Dialogic Basis of the Categories of “Openness” and “Tolerance” to the “Other” in Modern Political Discourse – Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel

[Dialogiczne podłoże kategorii „otwartości” i „tolerancji” wobec „Innego” we współczesnym dyskursie politologicznym – Martin Buber i Gabriel Marcel]


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Summary: The article analyzes the dialogical nature of the concepts of “tolerance”, “freedom”, “openness”. The interpretation of the dialogical relationship and the appearance of “Other” in it as opposed to “I” through the prism of the concepts of M. Buber and G. Marcel are analyzed. The impact of philosophers of dialogue on the formation of the modern meaning of the concepts “tolerance”, “other”, “openness” is substantiated. The dialogical methodology of interpersonal communications as one of the options for political interaction is considered. The relation “I-You” and the relation “I-It” as principles of construction of mass communication and interpersonal interaction are investigated. The rise in understanding the “Other” in the context of the type of interaction with it is illustrated. The need for mutual openness to enable tolerance is established. Tolerance is seen as the mutual acceptance of two equal freedoms without a dichotomous division into primary and secondary. On the example of dialogic concepts of M. Buber and G. Marcel, the types of dialogical interaction with the “Other” and the possible interpretation of the “Other”, including its typology, are demonstrated. The influence of dialogic interpretation of intersubjective connection on the formation of modern European values is determined.

Słowa kluczowe: dyskurs polityczny; tolerancja; wolność; otwartość; „Inny”; dialog; stosunek; relacja „Ja-Ty”; przynależność.

Keywords: political discourse; tolerance; freedom; openness; “Other”; dialogue; relationship; “I-Thou” relation; belonging.

Introduction

The relevance of the study is predetermined by the transformational events in the European and Ukrainian societies, as well as the crisis phenomena that have been recently accompanying it on its European path. In our opinion, the study of the phenomenon of tolerance, its manifestation in politics and its influence on the formation of democratic institutions is becoming increasingly relevant given that most political systems in post-communist countries today are in transition from authoritarianism to a new type of political regime. “The vector of their further social and political transformations – either the establishment of a consolidated liberal-democratic regime or a return to authoritarian practices – largely depends on whether the principle of tolerance will be established in these societies in general and in the political environment in particular” (Shypunov H., 2012, p. 136).

Social tensions and split in views on the further vector of development of society lead to a constant return to the revision of values and their fundamental principles. “Recent events in the world, including mass terrorist attacks, anti-terrorist operations, bombing of eastern countries, encroachment on the sovereignty of their neighbors, clashes of different cultures and religions, accompanied by forceful actions and death – are nothing but a lack of dialogue” (Poliarush B., 2017, p. 77).
The philosophy of dialogue is a branch of philosophy, the representatives of which introduced the concepts of “tolerance” and “openness” in their modern meaning, the importance of which, in the realities that have developed in Ukraine and Europe to date, is beyond doubt. Consideration of the categories “Other”, “Tolerance” and “Openness”, which are fundamental in the philosophy of dialogue, will help us outline the basic importance that their developers invested in them in their concepts that have become fundamental to European political discourse. In addition, it will make it possible to understand the cause of misunderstanding and conflict with the “Other”, to propose a solution to this conflict, to avoid manipulation in the interpretation of the above concepts in order to preserve the correct vector of formation of values of an open society, as well as to resolve problematic issues to offer an optimal way out of the situation by reaching a real consensus in misunderstanding through scientific discourse and mutual respect for the “Other” and for ourselves, rather than through resorting to arguments of force and coercion so often used in our time.

The category of “Other” and the attainment of understanding with it, preserving one’s own “I” as personal, acquire relevant meaning in the philosophy of dialogue between the Jewish thinker Martin Buber and the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel.

It is important to reach a dialogue with the “Other” in the concepts of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel, to form and preserve their own “I”, as well as to achieve equality of the two subjects of conversation. The choice of these philosophers is not accidental, since they were the ones who were creatively working during the crisis in Europe, experienced the absence of dialogue and violence. It is through their understanding of the importance of a dialogue that we understand the importance of their views for the current crisis situation in Ukraine and transformative changes in Europe.

**Dialogic Understanding of the Interpersonal Sphere between “I” and “Other”: the Implementation of Tolerance and Openness in the “I-Thou” relation**

Martin Buber begins the concept of dialogism by distinguishing the concept of “dialogue” and the concept of “communication”. “In relation to this difference between the I-Thou and the I-It relationship, Buber provides compelling phenomenological descriptions. He discovers a corresponding difference between the roles of the respective subjects who say ‘I.’ In the one relationship, the ‘I’ features as an actor, in the other as an ob-
server” (Habermas J., 2015, p.11). He argues the difference by the limited communication that is within or rather in the framework of linguistic communication between people. A remark on this type of interpersonal interaction, which is understood as “dry” communication, is devoid of existential content, i.e. metaphysical character, which can turn simple communication into a relationship. In contrast to this formulation of language, he describes the sphere of the silence, where the dialogue between “I” and “Other” occurs, or as the thinker himself formulates: “Thou” (or “You”). “The silent is the highest manifestation of openness, i.e. the openness of the intimate or, even better to say, the openness of the private, since if we use the concept of “openness” in the context of Martin Buber’s dialogic relationship, it should be borne in mind that it is private openness” (Kovalchuk M., 2017, p. 20).

Indeed, dialogue also uses a language for people to understand and accept each other. The philosopher himself defends the view that this “language can be deprived of all sensory signs and remain a language” (Buber M., 1995, p. 96). Symbolic language is the prerogative of communication enclosed within its framework. Communication between people involves the exchange of information between one subject of communication and another. The exchange of information, in essence, is nothing more than the transfer of partial and empirical knowledge. Thus, in a dialogic relationship “knowledge is not needed. After all, where there is openness between people, even if not in words, the sacred word of dialogue was heard” (Buber M., 1995, p. 96). In a real dialogue, there is no division of the two participants into subject and object, or the one who transmits something and the one who receives this “something”. Here we notice “the author’s emphasis on the equality of the two, the mutual desire to move towards each other, and to penetrate each other, thus entering the interpersonal sphere and overcoming privacy” (Poliarush B., 2017, p. 77).

Martin Buber formulates three ways of perceiving the other in order to delineate the boundaries of dialogue and finally separate it from a certain confusion with communication, which takes place in the everyday interpretation of this phenomenon: 1. Observation; 2. Contemplation; 3. Penetration.

Observation is nothing but a way of perceiving the other in terms of science, which in turn should lead “I” to new knowledge. The purpose of this perception is to obtain information that involves the activity of “I” only as a desire to discover something new, and the fear of missing a detail. The “Other” is perceived by us as nothing more than an object, or rather an item, which is subject to the activity of active “I”. The observer divides his counterpart into small particles so that he can easily recognize
him in parts, thus withdrawal the importance of his counterpart for him-
self as a whole. “I” here seeks only certain features that are clearly repre-
sented in the object of study and will serve in the future as arguments in 
an attempt to classify and formalize a whole class of things that are simi-
lar to it. “I” focuses only on the openness of the other, thus not offering its own openness.

The spectator is not so scrupulous and meticulous in his approach to 
the “Other”, he is not afraid to forget the features and partial details of the 
object of contemplation. What he contemplates is seen by him as an object 
of pleasure, and the purpose of contemplation is generally to get pleasure 
from communicating with his counterpart. Therefore, attention should be 
paid to the ways of communication that occurs as a result of the two previ-
ous attitudes to the other, then the lack of dialogue in them is stated. Here 
we see communication, the task of which is only to transfer or acquire 
knowledge about the object. The similarity of these two types of consider-
ation of the “Other” by “I” should be asserted. Martin Buber expresses 
this similarity in the following words: “What the observer and the specta-
tor have in common is that the One and the Other have an attitude, name-
ly, the desire to perceive the person before their eyes; that it be an object 
separate from them and their personal life, which is why it can be correct-
ly perceived” (Buber M., 1995, p.100). Thus, in these two ways of interac-
tion there is no desire for private openness, and therefore there is no inter-
personal sphere.

The next way of communicating our “I” with the other is penetration, 
and the very penetration in the “Other” is a relationship with him, which 
generates dialogue and entry into the interpersonal sphere. This act does 
not carry a communicative and information load. Our counterpart is not 
seen as a collection or accumulation of something here, but as a whole, as 
a value for us. This moment of communication, in contrast to the previous 
two, is not characterized by the activity of one and falling under this activ-
ity of the “Other”, and the activity of the two, moving towards each other, 
private openness to each other. Martin Buber formulates the importance 
of penetration for dialogue in his opinion: “The limits of the possibility of 
dialogue are the limits of penetration” (Buber M., 1995, p.101).

The awareness of freedom is an important aspect in relation to the 
other: both the freedom of our own “I” and the freedom of the “Other”. “Be-
cause dialogue in its essence is not the suppression of one freedom by an-
other, or the domination of one over the other, but first of all the meeting of 
these two freedoms” (Poliarush B., 2017, p. 77). We have the freedom to 
refuse to open up to the Other, the same is possible vice versa. The very 
act of openness is a manifestation of the freedom of the two, because our
“I” and “Other” open up to each other, giving the opportunity to penetrate each other: “Of course, to meet the “Other”, you need to have a starting point, to be yourself. A dialogue between just individuals is only an essay, it may be carried out only between persons” (Buber M., 1995, p. 101). Freedom also distinguishes the act of dialogue and the act of communication by the fact that the exchange can take place without free movement towards it, it can be forced, including by actual force. “But Martin Buber emphasizes that freedom is always accompanied by the responsibility for us and for our “Other”. Because we are responsible for every appeal to us, for every openness to us, for every relationship with us” (Kovalchuk M., 2017, p. 19).

The philosopher distinguishes three types of dialogue: 1. Real (relationship); 2. Technical (communication); 3. Monologue that is “disguised” as a dialogue.

Technical and monologue types of dialogue are essentially nothing more than communication. Because technical dialogue does not involve any transition into a relationship, or even an attempt to consider own “Other” as a person. The “Other” emerges here as a means to an end for our “I”, nothing more. A monologue can also be seen as a communication, because a monologue also takes place between two interlocutors, when neither hears whom he is communicating with, although formally communication takes place: “A living monologue will never see the Other as something it is not, but with what he still enters into communication” (Buber M., 1995, p. 109). Thus, we can assume that the philosopher divided two ways of interpersonal existence between “I” and “Other”: dialogue, which finds its implementation in the relationship; and monologue that happens all the time between people who are just in contact with each other, looking for some benefit from it for themselves.

“Martin Buber does not see dialogue only as a relationship between two people, because in political interaction we have to be in a relationship with a much larger number of people. In the political context, the philosopher proposes the concepts of community and connection” (Poliarush B., 2017, p. 76). It is also worth noting here that despite the number of people we may be in a relationship with, the subjects of that relationship will be divided into our own selves and others. The communion between people is built as a result of our “I” being in relation with the “Other”, and finding ourselves in the development of our individual freedom next to it. That is, people who are united by the idea of community are in a relationship with each other, voluntarily and consciously, and everything that happens between them comes from their good will. Here we cannot divide “I” and the “Other” into primary and secondary, in this case we see equality of two
active subjects in which two bear equal responsibility for continuation or the termination of community: “Community is community which emerges (so far we know only this), it is not the presence of many people next to each other, and their existence in each other; even if they all attain the same goal together, they feel the movement towards each other everywhere, the dynamic orientation towards each other, the waves that go from “I” to “Thou”” (Buber M., 1995, p. 119). Therefore, it is quite rational to conclude that Martin Buber came to this idea under the influence of his desire to find philosophical grounds for finding and implementing intercultural dialogue between nations, the absence of which was felt by the thinker and the majority of the population throughout the twentieth century.

Collectivity or connectedness is the opposite of community. This way of communication of several is negatively colored through suppression of personal freedom from which we should refuse, entering into connection with “Others”. This type of communication involves a vertical division into primary and secondary. Namely, the one who is deprived of liberty and the one who deprives: “Collectivity is based on the organic weakening of the personal, while community is grounded on its growth and confirmation in the pursuit of each other” (Buber M., 1995, p. 96). “The philosopher also takes the idea of collectivity from his own experience, namely from an attempt to build a totalitarian regime in Germany in the 1930s, from which he himself suffered” (Kovalchuk M., 2017, p. 19).

“Other” in the philosophy of dialogue of Martin Buber appears before the subject, which we will further understand as “I”, according to the attitude of this “I”. First of all, it should be noted that a person’s attitude to another is determined by the words he utters to him: the world for a person is “… twofold, in accordance with the twofold attitude. The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks” (Buber M., 1970, p. 3). These pairs of basic words are “I-Thou” and “I-It”. These words are the utterance itself, a form that indicates an interpersonal connection, which directly forms the interpersonal sphere between “I” and the other and signals the presence or absence of mutual private openness. “This complex relationship is reflected in the competent use of the system of personal pronouns and of the associated referential terms. The very knowledge of competent speakers about how to use personal pronouns and deictic expressions, which forms the pragmatic frame for any possible communication, depends upon the systematic interpenetration of I–Thou and I–It relations” (Habermas J., 2015, p. 16).

Martin Buber identifies two ways to implement this area: the first is the relation “I-It”, and the second is the relation “I-Thou”. The relation originates from the utterance of another “It”, and is exclusively experien-
tial: “As experience, the world belongs to the primary word “I-It”. The primary word “I-Thou” establishes the world of relation” (Buber M., 1970, p. 6). In the “I-Thou” relationship, the subject does not divide anything into parts, the other is perceived and accepted as a whole. “What, then, do we experience of Thou? Just nothing. For we do not experience it. What, then, do we know of Thou? Just everything. For we know nothing isolated about it any more” (Buber M., 1970, p. 11). Martin Buber does not consider the formula of the relation “I-It” as something negative and opposite to “I-Thou”. On the contrary, “I-Thou” is taken here as what the relationship should grow into, to which it should develop. Indeed, man is by nature a sensual being, one who at first builds his vision of the world only on the basis of the senses and experience, but later on the basis of the senses forms a rational principle, the principle which leads from the corporeal to the spiritual. Nevertheless, when a person is in a relationship of the spirit, his bodily, sensory beginning is preserved, which sooner or later “will make itself felt” by the fact that I will not withstand the relationship and will pass into the attitude. “I-It” is the realm of the objective and the sensory.

On should say about the relationship with God or – to paraphrase it – the relationship with the Eternal “Thou”, which is not conditioned and not limited by the flesh. This relationship is a relationship of pure spirit. An example of this relationship for Martin Buber was Jesus Christ: “For it is the I of unconditional relation in which the man calls his Thou Father in such a way that he himself is simply Son, and nothing else but Son” (Buber M., 1970, p. 66–67). The relationship with God cannot be ruined and transferred to the “I-It” relationship, this relationship is eternal. As the Polish researcher of the philosophy of dialogue Jan Kloczowski writes: “So, the first and fundamental “Thou” for “I” of a man is, first of all, God” (Klochowski J., 2013, p. 45). For Martin Buber, meeting a person is at the same time an opening to the space of an encounter with God (Jasiński K., 2012). According to Buber’s philosophy: “In the order of openness, we first open up another person, but this is possible only because God is above us and watches over us” (Klochovsky J., 2013, p. 49).

Two Ways of Tolerance to Oneself and the “Other”:
the Relation of “Belonging” and “Openness”

In Gabriel Marcel’s philosophy of dialogue, the “Other” appears solely as the person with whom we interact. Dialogue, in the understanding of the philosopher, is not only a way of verbal activity, but also as a way of interaction, the result of which is the conversation and understanding of
the “Other”. Interaction with the “Other” as such is possible in two ways: belonging to the other and openness to the other.

Belonging to the other is possible, as belonging of the “Other” to my “I” and, in turn, belonging of my “I” to the “Other”. On the one hand, we observe the selfishness of “I”, and on the other self-denial of “I”. The relation of belonging is first of all a hierarchical relation: where there is a senior, the one to whom they belong, and the subordinate which is the one who is belonged. Equality in this respect is impossible, because it is “Having as such seems to have a tendency to destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by possessing, but which now absorbs the master who thought he controlled it.” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 164). The relationship of belonging is the interaction of the subject with the object, the person with the thing. Belonging to someone always presupposes the attitude of the person whom he belongs to the person belonged as to a thing.

Since the relationship of belonging between me and my “I” is possible, we can conclude that a person is not integral and harmonious in its essence: “It seems that it is of the very nature of my body, or of my instruments in so far as I treat them as possessions, that they should tend to blot me out, although it is I who possess them.” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 164–165). This bifurcation returns our view to the issue of belonging of me to myself, namely to me, as someone older and more authoritative, that is, there is not one of my “I”, but at least two of my “I”. “Openness” and “tolerance” for the “Other” originate in openness and tolerance for oneself.

If we talk about the belonging of my “I” to the “Other”, then there will be a devaluation of my own “I”: “The threat is the hold exerted by the other qua other, the other which may be the world itself, and before which I so painfully feel that I am I. I hug to myself this thing which may be torn from me, and I desperately try to incorporate it in myself, to form myself and it into a single and indissoluble complex. A desperate, hopeless struggle” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 162–163). This is the relationship of “I-I”, as one that primarily defines the subject as a person, is a determinant of attitude to themselves and the world. Here the issue of dialogic perception of oneself as a value is formulated. After all, when we give ourselves to someone else, we completely devalue ourselves and bow before the authority of another. Here, in relation to “I” and the counterpart, preference is given to the counterpart, due to voluntary humiliation. But is it possible for us to adequately perceive the “Other”? Thus, “I” creates for itself a kind of cult of the other, the attribution of the “Other” to the category of deities, which is a direct sign of the distortion of perception of his counterpart.

There is another statement: I do not belong to anyone. It is here that the independence of our “I” is postulated, the statement of its non-exis-
tence in relation to belonging to the “Other”. But as Gabriel Marcel himself writes: “It may be said that I can easily be indifferent to the fate of this or that object in my possession. But in that case, I should say that the possession is only nominal, or again, residual” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 162). But the possibility of our existence and affirmation without the “Other” is impossible. After all, emphasizing the importance of ourselves and the exaltation of ourselves, we build a relationship of belonging of others to me. Thus, the philosopher puts these three types of perception of himself and others as those that do not correspond to the reality and essence of the true relationship. The above-mentioned options of the relationship of belonging are essentially a coercion relationship. Where is the one who forces and the one who is forced to be in interaction. Communication does not provide a free answer that would correspond to the true thoughts of the forced.

In contrast to the relationship of belonging, Gabriel Marcel offers a relationship of openness to others that leads to dialogue and is carried out in dialogue. The “Other” emerges here as an equal subject who is perceived by us as a value.

“In so far as I shew my own views to myself, I myself become someone else. That, I suppose, is the metaphysical basis for the possibility of expression. I can only express myself in so far as I can become someone else to myself” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 161). This ability characterizes our “I” as capable of an attitude of openness, openness through love. “Love, in so far as distinct from desire or as opposed to desire, love treated as the subordination of the self to a superior reality, a reality at my deepest level more truly me than I am myself love as the breaking of the tension between the self and the other, appears to me to be what one might call the essential ontological datum” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 167). That is, on the one hand, we perceive the “Other” who appears before us as equal, and on the other hand we assert our own “I” on a par with him. Thus, we assert him and assert ourselves, it follows that the relationship of openness is twofold in nature, involving two equal subjects who act as both a “mirror” and a “reflection” of their counterpart. The very fascination with the “Other” demonstrates the desire of our “I” not to separate, thus existing only for ourselves, but to connect ourselves with the “Other”, thus existing with someone. “But we know very well that it is possible to transcend the level of the self and the other; it is transcended both in love and in charity. Love moves on a ground which is neither that of the self, nor that of the other qua other; I call it the Thou” (Marcel G., 1949, p. 167). Lack of enthusiasm contradicts this and opposes the assertion of values as a priority in the relationship. For example, the same lack of admiration may not directly show us the presence of envy and the inability to perceive the “Other” as equal. But
here it should be emphasized that, speaking of the attitude of openness to the “Other”, it can be not only about admiration, but also about compassion for the “Other”. Here the main ability of our “I” is the opportunity to move away from their problems, thus demonstrating that the priority is not on own interests, but on the interests of the “Other”.

This is where the choice arises, which is absent due to the presence of coercion in the relation of belonging. This choice is a sign of voluntariness in the emergence of interaction, expression of opinion or in any other area. The consequence of the choice is the presence of consent and consensus in the interaction. We are free to defend our own interests, to propagate our own opinions and to impose them as true, but in doing so we use force and, as a consequence, the coercion of that force, thus treating the interlocutor as something less, as a thing, asserting the relationship of belonging. But our “I” cannot be completely free and open to “Others” insofar as it relates to its life or being as the existence of a thing.

**Conclusions**

The study considers the concept of Martin Buber’s dialogue and his understanding of interpersonal interaction with the “Other”, in the context of interpreting the dialogue through the concepts of “openness” and “tolerance” to the “Other”. “Openness” and “tolerance” are understood as mutual acceptance of each other. According to Martin Buber, the whole sphere of human interaction is divided into the “I-Thou” relationship and attitude.

The “I-It” relationship is a way of interaction, in the process of which there is a division into subject and object of interaction. This division is accompanied by the separation of the subject of partial experimental knowledge from the object, due to its division into parts of experimental material. The “Other” is not perceived as a full participant in the relationship, but only as a means.

The “I-Thou” relationship is a way of interaction, as a result of which “I” appears as a person. This form of dialogue is possible between man and nature, man and man, man and divine beings. A relationship is a form of dialogue where the “Other” is perceived by our “I” as a value and affirmed in our thinking as “Thou” of our own “I”. That is, our attitude to another determines our own “I”. As a result, a sphere of openness and mutual penetration of “I” and “Thou” are formed as two equal participants in the dialogue.

It should be noted that the philosopher also justifies the secular departure of the sphere of dialogue. The above allows to apply the concept of dia-
logue not only at the personal private level, but also at the general political level. The main emphasis is that “I” and the “Other” have positive freedom, and dialogue is an interpersonal being that serves as a meeting place for these two equal freedoms, which do not contradict each other, but affirm each other. It should be noted that a positive understanding of freedom leads to responsibility to the “Other”, which forms the basis of the concept of “tolerance”.

In Gabriel Marcel’s concept of dialogue, there is a completely different tendency, which deviates from Martin Buber’s pervasive religious context and outlines the dialogue, as well as the perception of the “Other” in a dialogue, only in the sphere of human communication. First, he distinguishes between two types of human relations: belonging and openness. The relationship of belonging is seen by the philosopher as one that contradicts the realization of true dialogue and takes place under the influence of coercion, which only simulates equality and mutual relationship. Participants in this relationship are not equal to each other, they form a vertical hierarchy relative to themselves. Attitudes of openness to others are a condition for real dialogue in full. After all, this is where the dialogue takes place voluntarily, the participants are equal and free to withdraw from the dialogue. Tolerance is understood here as a mutual awareness of the value of one’s own “I” and the value of the counterpart, and is in no way one-sided.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


