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The Polish Underground State vs. The Polish Communists, and the concept of counteraction*

Streszczenie: Podczas II wojny światowej Polskie Państwo Podziemne zostało zmuszone walczyć o niepodległą, suwerenną i integralnie terytorialną Polskę również z komunistycznym podziemiem. Artykuł systematyzuje dotychczasowe ustalenia odnoszące się zarówno do antykomunistycznych struktur Polskiego Podziemnej odpowiedzialnych za prowadzenie konfrontacji z komunistami, skupiając się również na ukazaniu form oraz metod stosowanych w tejsze walce. Tekst przedstawia liczne ograniczenia, jakie rzutowały na dość umiarkowane metody konfrontacji z komunistami, jakimi posługiwało się Polskie Państwo Podziemne. Takich ograniczeń nie stosowali komuniści ani w okresie II wojny światowej, ani po zdobyciu władzy w powojennej Polsce.

Słowa kluczowe: antykomunizm, Polskie Państwo Podziemne, polscy komuniści, II wojna światowa

During the Second World War the fight of the Underground Poland soldiers for free, independent, territorially intact and most of all fully sovereign Poland was also led against such pro-Soviet organizations of Polish origin as Polish Workers' Party (PPR), People's Guard/People's Army (GL/AL), Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP), Central Office of Polish Communists (CBKP) and Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN). It was an integral struggle against the Moscow imperialism, instruments and executors of the Soviet foreign policy, which were – solely for the sake of propaganda – using Polish slogans, nomenclature and symbols, often full of Polish patriotism.

The inevitable confrontation with the communist underground took various forms. Their shape and character were affected by political, ideological and tactical reasons, as well as international war situation, including the role and position of USSR in the anti-German coalition.

* This article summarizes many years of research into the anti-communist activities of the Polish Underground State during the Second World War.

One of the significant elements of the activities of the Polish Underground in the “K” section¹, apart from observing and infiltration, was the issue of determining the forms and methods of counteracting the activities of the communist organizations. The question if the pro-Soviet underground in the occupied Poland should be eradicated did not give rise to any serious resistance and was perceived not only as logical continuation of anti-communist attitudes of the inter-war period², but especially in the times of war and occupation as logical and legitimate. However, developing a uniform response as to what measures should be taken became impossible.

The increase in the activities of “K” made the Underground Poland much more active. It made every effort to stop or at least minimize the political and military activities of the communists. This issue was particularly visible in the conspiracy articles, reports, or underground intelligence accounts³. Some of them pointed to the need to educate and consolidate the society, socio-political isolation, and constant monitoring of the communists, as well as deepening the conspiracy of their own structures and thus protecting them from communist surveillance. This convention included, among others, publications of „Rzeczpospolita Polska”, „Polska Walczy”, „Walki Ludu”, „Pobudki”, „Wiadomości Polskie”, „Dokumenty Chwili”, January 1942 report – „Nowe posunięcia Kominternu na

¹ According to the conspiratorial instructions from 19 XII 1943 the “K” cases included the activities of secret emissaries of the Soviet government, – secret agents of NKVD [...], – PPR [...], – ZWM [...], – KOP (Defence (sic!) Command of Poland – some fractions), – RPPS [...], – and other political groups sympathising with the aforementioned – Soviet staff intelligence, – Soviet landing troops, – Guard Army, – People’s Army, – Polish People’s Army, – mixed sabotage-subversive units”; AIPN Gd, 0046/433, vol. 1, *Walka Armii Krajowej i Delegatury Rządu z ruchem lewicowym (1939–1944)*, ed. MSW, Warszawa 1974, pp. 54–55 (also AIPN, 01435/16, p. 54); AIPN, 0397/251, vol. 1, Instrukcja w sprawach „K” i organizacji pokrewnych, 19 December 1943, k. 112 (also AAN, 228/1–1, col. 2); K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa Polski Podziemnej wobec komunistów polskich 1939–1945*, Warsaw 2009, p. 11.

² More about Polish anti-communist in the Second Polish Republic see K. Sacewicz, *Komunizm i antykomunizm w II Rzeczypospolitej: państwo – społeczeństwo – partie*, Olsztyn 2016, pp. 17–158; idem, *Zorganizowane antykomunistyczne inicjatywy społeczne w II Rzeczypospolitej* [in:] *Antykomunizm Polaków w XX wieku*, ed. P. Kardela, K. Sacewicz, Białystok-Olsztyn-Warszawa 2019, pp. 115–138; idem, *Rewolucja komunistyczna i dyktatura proletariatu w świetle publikacji Centralnego Porozumienia Organizacji Współdziałających w Zwalczaniu Komunizmu – zarys problemu*, „Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2017, no 2(30), pp. 65–85; idem, *Komintern w świetle polskiej publicystyki przeciwkomunistycznej II Rzeczypospolitej. Przyczynek do badań nad polskim antykomunizmem*, „Komunizm” 2017, no 6, pp. 7–28. Sacewicz K., *Концепции, методи и форми на действия срещу комунизма през погледа на журналистиката, която прави обществено достояние организациите обществени антикомунистически инициативи в Полиа между двете световни войни* [Concepts, methods and actions of communism should be based on journalism, which is the property of the public and anti-communist initiatives in Poland during the inter-war period], in: “History. Bulgarian Journal of Historical Education” 2018, v. 26, no. 6, pp.636–662.

³ See *Polskie Państwo Podziemne wobec komunistów polskich (1939–1945). Wypisy prasy konspiracyjnej*, ed. K. Sacewicz, Olsztyn 2005; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, passim; idem, *Prasa Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego wobec komunistów* [in:] *Polska Partia Robotnicza – Gwardia Ludowa/ Armia Ludowa na ziemiach polskich 1942–1944*, ed. K. Kaczmarski, M. Krzysztofiński, Rzeszów 2013, pp. 262–274; idem, *Metody i koncepcje przeciwdziałania Polski Podziemnej wobec działalności komunistów „polskich” (1939–1944). Próba syntezy* [w:] *Polskie wizje i oceny komunizmu po 1939 roku*, ed. R. Łatka, B. Szlachta, Kraków 2015, pp. 107–124.

ziemiach Polski” or May 1942 „Materiał do akcji przeciwkomunistycznej”⁴. This moderate tone was characteristic especially for the governmental authorities of provenience. Pointing to the forms and methods of propaganda and political struggle against PPR, however, it was remembered that this task was significantly more complicated than the anti-German campaign. The particular difficulty in resolving the communist issue was its connection with the policy towards the USSR, which hampered the actions of official factors, including their propaganda⁵.

Right-winged organizations were the advocates of more radical solutions⁶. The conspiratorial National Party (SN) [“Kwadrat”] backed in its press overall political isolation of the PPR⁷. Moreover, in March 1942 “Kwadrat” called for the disclosure of the company links before the Polish society, as well as for the preparation to the ruthless, armed battle against “K” “in whatever form it occurs”⁸. Nevertheless, in 1942 the counteracting of communist political action was exceptionally moderate. Even in the right-wing communities calling for the military trial were not dominant at that time⁹. This situation underwent a considerable overestimation in subsequent years.

The counter-intelligence agencies of the AK and the Government Delegation for Poland presented their opinions on the counteracting of communist action in 1942. Among others, the Department no. 999 of the Department of Security and Counterintelligence of

⁴ *Wokół prób wicherzeń komunistycznych*, „Rzeczpospolita Polska”, 10 III 1942, no. 4(24). *Upiór bolszewizmu*, „Polska Walczy”, 12 March 1942, no. 5. *Uwaga – „wróg wewnętrzny” działa!*, „Walka Ludu”, 29 May 1942, no. 8. *Bolszewizm wobec Polski*, „Pobudka”, October-November 1942, no. 8/9; *Działalność komunistyczna w Polsce*, „Wiadomości Polskie”, 13 May 1942, no. 8(65); *Problem komunistyczny w Polsce na tle wojny i okupacji*, „Dokumenty Chwili”, 12 November 1942, no. 13. AAN, 228/17–8, Nowe posunięcia Kominternu na ziemiach Polski, col. 25; AAN, 228/1–1, Materiał do akcji przeciwkomunistycznej, col. 45. See also AAN, 228/17–5, Report from 15 August 1942, col. 56.

⁵ In one of the reports of the Polish Underground Commission from the “K” section we read: “The situation is much more difficult as Polish official factors have constrained capacity of opposing this propaganda. Both the statements of the government in London and national publications are by nature less clear, less direct, which in the mass effect must always give weak effects. The constant pro-Soviet accents are particularly bad, pronounced – undoubtedly for political reasons – by the official factors of Anglo-Saxon politics. [...] All this comes to the Polish opinion and generally – it is very confusing.”; see. AAN, 228/17–5, Report on communist activities in Poland for the period between November 1942 and February 1943, col. 86

⁶ See more: K. Sacewicz, *Koncepcje przeciwdziałania sowiecko-komunistycznemu zagrożeniu bezpieczeństwa państwa w myśli programowej i publicystyce centralnych agend ruchu narodowego w okupowanej Polsce (1942–1944)* [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo Polski w XX i XXI wieku. Wybrane założenia teoretyczne i sposoby realizacji*, ed. H. Łach, Olsztyn 2012, pp. 135–185.

⁷ *Wytoczne dla propagandy antykomunistycznej*, „Polska Gazeta Codzienna pod Okupacją”, 5 June 1942.

⁸ *Nowy twór Kominternu na ziemiach polskich*, „Polska Gazeta Codzienna pod Okupacją”, 23 March 1942.

⁹ The Confederate Armed Forces responded to the question – how rudimentary for all activities of Underground Poland on the issue of “K” – „how to combat communism”, as follows: „It is not enough to tell people that communism does not do good, but it must be clarified that in the new Poland people will be better off than in 1939. One must, in a word, have what the national groups lacked so far, that is a rational and well-thought-out socio-economic program. [...] Only when the hypocritical slogans of the Communist Party are opposed with a rational socio-economic program, can the communist campaign be effectively combated”; *Walczyliśmy z komunizmem*, „Do broni”, 2 December 1942, no. 20.

the 2nd Division of the General Command of the Union of Armed Struggle- Polish Home Army (KG ZWZ-AK) (“Korweta”)¹⁰ was of the opinion that the actions of the communists were multi-sectoral and multidirectional, although they have a common goal, which is the preparation of „an attempt on limiting our independence, organized by Moscow and coordinated with the activities of the Soviet army”¹¹. In such a position, the following remedies were recommended: “1) Increasing propaganda campaign against communism in the whole Polish press. 2) Causing the issue and widely distributing brochures and leaflets indicating the dangers of communism for Poland and for every individual citizen, regardless of social class. 3) Standing firmly against the communist slogans of the immediate “national uprising”. 4) Rejecting the offers of talks and interventions put forward by the commune, because such talks would lead to the exposure of Polish organizations and would undermine the moral resilience of the society to the agitation of the communism. 5) Striving to create a unified anti-communist front in the society and to organising self-defense, which would serve both as defense against communism and against Germany. 6) Obtaining all possible Polish parties, especially the peasants and the right wing of the socialists for the actions in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 7) As an extension to point 5: preparing for the anticipated fight with the communists. (We do not want this fight, but we are already being attacked!)”¹². The concurrent recommendations included the February „Report on PPR” of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Government Delegation of the RP¹³. The author of the document – Tadeusz Myśliński – further postulated the disorganization of the PPR ranks, but without denunciations in Germany¹⁴, among others by “frightening

¹⁰ About „Korweta” see more: K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 20–22; idem, *Zabezpieczenie kontrwywiadowcze Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego przed agenturalną działalnością polskich komunistów (1939–1944) – przykład KG ZWZ-AK*, „Biuletyn Informacyjny AK. Miesięcznik ŚŻŻAK”, september 2016, no 9, pp. 69–74; M. Żuczowski, *Referat „999” Kontrwywiadu Komendy Głównej Armii Krajowej* [in:] *Z dziejów walk o niepodległość*, t. 2, ed. M. Gałezowski, Warszawa 2013, pp. 347–370; W. Bułhak, A.K. Kunert, *Kontrwywiad podziemnej Warszawy. Struktura, zadania i obsada personalna kontrwywiadu Komendy Głównej, Obszaru Warszawa i Okręgu Warszawa ZWZ-AK w latach 1939–1944* [in:] *Wywiad i kontrwywiad Armii Krajowej*, ed. W. Bułhak, Warszawa 2008, pp. 335–343; „Korweta” *Referat 999 Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa i Kontrwywiadu Oddziału II Komendy Głównej Armii Krajowej*, ed. M. Olczak, W. Handke, Warszawa 2020, pp. 6–65; „Korweta” *Referat 999 Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa i Kontrwywiadu Oddziału II Komendy Głównej Armii Krajowej. Raporty grudzień 1941 – maj 1943*, ed. M. Olczak, Warszawa 2020, pp. 5–469; „Korweta” *Referat 999 Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa i Kontrwywiadu Oddziału II Komendy Głównej Armii Krajowej. Raporty maj 1943 – luty 1944*, ed. M. Olczak, Warszawa 2020, pp. 6–402.

¹¹ AAN, 203/III-136, Sytuacja w ruchu wyrotowym (sprawozdanie za XII 1942 r. i I 1943), 5 February 1943, col. 18 (also AAN, 203/VII-62, col. 100; ibidem, 228/17–1, col. 23).

¹² Ibidem, col. 18–19.

¹³ AAN, 228/17–3, Raport w sprawie PPR, 11 February 1943, col. 18 (także *Raport Komórki Bezpieczeństwa Departamentu Spraw Wewnętrznych Delegatury Rządu RP na Kraj na temat podziemia komunistycznego w okupowanej Polsce z 11 lutego 1943 r.*, ed. K. Sacewicz [in:] *Polska pod okupacją 1939–1945*, t. 2, ed. M. Przegiętki, Warszawa 2016, pp. 169–186).

¹⁴ On the pages of the underground press, the whole Underground Poland was dismissed from the denunciation of communists against the German security authorities.; see among others *Dzieje Polskiej Partii Robotniczej*, „Komunizm a Polska”, 18 April 1943, no. 1; *Na froncie walki z komuną*, „Ajencja A.”, 6 October 1943, no. 8; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, p. 218.

them away from printers, meeting rooms, meetings, cleaning the weapon storages, etc.¹⁵, organizing their own mass meetings, and setting up their own communist body, for example of the Trotskyist tone” to unravel communism” capturing the audience of the “K” press, and above all, the coordination of anti-communist intelligence activities carried out by various agencies of the independent underground¹⁶.

The characteristic feature of the Polish Underground agendas studies, often of various provenience, was consistent opposition to any form of official contact with the communist party. This was a consequence of stopping the PPR’s desire to break into the full-fledged participant in the political life of the Polish independence conspiracy¹⁷. Personal relationships with the K leaders were also stigmatized, of course apart from information and intelligence activities, recognizing them as a real infiltration threat of their own ranks by foreign agents¹⁸. The ideas of any talks with the communist underground were negated not only by the AK information and intelligence agencies, but also similar structures in the Government Delegate RP¹⁹. Nevertheless, contrary to their recommendations, in February 1943 political talks between representatives of the Plenipotentiary for the Government RP and the PPR took place²⁰.

In 1942, Underground Poland did not come up with a coherent stance on the forms and methods of counteracting communist political and military activity, nor on the protection of its own structures from the threat of communist infiltration. Thus, along with the deterioration of bilateral Polish-Soviet relations and their unilateral discontinuation by Moscow, with the increase in the intensity of the activity of the comparty in occupied Poland and the emergence and functioning of the „Polish” communist agencies in the USSR, as well as the approach of the Soviet troops to the eastern borders of the Second Republic of Poland, the problem of attitude towards the Moscow agent became more and more pressing. The existing deficiencies revealed themselves with all their might. 1943 became a breakthrough for the development and regulation of communist issues in the overall policy of Fighting Poland. This also involved the question of finding a definite answer to the question on what methods and to what extent to combat the „K” factors.

¹⁵ AAN, 228/17–3, Report on PPR, 11 February 1943, col. 18.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ AAN, 203/III-136, Sytuacja w ruchu wywrotowym (sprawozdanie za XII 1942 r. i I 1943), 5 February 1943, col. 19.

¹⁸ See point 46 of „Instrukcja postępowania konspiracyjnego” [in:] *Armia Krajowa – służba pojedynczego żołnierza*, oprac. A. Chmielarz, A.K. Kunert, „Dokumenty i Materiały Archiwum Polski Podziemnej 1939–1956” 1995, no. 3, p. 136.

¹⁹ AAN, 228/17–3, Raport w sprawie PPR, 11 February 1943, col. 18; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, p. 219.

²⁰ See more: K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 220–226; idem, *KG AK wobec kwestii przeciwdziałania polityczno-propagandowej działalności podziemia komunistycznego w okupowanej Polsce w 1943 roku. Zarys problemu* [in:] *Człowiek w Europie. Człowiek wobec problemów XIX i XX wieku*, ed. M. Franz, M. Kardas, Toruń 2011, pp. 360–362.

The terms commonly used in the Underground Poland journalism with regard to the communists, such as „Soviet agency”, „the fifth Soviet column” or „Comintern branch”, „targowica”, „traitor”, and „enemy”, clearly indicated that cooperation with them cannot be ensured. Therefore, the issue requiring elaboration was not whether, but how to fight. In 1943 the deliberations on this matter were characterized by an increase in the radical and uncompromising concepts of solving the “K” problem, with the subordinated and radical positions still balanced at the time.

The first ones should include the voice of the periodical „Communism and Poland”, which defied the communists from any denunciations against the Germans, emphasizing that there are many “Polish people deceived by the leaders of these organizations.” in the ranks of PPR-GL²¹. SL took similar positions in the fight against the communists²². The “triangle” emphasized that it was, and will always be, “in the fight against all attempts to Bolshevise our relations, to lay eggs, to wreak havoc, and to create diversion among our society”²³, and pointed out: “Fighting against ideological communism, we are not going to get involved in bloody brotherly fights. We want to fight foreign agents with the righteousness of our cause, not the stick. [...] We have rifles and bombs directed against the Germans at the moment.”²⁴. The Government Delegate of the RP also emphasized the dominant role of propaganda and political activities in the anti-Communist campaign. These would be conducted in two ways, that is as broader propaganda addressed to the broad masses of society²⁵ and as narrower, the recipients of which would be „minds already formed”²⁶. It was emphasized that both types of propaganda action, using national-patriotic content, should discredit “K” as an agent of the Soviet factor.

²¹ *Dzieje Polskiej Partii Robotniczej*, „Komunizm a Polska”, 18 April 1943, no. 1. This position was also characteristic for people’s circles. We read on the pages of the party section: „Among the communist ranks, accidentally, there was a certain amount of Polish full-fledged element, impersonated only, which is easy to understand and forgive in the current conspirational conditions. We have to convince these people with words, we must get them back for us and for Poland, not murder them.”; *Stosunek ruchu ludowego do akcji komunistycznej*, „Przez walkę do zwycięstwa”, 20 November 1943, no. 26(95).

²² On the relationship of the “Triangle”, as well as the people’s movement to the PPR in general, see B. Pobiażyn, *Ruch ludowy wobec komunistów w okresie II wojny światowej* [w:] *Polska Partia Robotnicza – Gwardia Ludowa...*, pp. 204–235; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, passim.

²³ *Placówki i agenci bolszewizmu*, „Przez walkę do zwycięstwa”, 20 August 1943, no 17(86).

²⁴ *Stosunek ruchu ludowego do akcji komunistycznej*, „Przez walkę do zwycięstwa”, 20 November 1943, no 26(95).

²⁵ According to the principles of anti-Communist propaganda included in the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of Poland (most likely from mid-1943). „Przyczyny wzrostu komunizmu na terenie kraju” stated: „What should work first is so called broader and more active assault propaganda, which uses popular slogans, understandable for everyone [...]. Communists should be outbid in their promises”; AAN, 202/III-31, Reasons for the growth of communism in the country, [1943], col. 28.

²⁶ „The narrower propaganda deals with polemics with communist theses and selects substantive arguments. At present it is a further project, and it is also true that the seriously and deeply thinking spheres have understood the dangers of communism fully and for a long time.”; *ibidem*, col. 30.

As for the methods and forms of combating communists, the moderate position was occupied by the 6th Division of the KG AK²⁷. The most authoritative PPP magazine „Biuletyn Informacyjny” repeatedly warned against the communist threat in very meaningful and unequivocal publications. Nevertheless, it gave no consent to using offensive forms in the fight against the „K”. If the Bureau of Information and Propaganda in AK High Command (BIP KG AK) had already bet on the offensive, it was purely political, the blade of which was supposed to be conspiratorial journalism based on uncompromising rhetoric and content.²⁸ The Department no. 999 of the Department of Security and Counterintelligence of the 2nd Division of the KG AK also spoke on the discussed issue. On the basis of months of observation and analysis of the operations of the “K” structures activities,²⁹ “Korweta” developed a four-point model defining the defense action of the independent underground. They were: “1. To purge Polish organizations from communist elements and pay close attention to the eradication of the «plugins» of communist intelligence. 2. Deviation from any conversation or contact with the community and its branches. 3. Raise your own propaganda striking communism, denouncing the masses and brutally attacking communist slogans (especially leaflets on current topics reaching the masses). 4. Transition to counter-combat on the battlefield against murdering “Polish patriots” by communism.”³⁰ Also in the second half of 1943, the AK continued its tactics of fighting communist structures, based on the self-defense of its own ranks and society, but not military offensive.

The indications and appeals of the national-democratic, Christian democratic and Piłsudski-ite were more radical. Undoubtedly, their increasing significance in 1943, apart from the negative attitude towards the PPR, as the agenda of the Soviet and anti-Polish

²⁷ See K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 238–239; idem, *Prasa Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego...*, pp. 287–288; idem, *KG AK wobec kwestii...*, pp. 363–365.

²⁸ A clear example of such a direction of propaganda offensive were the publications of „Biuletyn Informacyjny”. In the magazine we read, among others: „**Every Polish person – a worker, a peasant or an intelligent – who undergoes communist propaganda, who cooperates with the communists in the slightest – becomes a traitor today as he is volksdeutsch.** [...]PPR is nothing but the Bolshevik agenda in Poland. [...]There is great communist work in Poland and ... against Poland. The imperative is to be aware, to resist all the detrimental communist influences. In addition to patriotism and goodwill, the mind and intelligence must be put to the test of the insidious enemy. [...]**The Pole cannot be a Communist because he is no longer a Pole. Communism is the product of the Soviet spirit. And while the Russian Communist can be a good patriot because he is pursuing the goals of his homeland, the member of any nation – especially the Polish one – cannot be both at the same time**”; *Komunizm – narzędzie podbojów Rosji*, „Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 23 September 1943, no. 38(193).

²⁹ See W. Bułhak, A.K. Kunert, *Kontrwywiad podziemnej Warszawy...*, pp. 335–343; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 217, 226, 240–241.

³⁰ AAN, 203/III-132, Działalność obozu rewolucyjnego w Polsce (w okresie 21 IV do 15 V 1943 r.), 4 June 1943, col. 29.

„comin” of the Comintern³¹, was influenced by the growing crisis in Polish-Soviet relations, culminating in the disclosure of the Katyn massacre³².

In March 1943, a thorough analysis of the activities of the communist underground and the USSR was organized in the circles of the national movement³³. According to this assessment, communism and the Soviet state were considered a fierce enemy of Poland and its interests. It was therefore advisable to take immediate defensive measures. These included primarily the intensified propaganda activity of unmasking PPR-GL as a Soviet agent. At the same time, it was stressed that “all Polish organizations should now prepare for a combat trial with the Communist Party, which has already launched an offensive against Poland and the Polish nation.”³⁴. The concept of armed struggle with “K” found its place in the political concepts and journalism of many independent organizations. The conspiratorial SN systematically sought to express the official agreement of the Polish government to “immediately join the ruthless struggle aimed at destroying the communist organization in Poland and to prevent its criminal activity on the Soviet service”³⁵. The concurrent position was represented by the Confederation of Nations³⁶.

Strong voices in this discussion were the statements of Christian democratic communities and organizations. In the anti-communist action, the great importance of the process of public awareness of the danger posed by the USSR and its branches in Poland was recognized³⁷. Nevertheless, the underground Labour Party (SP, „Romb”) called upon all subjects of the Underground Poland to „already join **the gradual and planned liquidation**

³¹ About relations Polish Underground State to Comintern see more K. Sacewicz, *Komintern w świetle enuncjacji prasowych Polski Podziemnej. Przyczynek do rozważań nad antykomunizmem Polaków* [in:] *Polskie wizje i oceny komunizmu (1917–1989)*, Warszawa 2020, pp. 79–93.

³² On the consequences of the disclosure of the Katyn case for the anti-Communist problem in the Polish underground of independence see: K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 241–244.

³³ AAN, 228/17–8, Działalność Kominternu na ziemiach polskich od zawarcia układu polsko-sowieckiego z dn. 30 VII 1941, 1 March 1943 r., col. 8–22. Według Władysława Chojnackiego najprawdopodobniej jest to wydawnictwo NSZ lub SN; W. Chojnacki, *Bibliografia zwartych i ulotnych druków konspiracyjnych wydanych na ziemiach polskich pod okupacją niemiecką w latach 1939–1945*, Warszawa 2005, p. 73.

³⁴ AAN, 228/17–8, Działalność Kominternu na ziemiach polskich od zawarcia układu polsko-sowieckiego z dn. 30 VII 1941, 1 March 1943, col. 22.

³⁵ AAN, 206/2, O właściwy odwet. Do Pana Premiera Rządu Polskiego w Londynie, 1943, col. 3.

³⁶ In his writings, the KN emphasized: “The fight against communism must today be treated equally and in parallel with the fight against the German occupant. And it must be remembered that, unlike the fight with Germany, the struggle with communism will not end with the end of the occupation.”; *Taktyka Kominternu*, „Nowa Polska”, 5 May 1943, no. 51; see also: K. Sacewicz, *Koncepcje przeciwdziałania sowiecko-komunistycznemu zagrożeniu bezpieczeństwa państwa w myśli programowej i publicystyce centralnych agend ruchu narodowego...*, pp. 165–166.

³⁷ The Chadecka “Reforma” in this matter stated: “With the help of the awareness campaign, we have to make sure that there is no man in Poland who does not know ... that cooperation with the PPR or other Soviet institutions in Poland is the same treachery of the state as cooperation with the Gestapo and that in the future in the same way it will be treated by the Polish state and punished”; *Wobec niebezpieczeństwa bolszewickiego*, „Reforma”, 10 May 1943, no. 7.

of Soviet disposition centers”³⁸. The Christian Democrats in the Polish underground became one of the most ardent advocates of combating communism. Its radicalism in this regard was equal to the concepts of the SN³⁹, as well as National Armed Forces (NSZ)⁴⁰. At the same time, the SP did not deny the fact that the basic weapon in the fight against „K” is and should be the unity of society and the persistence of anti-communist attitudes, especially as communism was seen as an „epidemic disease” which cannot be eliminated with military means only⁴¹. The Union of the National Rebirth oscillated around the position of the „Romb”, which by unambiguously classifying Polish communists as traitors, agents of hostile powers, advocated the use of methods and means appropriate to this type of threat⁴². However, it is in organizations and environments of National Radical Camp (ONR) provenience, among others by the „Szańca” group, the most offensive concepts of anti-Communist action were formulated.⁴³

As of mid-1943, the position represented by Henryk Glass’s „Blok” was taken into account in the conspiratorial deliberations on methods and the formula for counteracting the communist threat⁴⁴. This agenda strengthened the position of supporters of the „K”.

³⁸ *Wobec niebezpieczeństwa bolszewickiego*, „Reforma”, 10 May 1943, no 7; see also [Komuna...], „Reforma”, 15 August 1943, no. 9; *Totalna mobilizacja przeciw komunizmowi*, „Naród”, August-September 1943, no 8–9; [Komuna przeszła do ofensywy...], „Nakazy”, 18 October 1943, no 34; *Weszliśmy w ciężki okres finału*, „Nakazy”, 20 February 1944, no 4(47); *W momencie decydujących rozstrzygnięć*, „Reforma”, 30 June 1943, no 8. In this article we read: “Time to proceed to liquidation of these pests”.

³⁹ The press department of the “Square” wrote that “both the saboteurs and the treacherous comrades of the People’s Army are recruiting – they deserve a strong response with a bullet in their heads”; *Armia Ludowa narzędziem wroga*, „Polak”, 20 October 1943, no. 19. In the next article we read: “Down with communism, with the People’s Army, commanded by the Bolsheviks, and composed of communists, Jews and former Soviet prisoners of war. Death of Soviet agents, the Soviets, who plow Poland in their back in 1939 to a German company.”; *Baczność wsi polska*, „Polak”, 2 December 1943, no 22.

⁴⁰ See *W walce z każdym wrogiem*, „Załoga”, 10 July 1943, no. 23; *Likwidować prowokację komunistyczną*, „Wielka Polska”, 28 August 1943, no. 33; *Palący problem*, „Polska Informacja Prasowa”, 23 July 1943, no 28; *Czyn na dzisiaj*, „Wielka Polska”, 31 July 1943, no. 29; *Dość tego*, „Naród i Wojsko”, September 1943, no. 8(12).

⁴¹ *Alarm*, „Nakazy”, 16 August 1943, no. 24.

⁴² *Bezkarność zdrady*, „Polska Odrodzona”, June 1943, no. 5.

⁴³ In the conspiracy of the „Szańca” we read: “Today, however, is the last moment to neutralize and destroy communism. [...] Commune must be destroyed to the end! The fight against communism must be absolute, just as the opponent is ruthless. The Communist, traitor and salesman, like the Gestapo, cannot find shelter, aid, indulgence and pity. We throw our last call to the utterly unaware or deaf members of communist organizations so far: break immediately with communism, otherwise you will be treated as complicit. Only after cleaning up the front of the national front of communism, will we manage the situation and be able to lead the proper fight against Germany.”; *Prowokatorzy i zbrodniarze*, „Szaniec”, 23 October 1943, no. 14(105).

⁴⁴ See more: K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 52–55; idem, *Wprowadzenie* [in:] *Adalbert Rock [Henryk Glass], Mein Kampf Józefa Stalina. Rewolucyjna strategia i taktyka komunistycznego imperializmu*, wprowadzenie i oprac. K. Sacewicz, Białystok-Warszawa 2020, pp. 7–34. idem, *W walce o Wielką Polskę. Centralne Porozumienie Antykomunistyczne „Blok” – sojusznik Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych na przeciwkomunistycznym froncie (1943–1944)* [in:] *Wywiadowcza i kontrwywiadowcza działalność podziemia narodowego przeciwko Niemcom i komunistom w latach 1940–1945*, ed. W.J. Muszyński, Warszawa 2019, pp. 140–158; idem, *Koncepcje przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniu sowiecko-komunistycznemu w publicystyce i opracowaniach wewnętrznych „Bloku” Henryka Glassa (1939–1944)* [in:] *Państwo konspiracyjne XIX i XX wieku*, ed. E. Hull, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 129–139; idem, *Koncepcje przeciwdziałania sowiecko-komunistycznemu zagro-*

It called, among others, to undertake an immediate, planned and ruthless struggle with the communist underground⁴⁵, but underlined that apart from the actual indications for the liquidation of „K” there are legal grounds for sanctioning such actions⁴⁶. On the basis of them the Polish communists, both in Poland and in the USSR were charged with the crime of treason⁴⁷. Emphasizing the special role of the judiciary of the Republic of Poland in the process of eliminating sources of threat to state security, the need to first judge the „K” leadership was pointed out⁴⁸. In the case of Wanda Wasilewska and Zygmunt Berling, as well as other leading “Polish” communist activists, this meant that, according to Henryk Glass, the only, obvious and necessary sentence was death.

Such assumptions of anti-communist action were among others the consequence of “Plan »C«”⁴⁹. – the top-secret document prepared by the „Blok”. It assumed that defensive actions would be planned and multi-sectoral⁵⁰. The role of intelligence in these activities was to acquire information about the forces and organizational structures of the opponent, its methods of functioning and planned operations. Moreover, attention was paid to the need to organize this section, among others by increasing its quantitative status, expanding the intelligence database and by centralizing the intercepted messages, while maintaining decentralization in fieldwork⁵¹. On the other hand, the tasks of anti-communist propaganda focused on paralyzing Soviet-communist agitation and propaganda activities, and then on gaining masses for their own anti-communist initiatives⁵². An important role in the anti-communist action was foreseen for the Polish judiciary⁵³, stressing the importance and necessity of using force solutions at the same time⁵⁴.

In April 1943 the national decision makers were sent “the Memorandum on the Dangers of the Communist Revolution in Poland” by the unspecified representatives of

zeniu bezpieczeństwa państwa w myśli programowej i publicystyce centralnych agend ruchu narodowego..., pp. 143–147; idem, *W służbie Niepodległej. Henryk Glass (1896–1984)*, Olsztyn 2019, pp. 36–44;

⁴⁵ *Likwidować prowokację komunistyczną!*, „Ajencja A.”, 26 July 1943, no. 5.

⁴⁶ K. Sacewicz, *Koncepcje przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniu sowiecko-komunistycznemu w publicystyce i opracowaniach wewnętrznych „Bloku”...*, p. 136; idem, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 29–30.

⁴⁷ On the pages of „Ajencji A.” – the press body of „Bloku” – we read: „The guilty of committing the crime of state, and therefore simply the traitor to his own state, becomes every member of these organizations not only by working in them, but by the very fact of belonging to them. It is under the law for the admission of this crime of criminal liability even if the offense was committed outside the country”; *Zdraycy pod sąd!*, „Ajencja A.”, 16 September 1943, no. 7.

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁴⁹ AAN, 228/1–1, Plan „C”, 1943, col. 10–13 (also AIPN, 0397/251, vol. 1, col. 204–207); „Blok” *Henryka Glassa wobec zagrożenia sowiecko-komunistycznego na podstawie „Planu C” (październik 1943 r.)*, ed. K. Sacewicz, „Echa Przeszłości” 2007, vol. 8, pp. 221–234; K. Sacewicz, *Koncepcje przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniu sowiecko-komunistycznemu w publicystyce i opracowaniach wewnętrznych „Bloku”...*, pp. 137–138.

⁵⁰ AAN, 228/1–1, Plan „C”, 1943, col. 10.

⁵¹ Ibidem, col. 11.

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Ibidem, col. 12.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, col. 12–13.

“Polish associations from Warsaw, Cracow, Lviv, Vilnius, Poznan”⁵⁵. The authors of the document assumed to fight any “K” influence in society. To this end, they emphasized the need for: 1) increased activity of the Government Delegate RP and political organizations; 2) a military decision for the simultaneous activation of the AK and NSZ “to carry out defensive and offensive combat action”⁵⁶, 3) preparation of intelligence “for decisive propaganda and armed combat against the Soviet-communist group in Poland”⁵⁷, 4) organizing propaganda. The first issue was adopting one of the three proposals for the organization of a political and social agreement platform: (a) the establishment of the Anti-Communist Committee by the political parties to which they would delegate their representatives; b) the formation of a Defense Committee of Poland composed of representatives of the largest political parties and other independence organizations of the underground⁵⁸, c) leading to the coalition of the most important political parties by the plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Poland⁵⁹. With regard to the issue of propaganda, apart from the recommendations of its centralization, the intensification of the flow of materials between independence centers, the memorial presented a detailed plan of propaganda and publishing action. Its purpose was an attempt to create an effective counterweight to “K” among others by using brochures and leaflets⁶⁰.

The basic means of combating the communist underground of the militant groups, advocating both moderate and radical ways of resolving the “K” issue, were the appeals directed to the society to preserve unity, responsibility, national mobilization and absolute rulings against the Government of the Republic of Poland. Derogations from such attitudes, were called national treason or even crimes by the press⁶¹.

In the autumn of 1943, KG AK contributed significantly to the formation of an unambiguous PPP position on the methods and forms of combating communist factors. Within

⁵⁵ Zob. AAN, 203/VII-59, Memoriał w sprawie niebezpieczeństwa rewolucji komunistycznej w Polsce, April 1943, col. 1–16 (also AIPN, 0397/251, vol. 1, col. 182–195); *Ocena działalności podziemia komunistycznego na podstawie Memoriału w sprawie niebezpieczeństwa rewolucji komunistycznej w Polsce (kwiecień 1943 r.)*, ed. K. Sacewicz, „Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2009, no. 1 (14), pp. 385–416. On the author of the memorial see: K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, p. 256.

⁵⁶ AAN, 203/VII-59, Memoriał w sprawie niebezpieczeństwa rewolucji komunistycznej w Polsce, April 1943 r., col. 13.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, col. 13.

⁵⁸ The “K” issues were to be one of many that would be dealt with by the multi-sectoral body of Underground Poland.

⁵⁹ AAN, 203/VII-59, Memoriał w sprawie niebezpieczeństwa rewolucji komunistycznej w Polsce, April 1943, col. 13. These proposals (see points “a” and “c”) proved to be in line with PPP’s organizational initiatives, i.e. the founding of SKA and KRP-RJN.

⁶⁰ Zob. AAN, 228/1–1, Plan akcji wydawniczo-propagandowej (akcja przeciwkomunistyczna), 2 April 1943, col. 27–27a; ibidem, 203/VII-59, Memoriał w sprawie niebezpieczeństwa rewolucji komunistycznej w Polsce, April 1943, col. 15; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 254–256.

⁶¹ *Wobec niebezpieczeństwa bolszewickiego*, „Reforma”, 10 V 1943, no. 7; see also *Prawda o niebezpieczeństwie sowieckim*, „Tydzień”, 7 October 1943, no. 28.

the Propaganda Department (“253”) BIP KG AK sub-division “Antyk” was established⁶². The military division of the underground state, through the creation of the sub-division “Antyk”, accepted it as the dominant propaganda-political, although uncompromising action against “K”⁶³. The sphere of offensive, planned application of military means to the communist underground was officially abandoned by the military leadership.

The increase in the threat from the “K” influenced not only the activation of the AK’s political and propaganda structures but also intelligence. On December 19, 1943, the manual “On matters of K and related organizations” was published⁶⁴. It defined the organizational scope of the “K” concept, and above all intelligence tasks and the form of their implementation. The manual also described the rules for counteracting the communist threat. They consisted of: propaganda activities – raising public awareness of the real purpose of the communist underground, strengthening the protection of its own ranks from surveillance and communist infiltration. In the event of such a threat the instructions obliged them to abolish it. The possibility of armed action against “K” was allowed, but only if its activity “is directed against the interests of the Polish people, the Polish government and the Polish Armed Forces (banditry, organized, provocative action or hostile activities)”⁶⁵.

The response to various claims, projects or even the demand for the formation of an official and coherent policy of the independence environments towards the communists was first of all appointment of the Social Committee of Anti-Communist on the 26th of October 1943 at the meeting of the CRC (SKA)⁶⁶. Its creation, and thus giving emphasis

⁶² Tadeusz Żenczykowski („Kowalik”, „Krawczyk”) was the organizer and head of the subgroup, his deputy was the „Pobudka” activist, editor of „Głos Polski” – Wacław Kozłowski („Kaniewski”), liaison and secretary of the subdivision – the wife of colonel Jan Rzepecki – Irena Maleńska („Ela”). In August 1944 there were 20 people; M. Ney-Krwawicz, *Komenda Główna Armii Krajowej 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1990, p. 197; W. Bartoszewski, T. Żenczykowski, *Wydział „R” w BIP KG AK. Rozmowa Władysława Bartoszewskiego z Tadeuszem Żenczykowskim*, „Zeszyty Historyczne” 1984, vol. 70, pp. 64, 75; G. Mazur, *Biuro Informacji i Propagandy SZP-ZWZ-AK 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1987, pp. 72, 144, 147; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 269–271.

⁶³ The weapon of „Antyk” in the ideological-political struggle was special press. Starting from November 1943 there was a biweekly „Głos Ludu”, as well as a biweekly addressed to the workers, entitled „Wolność Robotnicza; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 42, 44; idem, *Prasa Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego...*, pp. 270–271. In addition, every two weeks, a newsletter was published for the editorial offices of the conspiratorial magazine „Agencja R”, including material useful for propaganda on the “K” issue. Additionally, since December 1943 „Antyk” – for the needs of the political leadership of Underground Poland – issued a weekly “Rak” report; AAN, 202/1 – 38, *Sprawozdanie z działalności komisji programowej S. K. A. za okres I XII 1943 – 1 V 1944*, 6 May 1944, col. 41. Quite a wide range of publishing of the subdivision – issued under the action of SKA – were non-serial publications and brochures; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, p. 44.

⁶⁴ See AIPN, 0397/251, vol. 1, Instrukcja w sprawach „K” i organizacji pokrewnych, 19 December 1943, col. 111–118.

⁶⁵ AIPN Gd, 0046/433, t. 1, *Walka Armii Krajowej i Delegatury Rządu...*, pp. 56–55.

⁶⁶ AAN, 199/1, Protokół z posiedzenia KRP 26 X 1943r., col. 33–34; G. Mazur, *Sprawozdanie z działalności Społecznego Komitetu Antykomunistycznego z pierwszej połowy 1944r.*, „Studia Historyczne” 1997, vol. 4, p. 422; K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 39–40. The Committee formed 24 conspiratorial political organizations, including the four largest Polish Underground State (PPP) parties: Polish Socialist Party – Freedom-Equality-Independence (PPS – WRN), Peoples’ Party (SL), National Party (SN) and Labour Party (SP).

to propaganda and political forms of combating communists⁶⁷, did not mean that the confrontation with them was of such a dimension. Its character was not dependent solely on the guidelines and attitudes of independence factors, but mainly on the activities of the opponent. Since 1943, he has intensified the course of aggressive policy towards independence organisations – not only in propaganda but also militaristic dimension⁶⁸. This as well as the bandit-robbery activity of the branches of the communist-Soviet provenience⁶⁹ led in consequence to the retaliatory actions. The main burden was on NSZ⁷⁰. Despite the negative PPR rating by the AK and the NSZ, they represented different approaches to combating the “K”. These differences revealed themselves in the official commentary on the events at Borow in the Kraśnik region on August 9, 1943.⁷¹ On 18 November 1943, a notice was circulated in the “Biuletyn Informacyjny”: “The Armed Forces of the Country have nothing to do with the abominable murder on the 5 August of this year of the division of the so-called People’s Army near Borow in Lubelskie Voivodship”⁷². The NSZ received this message as the AK’s inconsistency in the anti-communist action⁷³. The most eloquent point in this matter, as well as reflecting the essence of the ONR

Franciszek Białas („Góralczyk”) was the president of the new organ z PPS – WRN, whereas his deputies were Stefan Korboński from SL and Francis Urbanski from SP.

⁶⁷ In the period from 1 December 1943 to 1 May 1944, the Committee issued 4 brochures (total over 21,000 copies), special editions (total 145,000 copies) and 18 different leaflets (total volume of 400,000 copies); AAN, 202/I – 38, Sprawozdanie z działalności komisji programowej S. K. A. za okres 1 XII 1943–1 V 1944, 6 May 1944, col. 40–41; G. Mazur, *Biuro Informacji...*, p. 145; idem, *Sprawozdanie z działalności...*, pp. 424–425.

⁶⁸ Refer to: P. Gontarczyk, *Polska Partia Robotnicza. Droga do władzy 1941–1944*, Warszawa 2003, pp. 184–185, 283–284; 292–300, 330–360.

⁶⁹ On the bandit activity of a large number of GL-AL divisions, as well as Soviet diversion and partisan divisions see M. Krzysztofiński, *Działalność grupy GL „Iskra”. Przyczynek do badań nad stosunkiem PPR i GL do ludności żydowskiej na Rzeszowszczyźnie*, „Glaukopis” 2008, no. 11–12, pp. 174–175; idem, *Komuniści na Rzeszowszczyźnie 1918–1944/1945*, Rzeszów 2010, s. 188–220; *Polska Partia Robotnicza – Gwardia Ludowa...*, passim; K. Sacewicz, *Obraz sowieckich akcji dywersyjnych w okupowanej Polsce (1941–1943) na łamach „Biuletynu Informacyjnego”*, „Echa Przeszłości” 2003, vol. 4, pp. 127–150; M. Bechta, *Rewolucja. Mit. Bandytyzm. Komuniści na Podlasiu w latach 1939–1944*, Warszawa–Biała Podlaska 2000, pp. 69–81; idem, ... *między Bolszewią a Niemcami. Konspiracja polityczna i wojskowa Polskiego Obozu Narodowego na Podlasiu w latach 1939–1952*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 218–219, 221–223.

⁷⁰ Zob. M.J. Chodakiewicz, *Akcja Specjalna NSZ na Lubelszczyźnie*, „Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny” 1993, no. 2, part 1, pp. 53–87, no. 3, part 2, pp. 45–73; *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne wobec podziemia komunistycznego. Instrukcja ...*, pp. 289–301.

⁷¹ Refer to: M.J., *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne. „Ząb” przeciwko dwóm wrogom*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 121–124; idem, *Akcja Specjalna...*, part 1, pp. 71–74; R. Drabik, *W wydarzenia pod Borowem. Wymuszona egzekucja czy zasłużona kara?*, „Glaukopis” 2003, no. 1, pp. 115–143; idem, *Polska Partia Robotnicza, Gwardia Ludowa – Armia Ludowa na Lubelszczyźnie 1942–1944* [in:] *Polska Partia Robotnicza – Gwardia Ludowa...*, pp. 108–109; P. Gontarczyk, op. cit., pp. 285–287.

⁷² „Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 18 November 1943, no. 40(201). AK KG considered the NSZ combat actions against “K” as ill-considered and highly embarrassing for official factors, and at the same time providing arguments for PPR propaganda; *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*, vol. 3: *April 1943–July 1944*, Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków 1990, p. 223.

⁷³ *NSZ potępione – Armia Ludowa uznana*, „Szaniec”, 4 December 1943, no. 15(106). “Blok” critically responded to the attitude of the AK as well; *Nieporozumienie*, „Ajencja A.”, 27 November 1943, no. 11; see also: *Dwa rozkazy – jedna prawda*, „Naród i Wojsko”, 20 December 1943, no. 10(20).

community's attitude to the idea of fighting communism, or Soviets in general, was the reaction of the "Szaniec", in which we read: "So the men of the People's Party, defenders of the masses of the Polish people and you all our friends and enemies, take into account that there are no enemies number 1 and 2 in Poland and for Poland. There is one enemy. **No matter what it is called – German or Bolshevik.** [...] The whole world is fighting with Germany. [...] Only the Germans are fighting with Soviet Russia today. Therefore, the liquidation of Soviet agents in Poland, even though they dressed in the most beautiful patriotic-Polish feathers – is a duty, a necessity. **This is what Polish national interest demands.** And that is why we will fight regardless of whether you like it or not. [...] The line of Polish policy cannot go down the winding paths, it cannot do twists and turns, it cannot be opportunistic. It must be consistent, clear and understandable for the whole nation. [...] **The nation needs leaders with character, tough, consistent, far-sighted.** [...] Reason tells us that you have to prepare for the worst. Self-defense instinct dictates that evil cannot be comforted that it cannot be tolerated but must be combated. Therefore, regardless of the course of historical events and our vicissitudes, we have to clean the country of Soviet troops and Kremlin agents. Under conditions of bondage, under conditions where the enemy imposes us with unequal fight – **there are no "abominable murders". There is only a need for self-protection**"⁷⁴.

The PPP course "K", stabilized at the end of 1943, did not undergo further re-evaluation in the following year. Still, the basic weapon in the fight against communist factors was propaganda, information and publicity activities. The structures of independence with greater force, and especially on a grander scale, reacted to the next political and military initiatives of the comparty in the occupied country. A specially developed political-propaganda unity emerged in response to the PPR's creation by the National Council of National Unity (KRN). It was not only the response of individual press bodies of the Underground Poland⁷⁵, Poland but, above all, the collective – signed by the 24 independent conspiracy organizations – appeal "to the Polish Nation", which stigmatized the activities of the Communist Party⁷⁶. Until the outbreak of insurrectionary fights in Warsaw, the

⁷⁴ *NSZ potępienie – Armia Ludowa uznana*, „Szaniec”, 4 December 1943, no. 15(106).

⁷⁵ This reaction was immediate, substantive and covering almost all political and military organizations of the PPP; see K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 300–307.

⁷⁶ We read in it: "The PPR acting on our soil, a foreign communist agent, conducts its action in the most vital interests of Poland according to the directives of the external and non-Polish center of disposition. [...] The "Polish Workers' Party" and its expositions, allegedly "Polish" People's Army, declare their willingness to give back the eastern territories of the Republic of Russia and to fight endowed with the trust of the nation, the legitimate government and the army of Poland, and their counterparts in the country. In pursuit of the weakening and demolition of the nation's forces in the crucial period of the war, communist agents call on the "National Council" and "Headquarters of the People's Army" and announce the creation of the «Provisional Government». Regardless of the negligence of the forces and meanings that the above-mentioned fictitious externalities, calculated for publicity, the PPR action should be strongly reviled, as a betrayal of the nation and the Polish State"; AAN, 200/2, *Do Narodu Polskiego*, [1944], col. 38; *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach...*, vol. 3, p. 268. see also K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, p. 308.

PPP position on the forms and methods of anti-communist action was not modified. Its main pillar was to be and was indeed SKA. Unfortunately, this was too late for the effects of its activity to be even greater. In addition, in assessing the activities of the underground of the “Polish” communists, it should be borne in mind that, regardless of the question of the organization of the independence structures of the “K” section, the most determinant element that conditioned the possibility of defeating the Communists was the entry Red Army on the territory of occupied Poland. Of course, this does not in any way account for the significant delays, inconsistencies⁷⁷ and other weaknesses and errors of the anti-Communist action of Underground Poland⁷⁸.

The increase of the threat from the pro-Soviet factors forced the Polish Underground State, and generally on the independence structures, the absolute necessity of taking protective as well as retaliatory measures. This, in turn, required the formulation and methods of anti-communist action. In this matter, the underground was divided into two informal camps, that is the supporters of hard, ruthless, even armed confrontations with the Communists, and critics of such solutions, who were inclined to take advantage of purely political means. On the one side there were national-democratic, Christian democratic, post-Sanatia, on the other side leftist, popular, democratic and syndicalist organizations, and above all the governmental institutions. As a result of a specific debate, it was not possible for the whole of Poland to work out a single model of anti-Communist action.

Not until autumn 1943 was it defined – by the creation of the SKA – for the Polish Underground State. However, the borders of that state were beyond its influence, among others in the form of NSZ structures not merged with the AK, which by the end of their existence would advocate the need for a strong Soviet-Communist expansion. Thus within the PPP the dominant means of fighting the “K” – also the offensive one – became a political action, expressed by extensive propaganda and information activities. Officially, the use of military tools was limited to defense. An important shortcoming of the anti-communist PPP campaign was the complete lack of use of the role and importance of the Polish judiciary, including in the propaganda dimension. Political constraints, the fear of the propaganda power of the Soviet machine, and the fear of the leftist Polish conspiracy environments for the uncontrolled anti-Communist activities, were the basis of the limited nature of PPP activities in the “K” sector.

Such restrictions were not noticed by the Communists of PPR and AL. In the second half of 1944, the “Polish” Communists, as a result of the Red Army offensive and Mos-

⁷⁷ Lack of consistency – aside from the question of the tactical validity of the use of certain forms of “K” combat – it did not concern right-wing organizations, especially the NSZ. These defined the communists as Soviet agents and therefore advocated the use and application of the resulting measures.

⁷⁸ On the successes and failures of Underground Poland in struggles with structures created by “Polish” communists, see K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, pp. 355–357.

cow's decision, captured the authorities in the lands west of the Bug line. They began the ruthless physical elimination of the **Underworld**. After the Conference in Yalta⁷⁹, which took Poland and Poles not only the eastern lands of the Second Republic, but also the independence and sovereignty of the Communists gained international recognition by creating according to the Yaltan formula TRJN⁸⁰. For the Polish Underground State, this meant his further extermination. Methods and forms of its eradication were developed by the Soviets over the years of their rule and the terror of the Soviet Union. Their victims were entire structures of independence conspiracy, including soldiers of Anti-Communist⁸¹.

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⁷⁹ About Polish Underground State relations to conference in Yalta see more K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa Polski Podziemnej wobec konferencji jaltańskiej i jej następstw* [in:] *Jalta. Rzeczywistość, mit i pamięć*, red. S. Łukasiewicz, Warszawa 2019, pp. 102–130

⁸⁰ In the opinion of Marek Kornat Yalta was „false vision of world peace”; M. Kornat, *Jalta – fałszywa wizja pokoju światowego* [in:] *Jalta. Rzeczywistość...*, pp. 15–47.

⁸¹ See K. Sacewicz, *Antykomunista w komunizmie. Adam Roman Keller w świetle aktu oskarżenia Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (18 sierpnia 1953)* [in:] *Warmińsko-mazurskie studia z historii najnowszej*, red. S. Nowakowski, K. Sacewicz, t. 2, Olsztyn 2019, pp. 229–254.

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The Polish Underground State vs. the Polish Communists and the concept of counteraction

Summary: During World War II, the Polish Underground State had to face yet another enemy, namely the communist underground, in its struggle for Poland's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The article systematizes the existing knowledge about the anti-communist units of the Underground State and the forms and methods used in the battle against the communist enemy. The obstacles that prevented the Polish Underground State from implementing radical methods of counteracting communist forces were identified. The communists did not demonstrate such restraint during World War II or the post-war occupation of Poland.

Keywords: anti-communism, Polish Underground State, Polish communists, World War II