly, as “recommendations” were not binding. On the one hand, the US Congress could not be coerced to exercise the agreements; on the other, the American signatories of the Treaty could not be held responsible for the failure in that respect. For the Loyalists, it meant their estates and belongings left behind in the thirteen colonies were lost; there was no place to return to any more.

During the War of Independence, the Loyalist rangers fought the Americans in the western and northern areas of the frontier. That made them operate all over the Quebec-Patriot lands border, which brought about a curious phenomenon. The Loyalist troops and scouts operating west of Quebec, around the Great Lakes, kept reporting Governor Haldimand on attractive lands, good soil, wealth of timber, favourable climate, convenient waterways and – generally – good prospects for colonisation of those frontier areas. The exploration was continued throughout the whole war. In 1779, reports from a Loyalist Captain, Walter Butler, attracted F. Haldimand’s attention to the matter. Then, a regular

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reconnaissance raid, carried out by another Loyalist soldier group, under Sergeant John Hay (1783), confirmed the so-far knowledge on the lands\textsuperscript{53}.

The Governor started considering the upper country colonisation in a more serious manner\textsuperscript{54}. Realising the level of the Loyalists’ frustration with the Peace Treaty provisions and the UELs’ hatred towards the Yankees, and to avoid mutual raids and border conflicts, General F. Haldimand wanted to have the UELs further to the west, far from the northern American settlements. Hence, the emigres were commonly inspired to settle as far from Montreal as Gaspe Peninsula in the east and Niagara and Kingston in the west\textsuperscript{55}.

In 1783, the Loyalist reconnaissance reports proved invaluable; the Peace Treaty of 1783 provisions meant Mohawk Valley and the Iroquois Country were lost to the newly-created United States\textsuperscript{56}. The British government – completely unaware of the specifics of the local-Loyalist-Indian relations – ceded the lands, including the northern forts, from which the Loyalists had operated, e.g. Niagara or Detroit, to Americans.

Worse still, the fact the British King ceded to the US the lands of the Iroquois created significant outrage among the latter. They perceived themselves as free and independent people, certainly not King George III’s subjects. Thus, the Indians could not comprehend how the monarch dared give away the property which had not belonged to the United Kingdom\textsuperscript{57}.

Governor Haldimand perfectly understood the seriousness of the situation. He wrote letters to London, lobbied to change the peace provisions and kept convincing the British decisionmakers to reverse the situation. He used all the available argumentation to support the case of the Loyalists and their Iroquois allies, “[…] by their (white Loyalists and Iroquois – M. B.) allegiance we have hitherto, with a handful of troops, held possession of the Upper Posts. And, without their cordial assistance, it will be impossible to maintain the country”\textsuperscript{58}.

Nevertheless, his initiatives were largely in vain. The Governor’s only achievement was the British fifteen-year-long delay in passing over the forts to the US – under the pretext of mistreatment of the Loyalists\textsuperscript{59}. Still, the Iroquois territory was ultimately lost. It had become clear the Loyalists of every stock – actively and meritoriously fighting for Canada and the Crown throughout the war – lost their homes and had to permanently remain in Quebec.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibidem, 174.
\textsuperscript{54} W. Stewart Wallace, \textit{The United Empire...}, 97–8.
\textsuperscript{55} Edelgard E. Mahant, Graeme S. Mount, op. cit., 21.
\textsuperscript{57} Moore, op. cit., 174.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibidem, 175.
\textsuperscript{59} Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, op. cit., 62.
The challenge for Governor Haldimand was immense indeed. First, he was aware of the London authorities’ ignorance regarding the local, Canadian relations. Second, by 1783, he had faced the influx of around ten thousand Loyalists – almost exclusively of Anglophone stock – mostly devoted rangers and militiamen with their families. Additionally, Quebec needed to accommodate around approximately 5,000 Iroquois. Also, with its Francophone inhabitants, Quebec faced a serious identity shock. On the top of all that there was growing Loyalists’ frustration with the unfavourable war outcome and uncertainty of the future. Gov. Haldimand needs to be credited with the will to challenge and common breaking numerous unrealistic instructions he received from London. It was largely due to his open-mindedness and quick thinking that the province did not collapse or disintegrate under the waves of the Loyalist immigration60.

General Haldimand was determined to protect and preserve the rights and freedoms of his Francophone Quebeckers as well as the British domination over them. Simultaneously, he felt obliged to support the Loyalists and Indians. Nevertheless, he did not believe in assimilation of the UELs and Iroquois with the province’s society, already split into the Anglo- and Francophone elements. Therefore, instead of attempting any sort of cohabitation or coexistence, the Governor decided to invest his efforts in the physical separation of the newcomers and locals. Thus, the prospects offered by the upper country looked promising. Back then, the decision seemed perfect; however, in the long run, the worries proved detrimental. Socially, the Lower and Upper Canadas drifted apart and – after the 1837/38 rebellions – had to be “manually” assimilated.

Beginning from the early 1784, this time with the full support from London, F. Haldimand organised the colonisation, administration and settlement of the areas west of Quebec. The spring of 1784 brought the establishment of new townships in the upper country; the uninhabited area was being settled almost exclusively by the Loyalist element. During 1780s, there appeared around 10,000–12,000 people to permanently settle down; and there were more to arrive in 1800s61.

A significant share of the Loyalists re-patriating to the upper country were inexperienced at farming or breeding. Commonly, they were township clergymen, civil servants, British administration clerks, small businesspeople and craftsmen62. Curiously, and contrary to the common Canadian myth, meticulously cherished by the Loyalists’ descendants, the Quebec-settled UELs were not the crème de la crème of the thirteen colonies63. Most of them:

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60 W. Stewart Wallace, *The United Empire...*, 103.
61 Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, op. cit., 47.
63 W. Stewart Wallace, *The United Empire...*, 84.
were not wealthy, well-born, well-educated Americans. Most were frontier farmers, skilled and semi-skilled artisans and small tradesmen. A high proportion were illiterate. Most were not Anglican. [...] Many were Catholic, and a few were Jews. [...] A majority could trace their origins to Britain, many were Dutch or German or French-Canadian, some were American blacks and others were Six Nations Iroquois 64.

Therefore, the Loyalists’ survival in the new places had to be supported by the government (both local – Haldimand’s Quebec and central – London) with food, tools, animals, transportation, technical expertise etc 65. Nonetheless, the venture proved effective; not only did the settling of the new land end successfully, but also mortality proved low, the area relatively safe and prospects for further colonisers promising 66.

The Quebec authorities’ assistance to the Loyalist and Indian settlements in the upper country lasted three years. Nevertheless, even though the settlers worked hard, they were willing to start new lives in the new surroundings and some did have certain frontier experience, the things did not go easily. The lack of professional, competent and – most of all – numerous enough surveyors to manage the acreage destined to the Loyalist purposes caused considerable delay in grants and sparked land speculation. Also, the provincial government, despite its enthusiasm and support in the respect, was incapable of providing all the basic clothing, food, tools, lumber and other necessities, which caused further hardships 67.

2.4. The making of Upper Canada

The development of the vast areas in western Quebec led the Loyalists – the land’s exclusive inhabitants and administrators – to petition to the UK Parliament asking for the establishment of their own, separate province. The reasons were manifold. First, the Quebeckers would feel more comfortable if the Loyalists could be somehow separated, yet, maintaining friendly cooperation and proper relations. Second, the Loyalists – heirs of the American political mentality and system of law and values – did not approve of the Quebec law of the land, i.e. the Quebec Act (1774). The bill sanctioned the privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church (including the imposition of the tithes), application of the French civil law rule and the seigneurial social system 68. Understandably, it could not have been enthusiastically received by the UELs arriving from the US.

65 Ibidem.
66 Ibidem.
67 Edgar McInnis, Canada: ..., 164–165.
Governor F. Haldimand understood that – in a longer perspective – such a collage of customs, views, faiths, political stances, economic differences etc. would make it impossible for Quebec to continue peacefully. The Loyalists’ petition to the King was well-worded, constructive and convincing. Importantly, they clearly outlined the potential boundaries of their province and pledged full allegiance to the King. The petition concluded with the reference to the already-existing precedent of New Brunswick. Thus, the UELs’ proposal seemed a win-win solution.

In such a socio-political constellation, in 1791, the Parliament of the United Kingdom agreed to create the Province of Upper Canada. The formal assent took the form of the Constitutional Act of 1791 (or Canada Act). The province included the current Southern Ontario as well as parts of Northern Ontario, which – originally – had made up New France. Those were watersheds of the Ottawa River, Huron and Superior Lakes; nonetheless, the area did not cover any watersheds of Hudson Bay. The land was referred to as Upper regarding its geographic location alongside the Great Lakes and north from the Saint Lawrence River. The land was geographically opposed to Lower Canada, i.e. the Province of Quebec to the north-east. That way, Quebec – in its shape and borders from 1763 – was divided. The Province of Upper Canada was supposed, much as the other Canadian provinces, to have its own Legislative Assembly.

Already during the first Governor’s, J. G. Simcoe (1791–96), term, the Upper Canadians realised the new province was heavily under-populated, which made progress immensely difficult. Obviously, in such conditions, development of Upper Canada’s infrastructure, i.e. roads, schools, waterway transportation network and other markers of civilisation suffered a considerable slow-down. Boosting the province’s population appeared the primary-yet-challenging task. The “import’ of loyal British subjects from the UK was no option; back then, the British government discouraged immigration to the colonies. Hence, the provincial authorities turned southwards. The plan was to attract to Upper Canada any available “Loyalists at heart” remaining in the US. The task was not difficult as whoever arrived in the province and took the oath of allegiance to King George III was automatically becoming eligible to land plots, seeds tools and other assistance and necessities. Those newcomers, commonly referred to as Late Loyalists, kept coming in large numbers throughout the whole term of Gov. J. Simcoe, i.e. until 1796.

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71 Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, op. cit., 49.
72 Its first Lieutenant-Governor, Sir John Graves Simcoe (1791–96), initially resided in Niagara-on-the-Lak; yet, he soon transferred the capital to York – now Toronto – for security reasons against the Americans. Edelgard E. Mahant, Graeme S. Mount, op. cit., 22.
In that period, any guise of the Loyalist motives and backgrounds in the case of Upper Canada settlement was openly given up. Land speculation intensified and thousands of non-Loyalist Americans flooded the province\(^\text{73}\). Hence, largely against Governor Simcoe’s intentions, the original – Loyalist – element was diluted by the influx of settlers as remote to any Loyalist cause as possible\(^\text{74}\). Curiously, that fact was to become positively fundamental in the later disintegration of the aristocratic ruling clique of the province after the 1830s rebellions\(^\text{75}\).

The beginning of 19\(^{th}\) century intensified the non-Loyalist immigration – a significant trend which was to prove perilously influential for the future of all Canada. Tempted by the land quality, vast acreage available and unlimited life opportunities Upper Canada offered, numerous farmers and breeders from the United States started colonising the region. Initially, the minority – outnumbered and economically, socially and politically insignificant – did not seem challenging. With time, however, having grown in number and influence, the Americans in Upper Canada started demonstrating disturbing certainty Canada’s annexation by the US, or a sort of US-Canadian merger – obviously under the American auspices – was just a matter of time. By the outbreak of the War of 1812, the American minority leaders in Upper Canada (e.g. Benajah Mallory, Bernard Marcle or Joseph Willcocks) claimed to represent up to 30% of the local population\(^\text{76}\). Thus, during the 1812 war, such settlers’ loyalty to Canada became an issue.

Interestingly, the first decade of 19\(^{th}\) century also brought Canada a wave of the British immigration. Numerous newcomers settled in Upper Canada; as their attitudes and socio-political stance were similar to those of the Loyalists, the UK immigrants soon polarised with the, more democratic, American element\(^\text{77}\). The social, economic, ideological and, most of all, political support of the newcomers from across the ocean is difficult to over-estimate in the perspective of the forthcoming American-Canadian-British face-off. The conflict could actually change everything regarding the future of North America. Luckily for Canada, it ended with the \textit{status quo ante bellum}\(^\text{78}\).

The Upper Canadians swiftly organised their government, administration, legal system, social structure and local communities. Needless to say, the Loyalists copied the solutions they had known and practised for years in the thirteen colonies. Therefore, their

\(^{73}\) Ibidem, 23.

\(^{74}\) J. L. Granatstein, \textit{op. cit.}, 18.

\(^{75}\) Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, \textit{op. cit.}, 116.

\(^{76}\) Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, \textit{op. cit.}, 50.

\(^{77}\) Ibidem.

system appeared respectful to the conventional rule of law, attached to the traditions and well-established, hierarchic and well-organised values. Unfortunately, it was also bureaucratic, stratifying the citizens, inflexible, immune to reform and evolution-proof\textsuperscript{79}. By 1810, a clique known as the \textit{Family Compact} dominated the province’s political life. The small group monopolised the political life as well as economic and judicial aspects of the provincial administration. An exclusive, elitist and obscurant “brotherhood” single-handedly managed the province. However, owing to the mounting social distrust, frustration, exclusion and discrimination (concerning \textit{i.a.} the American immigrants), the pressure on change was mounting. Nonetheless, it required violent turbulences of the 1837–38 rebellions to eventually enforce the modifications of the government\textsuperscript{80}.

2.5. The UELs on St. John Island

If – in their \textit{Odyssey} – the UELs were afraid of being mistreated as naïve, lost, impoverished and needy newcomers, they could not have found themselves in a more unfriendly place than the island. In 1783, Prince Edward Island (back then known as St. John Island), was mainly owned by a number of private proprietors. Once it was established the British government planned to accommodate large numbers of Loyalists in Nova Scotia, the land owners petitioned to the administrator of the island, Lord North. The claimed they were willing to give up some of their lands to provide asylum to the refugees from the US. They were ready to resign from one fourth of their property (i.e. approx. 109,000 acres)\textsuperscript{81}. What they wanted instead was the government to abate the quit-rents.

The petition was appreciated by the government and land grants were offered to the UELs on similar provisions to those in Nova Scotia and Quebec. The incentives tempted a number of emigres to come directly from New York; others relocated from Shelburne, Nova Scotia. By the end of 1784, it is assumed ca. 600 UELs resettled to the island. It was a substantial number as they made up around 20\% of the local population.

By December 1785, 208 land grants were made to the Loyalists\textsuperscript{82}. The newcomers were appointed plots and assured their land titles were secured. Then,

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\text{[...]}\text{ when they had cleared the lands, erected buildings, planted orchards, and made other} \\
\text{improvements, they were told that their titles lacked validity, and they were forced to} \\
\text{move. Written title-deeds were withheld on every possible pretext and, when they were}
\]

\textsuperscript{79} Hugh L. L. Keenleyside, op. cit., 50.
\textsuperscript{80} Yet, the \textit{Family Compact} was no unique phenomenon in Canada; actually, it was an Upper Canadian equivalent of the \textit{Château Clique} in Lower Canada.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibidem, 21.
Hope Restored: the United Empire Loyalist Settlement...

granted, they were found to contain onerous conditions out of harmony with the promises made. The object of the proprietors, in inflicting these persecutions, seems to have been to force the settlers to become tenants instead of freeholders83.

Worse still, the Loyalists were not united in the difficult situation. Such local prominent figures as Colonel Edmund Fanning, the Lieutenant-Governor and a Loyalist himself, was allegedly involved in the plot. The main problem was the fact the Loyalist land titles were commonly prepared on loose sheets of paper added to the Council Book. When it came to proving the titles, the loose sheets were – of course – missing, which basically proved the evil intentions of the land proprietors in the first place. Interestingly, when some documents were discovered later, “they were found to bear evidence, in erasures and the use of different inks, of having been tampered with”84.

Initial steps to force the local land owners to admit the legality of the Loyalists’ land grants happened as late as 1795. Still, by then, many had left and some died85. The legal struggle took the duped Loyalists over seventy-five years before their children and grandchildren were actually re-granted their legal property. In the meantime, many gave up, left without compensation or died of stress and mistreatment.

Elsewhere the refugees were well and loyally treated. In Nova Scotia and Quebec, the English officials strove to the best of their ability, which was perhaps not always great, to make provision for them. But in Prince Edward Island they were the victims of treachery and duplicity86.

3. Indian Loyalists in Canada

Within the frame of the Loyalist settlement of what became Upper Canada, the Indian re-settlement deserves more insight. Iroquois, by the English commonly referred to as the Confederation of Five Nations, had co-operated with the Crown long before the War of Independence87. The tribes making the confederation were the Mohawks, Oneidas, Cayuga, Onondagas and Seneca. In 1712, the Tuscaroras (from the south) joined the five tribes forming the Six Nations Confederation88.

84 Ibidem.
85 *Loyalists of the Maritimes*, 21.
86 Ibidem.
The most prominent Iroquois leader of the War of Independence era was a Mohawk, Chief Joseph Brant (Thayendanegea). His warriors actively supported the British and the Loyalists’ cause against the American Patriots. The Six Nations perceived the predatory American rebels of insatiable land hunger as a significantly more serious threat to the Indian element than the British.

On the conclusion of the war, the Mohawks decided to leave their lands to avoid living in the United States. Therefore, Chief Brant went to Montreal to negotiate the relocation of his tribe. The early worries of Gov. Haldimand concerning the potential hostility of the local Indians were soon dispelled. As the area had already been inhabited by the indigenous tribes, the Governor had been anxious about the idea of the Loyalist colonisation of the upper country due to the Indian issue. They might turn hostile towards the strange Indians resettling to their original lands. Most fortunately for every party, the local Indians were willing to sell their land to the government, provided the aim of the sale was the Mohawk re-patriation to the areas near the Bay of Quinte and – later – the Grand River. Also, both the local indigenous tribes and the Mohawks were positively disposed to the initiative of the Indian-white Loyalist co-colonisation of the Upper Country province. Actually, both the local natives and the repatriated Mohawks allowed the white Loyalists to settle within the lands the Indians were offered by General Haldimand.

The Governor, favourable towards Chief Brant’s Indians’ re-patriation to Canada, granted the Mohawks a plot of land by the Bay de Quinte – bought from the Mississauga Indians. However, as the Seneca insisted the Mohawks live – for both tribes’ security reasons – nearer to them, Chief Brant travelled to Haldimand to renegotiate the issue. The Governor assigned funds to buy yet another land plot from the Mississaugas (approx. 10 km²), this time, by the Grand River. That located the Mohawks in the vicinity of approximately 60 km from the Seneca. Around 2,000 Brant’s countrymen settled there; a minor proportion chose Haldimand’s original offer – the Bay de Quinte area. As neither the Mohawks, nor the Canadian administrators, nor the British kept any registers concerning the Indian migration to Canada it is quite impossible to establish any more exact or reliable numbers, however.

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89 Ibidem, 81. Interestingly, some Indians collaborating with the British owned Black slaves, e.g. Chief Brant, the most prominent Mohawk leader, had around thirty-five of them. Ibidem.
92 Ibidem, 83.
4. Canadian Black Loyalists

The Blacks were yet another group of the United Empire Loyalists deserving attention. When the War of Independence broke out (1775), Lord Dunmore, the Governor of Virginia, issued the so-called *Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation*:

> I do require every Person capable of bearing Arms, to resort to His Majesty’s Standard, or be looked upon as Traitors to His Majesty’s Crown and Government, and thereby become liable to the Penalty the Law inflicts upon such Offences; such as forfeiture of Life, confiscation of Lands, &c. &c. And I do hereby further declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or others, [...] free that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining His Majesty’s Troops as soon as may be, for the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper Sense of their Duty, to His Majesty’s Crown and Dignity.

The document inspired hundreds of slaves to escape from the American plantations and join the British Army. The *Declaration* itself started the first massive Black emancipation initiative in North America. Soon, another British document – the *Philipsburg Proclamation* of 1779 by Sir Henry Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in North America, promised freedom to any Black slave fleeing the Patriot plantations. Clearly, both actions were inspired by practical purposes, namely, destabilisation of the Patriots’ economy and Black recruits provision for the British army; certainly, no sort of humanistic sentiments towards slaves themselves.

The two documents agitated the Blacks on the American plantations to massive escapes. As a result, the British received hundreds of recruits to fight against the US. However, soon, once the UK government contracted Hessian mercenaries (1776) – soldiers of proven value, training and quality – the Black draft ceased to be an issue. Still, the British kept their promise and did free the slaves who had fled from their American masters. There was a dose of hypocrisy in it, though. The British liberated the American-owned escapees and – at the same time – they handed over the run-away slaves to their masters who remained loyal to the Crown. Such a stance towards slavery proves the British...
treated the matter in a highly objective manner. Ultimately, the interests of the white, pro-British slaveowners did prevail.

Between 1775 and 1815, a number of regulations which influenced the issue of slavery were introduced in Canada. Until the end of the War of Independence, slavery was legal and practiced in Canada. Hence, the Loyalists arriving in British North America could legally bring their slaves along and expect their ownership to be respected. The Treaty of Paris (1783) did not refer to slavery in any way, which meant the slave issue was to remain as before the war. Then, in 1790s, certain court decisions, e.g. in Lower Canada, introduced limits on slavery. However, the Imperial Act of 1790 guaranteed the Loyalists their ownership of the slaves they had in Upper Canada. The Slave Trade Act of 1807 outlawed trading slaves all over the Empire and the abolition of slavery came in 1833, with the Slavery Abolition Act\(^98\).

When the war was sure to be lost, the UK government decided to evacuate the Blacks, like any other UELs. They were shipped from New York and Charleston and dispatched to the Caribbean, Nova Scotia, Upper Canada and the United Kingdom. It is necessary to emphasise the vast majority of the Blacks who appeared in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were enslaved. First, it was legal there; second, the Blacks came as the “property” of the white UELs. Such a procedure was sanctioned by the King’s Imperial Statute of 1790:

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\text{Negros, household furniture, utensils of husbandry, or cloathing free of duty: provided always that such household furniture utensils of husbandry and clothing shall not in the whole exceed the value of fifty pounds per every white person […] and the value of forty shillings for every negro brought by such white person.\[
\text{[…] All sales of […] any Negro so imported […] shall be made after twelve calendar months after the importing […]\]}
\]

By 1790s, the number of the enslaved Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia may have reached ca. 3,000–3,500 people\(^100\). The proportions were radically different in other Loyalist destinations. Lower Canada (Quebec) accommodated mere 300 Blacks, and Upper Canada received ca. 500–700 Blacks\(^101\).

In Nova Scotia, Shelburne appeared specifically attractive for the Black Loyalists, as the British government’s offer there was 100 acres per head of the household and 50 acres extra for each family member. However, the offer was manipulated. The Blacks, even the

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\(^100\) Laura Neilson Bonikowsky, op. cit.

free ones, were commonly discriminated as regards the land grants. They had to wait, in some instances up to six years, to be granted a mere fraction of an acre (sic)\textsuperscript{102}. The land plots for the Blacks were located across Shelburne harbour, where the Blacks established Birchtown – the biggest North American Black township of its times\textsuperscript{103}.

The Blacks tried to independently administer and organise themselves in the new place. As many among them were Baptists, Black gatherings were united under the leadership of their preachers. One such a dynamic Black leader, David George, arrived in Shelburne. He soon managed to erect a chapel there (1784) and preached the locals, Blacks and whites alike\textsuperscript{104}. Still, the co-existence proved impossible and tensions mounted within the local community. On 26 July 1784, the white Shelburners destroyed George’s house – and twenty other Blacks’ farms – starting the \textit{Shelburne Race Riots}\textsuperscript{105}.

In 1792, facing acts of vandalism and violence, frustrated and embittered by being deprived of the vote, trial by jury and proper land grants, around 1200 of the Shelburne Blacks (35\%) – including David George – left for the African colony of Sierra Leone (the solution offered by the British government to improve the situation), mere few years after their settlement in Canada\textsuperscript{106}. Others decided to sell themselves – through labour contracts – to the local merchants and other businesspeople, practically returning to economic slavery\textsuperscript{107}.

In other Canadian provinces, largely due to the considerably lower numbers of the Black Loyalists, the issues concerning settlement were less spectacular; yet, discrimination and hostility – by no means – of lower degree. Be it Lower, Upper Canada or New Brunswick, the Blacks faced similar limitations and hardships as in Nova Scotia\textsuperscript{108}. They were commonly pushed to the end of the land grant waiting lists or not allowed to actively participate in the life of the local communities.

Moreover – worst of all – even if granted land, the Crown refused to issue the land titles\textsuperscript{109}. It meant the Blacks were – technically – turned into mere tenants and no owners of their plots. Thus, they could neither sell nor leave them to their children\textsuperscript{110}. Such a decision of London proves the Black Loyalists and their accommodation was incomparably less imperative for the Crown than the Indian issue, let alone the white UELs’ repatri-
tion. Such an attitude stemmed from a combination of small numbers of the Black Loyalists in Canada, racial and social prejudice on the British parliamentary, Canadian federal, provincial and local levels. Additionally, the Blacks ceased to be any argument in the British politics. The British army did not need Black recruits any longer. Also, the Blacks did not present any sort of economic or political force to influence politics on any level.

Curiously enough, despite all the adversities, limitations and discrimination the Black Loyalists faced in Canada, many remained there. Even more so, during the war of 1812, they actively supported the British-Canadian cause, joining the British Army and Canadian militia troops yet again. Hence, the Black Loyalist heritage is significantly important for the contemporary Canadians. With time, there appeared various associations and societies cherishing the contribution the Blacks made to the making of Canada from 1780s onwards.

Conclusions

The impact the United Empire Loyalists had on the history of Canada, especially in her early days, is difficult to overemphasize indeed. Their influx started in 1775, at the beginnings of the shaping of Canada in all her dimensions, be it geographical, political, social or economic.

Geographically, the Loyalists contributed to the swift change (1783–1791) of the map of British North America. New provinces – Upper Canada and New Brunswick – appeared; the old ones, Lower Canada (Quebec) or Nova Scotia, took new shapes. The UELs pioneered the Canadian “go west’ idea. It was the Loyalist scouts who explored the frontier areas of what later became Upper Canada and it was them who settled the new province.

Politically, the Loyalists brought to Canada – and successfully implemented there – their well-established and practical forms of self-government, developed in the thirteen British colonies. After the initial period of the imposition of the UELs’ ways, the Rebellions of 1837 and 1838 proved to them they needed to modify and upgrade their government to the specific, local needs. And they did it effectively, developing, alongside with other citizens of Upper Canada, the idea of the “Responsible Government”.

Socially, the ‘Canadian’ Loyalists turned out people from all walks of life, of various education, vocational experience, religions, political stances, social standing or financial status. Such a variety immensely contributed to the redefinition of the Canadian social structure; they shaped it in the way it was to remain for years to come. The active,

111 Channon Oyeniran, op. cit.
113 For example: Black Loyalist Heritage Society, The Black Loyalists in New Brunswick.
dynamic and entrepreneurial Loyalist element added new energy to those settling Canada before 1783. The UELs provided the Canadian society with the necessary dose of energy, dynamism and drive to develop. Shaking the “local Canadians” out of their comfort zones, the Loyalists – traditionally reluctant and hostile towards the Americans – contributed to the shaping of the Canadiannes of British North America. Through the events between 1775 and 1815, Canada’s inhabitants rested their identity largely on the anti-American sentiments.

In the economic dimension, the fact the Loyalists spread all over British North America meant the emergence of new industries and development of the traditional ones. Owing to the appearance of large human masses in various areas of Canada, the demand for timber, fishing, construction industry or various commercial, transportation and communication services soared. The turn-up of the UELs created the necessity to invest in progress, industrial and technological improvement. That required joint efforts and cooperation of the locals, UELs, provincial governments and the UK authorities on the so far unprecedented scale.

From the onset of the Loyalist immigration to Canada, the British government tempted and encouraged them to settle there. The newcomers were largely Anglophone, loyal to the King and made an excellent – courageous and American-hostile – buffer against the United States. London did not hesitate to bear serious costs, invest time and effort into the white and Indian Loyalist accommodation and their support in Canada. That saved social problems and economic challenges in the UK, once the masses of UELs potentially landed there.

Such determination did pay off indeed. It was a truly win-win solution for the British government, Canadian provincial authorities and the Loyalists alike. The Loyalists shaped and mastered the – traditionally Canadian – evolutionary attitude. In all the possible respects, the UELs’ influence followed in the direction of peaceful petitioning, concessions, compromising and negotiations rather than the revolutionary solutions, so much preferred by the Americans.

The influx of the – almost exclusively Anglophone – element, loyal to the Crown on the one hand and distrustful and reluctant towards the United States on the other, determined the –Anglophone-dominated – future character of the country. The British-American War of 1812 proved it; the Loyalists – white, Indian or Black alike – fought gallantly against the US, defending Canada and further shaping her Anglophone, pro-British profile.

In the racial context, the Iroquois Loyalists brought to Canada intensely cooperated with the whites, and vice versa. The post-1783 Indian declarations inviting the white Loyalists to settle on the Canadian soil presented to the Iroquois speak volumes about their political and social openness. The pro-British approach and solid pro-Loyalist senti-
ment proved decisive in the UK-Canada-US confrontation of 1812. The Indians took the Canadian-British side and they constituted a significant proportion of the forces resisting the Americans.

The Black Loyalists’ appearance in Canada – although much less spectacular, happy or successful – did contribute to the later shape of Canada, too. In the new circumstances, slavery needed to be swiftly and efficaciously re-regulated. Simultaneously, Canada had to accommodate a certain number of free Blacks and develop ways of integrating and incorporating them into the society. Rough and turbulent as the process turned out, those who remained in Canada did contribute to the actual, modern make-up of the Canadian society.

The considerable British involvement in the Loyalist assistance – in every possible aspect – fostered the pro-British sentiment among them. It lasted for dozens of years, making the Canadian pro-Britishness and anti-Americanism solid fundaments of the Canadian pro-Britishness and anti-Americanism solid fundaments of the Canadians for the rest of 19th century. The Loyalist conservatism, reluctance towards the American-style democratic “mob-rule” determined the qualities of the Canadian institutions and law making.

The Loyalist political stances brought both positive and negative outcomes as well. The respect of the traditional institutions and the rule of law seem paramount. Among the negatives, the autocratic, exclusive rule and exclusion of larger groups in decision making proved striking. With time, the UELs were forced to adapt their ways to serve more universal purposes and – unquestionably – in a more effective manner cater for all the citizens of the provinces, which only proves the flexibility of their political attitudes.

Last of all, the Loyalists brought to Canada the conviction they were North Americans. Distinct to the inhabitants of the US, pro-British and diverse, nonetheless, the inhabitants of the North American continent. That equipped the traditional Canadians with a new dimension of their self-perception and self-identity.

All the above-listed aspects together decided on the pro-British character of Canada; the feature which lasted until the World War II. Paradoxically, as the United Empire Loyalists made Canada pro-British and North American at the same time, once Canadian pro-Britishness and North Americanness drifted apart – during the WWII – Canada chose her North Americanness, the feature the UELs had instilled in her inhabitants over a century before.

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Hope Restored: the United Empire Loyalist Settlement in British North America, 1775–1812

Summary: The article looks into the process of resettlement of the United Empire Loyalists from the newly created United States to British North America. The settlement, political and social considerations, as well as the logistic challenges to the already-existing Canadian provinces are evaluated. The paper outlines the creation of New Brunswick and Upper Canada; it also investigates the issues of the Indian and Black loyalists’ repatriation and the British government assistance in the process.

Keywords: Loyalists, Canada, provinces, War of Independence, repatriation, United Kingdom