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## Reception of Francis Hutcheson's Views in Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of the Power of Judgment

### [Recepcja poglądów Francisca Hutchesona w filozofii refleksyjnej władzy sądenia Immanuela Kanta]

**Streszczenie:** Celem niniejszych rozważań jest ukazanie zależności, jakie istnieją między teorią estetyczną głoszoną przez szkockiego filozofa Francisca Hutchesona, a zaproponowaną przez Immanuela Kanta filozofią krytyczną. Zagadnienia te wydają się warte omówienia w świetle nowych badań nad estetyką brytyjską, szczególnie jej znaczenia na gruncie nowo tworzącej się dziedziny, jaką stała się estetyka po Aleksandrze Baumgartenie, a przede wszystkim po filozofii krytycznej Immanuela Kanta. Przedstawione zestawienie poglądów Hutchesona i Kanta wskazuje na wagę teorii piękna przedstawioną przez szkockiego filozofa, która wynika nie tylko z faktu nadania epistemologicznego znaczenia doświadczeniu estetycznemu i uznania, że jego warunkiem jest bezinteresowność postrzegania. To, co istotne, to miejsce, jakie Hutcheson zajmuje w procesie ewolucji estetyki, jaka ma miejsce w XVIII w., w procesie, który zwińczył Kant swoją *Krytyką władzy sądenia*.

**Summary:** The following dissertation aims at presenting the dependencies between the aesthetic theory by the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson and the critic philosophy by Immanuel Kant. Those issues seem to be worth discussing in the light of some new research into the British aesthetics: particularly, for its significance in the field of newly created domain that aesthetic has become after Alexander Baumgarten and, mostly, after critical philosophy by Immanuel Kant. The comparison of the views held by Hutcheson and Kant shows the importance of the theory of beauty presented by the Scottish philosopher that results not only from his acknowledging the epistemological significance of an aesthetic experience and accepting that it is conditioned by disinterestedness of perception. What is important is Hutcheson's place in the evolution of the concept of *aesthetics*, which took place in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and which was crowned by Kant and his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Francis Hutcheson; estetyka; Kant; władza sądenia.

**Keywords:** Francis Hutcheson; aesthetic; Kant; power of judgement.

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Many of the ideas held by Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* were fashionable and, as such, discussed by philosophers before him as well as by his contemporaries. Those include Joseph Addison, Henry Home, Edmund Burke, Francis Hutcheson, and others. The following paper aims at presenting the dependencies between the aesthetic theory by the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson and the critic philosophy by Immanuel Kant. Those issues seem to be worth discussing in the light of some new research into the British aesthetics: particularly, for its significance in the field of newly created domain that aesthetic has become after Alexander Baumgarten and, mostly, after critical philosophy by Immanuel Kant<sup>2</sup>.

### Introduction to Francis Hutcheson Theory of Beauty

With his theory of beauty, Francis Hutcheson is located between the considerations presented by Lord Shaftesbury (and the tradition that he originates from) and John Locke, and philosophies proposed by David Hume and Immanuel Kant. It also becomes more common to read Hutcheson's aesthetic theory within the framework of the genealogy of modern aesthetics, where Hutcheson plays an important role, however, underappreciated by many. Some recent research into Hutcheson's aesthetics present that philosopher, or to be exact – his concept of beauty, in a totally new light. A thematic issue entitled *Francis Hutcheson and the Origins of the Aesthetic* of "Journal of Scottish Thought" (2016) edited by Endre Szécsényi is particularly worth mentioning here.

Hutcheson is remembered in history of philosophy mostly as an ethicist; however, it is considered that his concept of beauty presented in *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* makes the first systematic and modern aesthetic treatise<sup>3</sup> (Kivy P., 1992; 1995, 2003; Korsmeyer C., 1979; Szécsényi E., 2016). Hutcheson's *Inquiry* comprises of

<sup>2</sup> Jerome Stolnitz, considers the British thinkers to be the first ones to investigate a possibility that there exist an autonomous philosophical domain to include research of all the fields of art: "[...] British thinkers of the period, in whom aesthetics theory, as we know it, very largely originated" (Stolnitz J., 1961, p. 186; 1977).

<sup>3</sup> The first issue of 1725 was entitled: *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises, in Which the Principles of the Late Earl of Shaftesbury Are Explained and Defended Against the Author of the 'Fable of the Bees' and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil Are Established According to the Sentiments of Ancient Moralists, with the Attempt to Introduce a Mathematical Calculation in Subject of Morality*. As early as in its second edition, the title was shortened to the following: *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises (I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design; II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil)*.

two parts: the first one deals with beauty, order, harmony, sense, and it makes the main source of the views presented here; the second one discusses moral good and evil.

Hutcheson is inspired by philosophers before him, mostly by his master Lord Shaftesbury, who started the current defined as the moral sense school, according to which the human being has an inborn feeling of good and beauty. Hutcheson accepts the concept of a human presented by emotivism and, as he begins his considerations with studying human nature, he follows the Platonian equation of beauty and good showing their relation on the moral plane of human activity. Following Shaftesbury, he identifies the internal power to recognize what is right and wrong separating, however, its scope of actions and isolating the sphere of ethics from that of aesthetics. When referring to the aesthetic experience, Hutcheson applies the notion of disinterestedness, which can already be seen in Shaftesbury, and – like Shaftesbury – he refers to an intentional and harmonious vision of the world as well as to the rule that governs it, which is equalled to the God – Great Creator.

### Kant and Hutcheson – differences and similarities

The research into both Kant's and Hutcheson's philosophies has got its history; however, it should be stressed here that in large part it deals with the issues of ethics. It is worth recalling here an outstanding book by Jeffrey Edwards (2018), *Autonomy, Moral Worth, and Right. Kant on Obligatory Ends, Respect for Law, and Original Acquisition*. Edwards stresses the importance of historical investigations, which is substantial in this context to demonstrate Hutcheson's presence in that monography as particularly valuable. The research comparing both Kant's and Hutcheson's concepts of beauty has been presented by Peter Kivy in his most recent book-length study *The Seventh Sense: Francis Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics*. Some remarkably interesting research by Kantian philosopher J. Colin McQuillan has been presented in *Outer Sense, Inner Sense, and Feeling: Hutcheson and Kant on Aesthetic Pleasure* published in *Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment*<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Through the analysing the notions of sensation, (Hutcheson) and feeling (Kant) McQuillan shows how Kant rejects sensibillism and empiricism in a search for transcendental principles of aesthetic judgment: "Kant had decisively rejected the claim that are universal and necessary rules governing aesthetic judgment, precisely because those judgments are empirical, that is, having their origin in the senses" (McQuillan C., 2017, pp. 90–107).

The main difference that may be seen in the views held by Kant and Hutcheson seems to be in different subjects and objectives of their studies (Śliwa M., 2009)<sup>5</sup>. When investigating human nature, Hutcheson aimed at showing its 'divine character' and, thus, at justifying the purposefulness in the world. Kant, however, did his research in order to identify the area and limits of human thinking and the total human knowledge of the world. Nevertheless, there are numerous common points in the philosophy proposed by the Scottish thinker that foretell solutions presented later by Kant. Those include separation of ethic and aesthetic spheres, the role of feelings in the cognitive process and, which is connected with it, some kind of intuitiveness of perception together with assumption of the need of existence of ego identity. Those also include disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience itself and purposiveness in the world. However, it is also possible to notice the limitation that Hutcheson imposed on himself by accepting the existence of the Great Creator as a reference for all human cognitive processes.

#### **a. The distinguishing between the ethical and aesthetic spheres**

In dissertation written in 1764 entitled *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, Kant accepted the parallel between the aesthetic and ethic spheres, which is a direct relation to Hutcheson (Fischer K., 1928). Kant states that real beauty and virtue are a state of an internal harmony. Foundation of morality is based on the moral feeling, as well as the perception of the beauty and sublime is based on aesthetical feeling. Kant separates here two opposing types of moral sense and their respective analogous aesthetic feelings. There is a sense of the first degree connected with individual feeling of beauty and good, as well as its equivalent sense of the second degree based on the feeling of sublimity referring to a wider non-empirical subject that can be represented by a society or a nation. In consequence, Kant accepted a division that had been made for the first time by Hutcheson claiming that two separate senses, the sense of morals and the sense of beauty, are common senses, appurtenant to every human being. In spite of converging subjects of that dissertation and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, it would be a mistake to view it as an introduction to the third *Critique*. In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant spoke critically on the view that the notions of good and beauty were to differ only in their logical form. As for the notion of good, we would relate to some kind of objective purposiveness; however, the notion of beauty would be understood as formally subjective purposiveness. If we were to

<sup>5</sup> The following issues were discussed by author in this monograph.

accept such a solution, we could not define any specific difference between the beautiful and the good<sup>6</sup>.

Hutcheson's aim was to justify of the objective status of values. By assuming the existence of the Great Creator as a guarantee of the world realness, Hutcheson accepts the concept of the substance as a really existing one. He refrains from proving the existence of the substance itself, instead of that he shows God's existence through purposiveness in the world and by that he proves the existence of the cause of the purposiveness. So, according to Kantian philosophy, he avoids the mistake of trying the ontological proof of God's existence and basing it only on intellectual premises<sup>7</sup>.

### b. Identity of ego

Kant understands the substance as an idea of collective identity of the object with it itself and the historical continuity of the object, which is a guarantee of that identity. According to Kant, human being, as a living creature, is to a huge degree dependent on the causality of freedom as the base of identity for the perceiving subjects themselves. Kant calls the unprompted causality of freedom thing-in-itself (noumen) and when referred to a human being – subject-in-itself. The source of the causality of freedom cannot be perceived neater as something existing in space nor situated in any given time. We can only perceive the results of its actions. Thus, it seems indispensable to assume the existence of transcendental ego, a notion of absolute cause for the cognitive process itself.

A similar way of explaining the identity of ego may be previously seen in Hutcheson – the identity is an argument for the realness of the outer world. He holds the view that it is impossible to learn the deepest essence of the things, although they evoke various ideas in us. The outer world of material objects is known to us only by those ideas; however, at the same time, we are ensured of its existence, which corresponds to those ideas. What is crucial in this case is the significance that Hutcheson attributes to the idea of personal identity, which is shown to us directly by conscious-

<sup>6</sup> “[...] rather a judgment of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment whereby something is declared to be good” (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:228).

Fragments of Kant's writings are cited according to the English edition (*The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. 16 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 – 2016), but the volume and page numbers are provided according to the German one: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, ed. the Royal Prussian, subsequently German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences. 29 Vols. Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900.

<sup>7</sup> “But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility” (Kant I., 1999, KrV, A 601/B629).

ness but is not identical to it. Hutcheson claims here that human mind is self-conscious because of perceptions, by being aware of differences between itself and any other mind (Fowler T., 1882, p. 207). And that brings us closer to the solution proposed by Kant, to the assumption of transcendental ego as a logical necessity resulting from analysing the cognitive process.

### c. The role of feeling in the aesthetic experience

In his early dissertation entitled *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* that was discussed in the beginning of this dissertation, Kant points at the role of the feeling in the whole human cognition, however, he discusses that issue no sooner than in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, where an analysis of the judgements of taste is carried out. It is to provide an answer to the question if we may decide on aesthetic judgements being true or false<sup>8</sup>. The role played by the feeling in the cognitive process was already pointed at by some British philosophers: Hutcheson and his teacher Shaftesbury, as well as Hume. Hutcheson begins validating the role of the feeling in cognition by defining the internal common sense. The sense is both of psychological and axiological meaning, similarly as in Shaftesbury, where the existence of a disposition is postulated, whose estimations are always right. The value of that estimation, referring either to beauty or morals, is characterized by 'directness' and 'unavoidableness' that make it a product of sensual experience, not an intellectual one. The pleasure that grows in mind by the internal sense is not a symptom of self-interest. The idea of beauty by itself is the pleasure that grows in mind when perceiving certain qualities. Thus, it is quite a subjective experience, although Hutcheson was convinced that the similarity of human nature required a universal component in all judgements of taste.

### d. The Idea of Beauty

Hence, beauty is not a name for qualities that occur in objects; they could not be called beautiful if there were no mind (together with the sense of beauty) that would perceive those objects – beauty is the name of perception or a sensual idea in the mind of a perceiver. The idea that, as it is said by Peter Kivy, may be compared to ideas of secondary qualities, such as warmth, redness, or sourness. At the same time, the idea of beauty as a pleasure is the same idea. If so, then the idea of secondary qualities and

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<sup>8</sup> Even in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant holds the view that justifying such judgements is not possible. That view is changed, of which we are informed from Kant's letter to Karl Leonhard Reinhold written in December 1787.

resentment or pleasure are not separate impressions but one: the same idea described in two ways. Following it, Kivy claims that: "Hutcheson has recognized the kind of double-aspect phenomenology of beauty which has made it seem to some both a 'subjective feeling' and an 'objective quality' – as the fusion theory puts it, a feeling objectified. Thus, beauty described as a pleasure emphasizes the subjective; beauty described as the idea of something like a secondary quality, even on the Lockean model of secondary qualities, emphasizes the objective 'feel' of aesthetic qualities" (Kivy P., 2003, pp. 57–58). Kivy's interpretation seems to be perfectly convincing.

Hutcheson claims that beauty always exists in relation to the sense of any mind that perceivers it. It is not related to any objective property of an object but is a perception by a mind in its strict meaning. The word *beauty* itself is often related to the impression or feeling that is evoked in us. Particularly, it is the feeling of pleasure causes by the rule of uniformity amidst variety. It underlies the beauty, stimulates it. The authentic feeling of beauty that is evoked in us is connected with the feeling of pleasure resulting from a 'formal' relation. What makes such a relation is almost a mathematical rule, an important mathematical law, as Hutcheson himself puts it, a law to determine the existence of beauty in every object – the rule of uniformity amidst variety. That rule seems here to be a certain 'measuring category' applied to aesthetic assessment. It should be noticed that variety increases beauty in uniformity, and uniformity strengthens beauty amidst variety. In the first case, using geometric figures, we may say that an equilateral triangle has got less beauty than a square that has less beauty than a pentagon that is less beautiful than hexagon. In the second case – an equilateral triangle has got more beauty than an inequilateral one and a square is more beautiful than rhombus. Beauty grows with the number of sides and that is an element of variety. Moving in the opposite direction, we are to find 'rawer' figures – there are neither uniformity nor similarity between their parts. There are also cases of so-called mixed relations which are visible what a circle and an ellipse are compared. A totally different order is made by the distinction that Hutcheson made by separating the absolute beauty – calling it also an original or primary one – from the relative beauty – a comparative one. That distinction is based on various grounds of pleasure that are provided by their perception. In the case of perceiving the absolute beauty, the pleasure results from the uniformity perceived in objects, and as for the comparative beauty – it provides the pleasure connected with being similar to some kind of an original. What makes the absolute beauty is the beauty of nature, the beauty of mathematical propositions, or the beauty of the whole. The beauty of nature is an example of what is beautiful in the world – as Hutcheson

puts it: “a surprising uniformity amidst almost infinite variety”. He claims that the whole nature possesses variety in itself, and uniformity is something unexpected and surprising, it is the main factor to drive that rule. He treated the beauty of nature rather as the beauty of the whole as a possibility to use the rule of uniformity amidst variety is a surprising one in such a huge number of particular, individual cases. He marvels at the beauty of a single object for, as he claimed, it is one of many that belong to the same type of object or beings that are similar to each other (Hutcheson F., 1728; Glauser R., 2016; Craig C., 2016; Śliwa M., 2009, pp.78–96).

The relative beauty is the beauty that we perceive in objects that we commonly consider to be imitations or recollection of something different. It is an effect of perceiving “uniformity amidst variety” on the grounds of compliance between two objects: a copy and an original, or an object and an idea. The original may be made of a natural object or an established idea. Yet, the most common form of the relative beauty is the beauty of imitation (Hutcheson F., 1728, I, XVI, p. 38).

It seems that in both cases when the absolute beauty and the relative beauty are considered, there occurs a process in our minds that compares an object to what is similar and to what is different. So, the following question comes across: what power makes it possible for us to compare the objects that we perceive?

Hutcheson claims consciousness, being an internal activity of mind, and has the power of comparing impressions and ideas. It uses internal senses – in that case it can be referred as the internal sense of beauty – and the law of uniformity amidst variety was introduced by the philosopher to describe and understand the rule that forms the basis for our deciding on the beauty in objects. Kant, however, speaks of the power of judgement that is responsible for comparing the ideas that appear in mind. Yet, turning images into ideas happens due to the reflective power of judgement – the power that makes it possible to identify if any given object or phenomenon is beautiful even if we cannot logically define the rules that explain the existence of beauty. It has to be noticed that although the thinkers present different solutions to the aforementioned issue, the sole process of comparing the original and the imitation takes place in the sphere of ideas.

### e. The power of judgment

Kant, who is thought to be the creator of modern aesthetic, has posed a question that is fundamental to that newly formed domain: the question of a possibility to issue aesthetic judgements and their truthfulness. The discovery that he makes in the third *Critique* has coloured the fate of the



whole aesthetics developed later: a search for a transcendental justification for the feeling has led to acknowledging its role in the cognitive process<sup>9</sup>.

This, Kant separates the determining power of judgement, where the intellect issues judgements using notions and shows by that objective properties of objects, from the reflective power of judgement, which issues judgement of their own kind, is 'heautonomic' by being the object of cognition and a law for itself at the same time (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:228). What makes the determining power of the judgement defined in such a way is the feeling that we get by the internal sense – the feeling that guarantees the compliance of the perceived world with the world of commonly accepted notions and categories of mind. The judgement that we pass is based on the power of imagination and intellect. It practically means that empirical cognition each time would be subjective one. Kant defends from the thesis on cognitive subjectivism by accepting 'heautonomy' of the aesthetic power of judgement<sup>10</sup>. On the other hand, we know that aesthetic judgements, judgements on the beautiful and the sublime become intersubjective ones. A judgement saying that any given object is beautiful is often considered to be a common judgement. Thus, it seems well-based that Kant in his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* differentiates two separate aforementioned senses as common judgements that are not justified logically by the philosopher.

According to Kant, our predisposition of good and ability to perceive beauty characteristic of every human nature is a fontal feature,<sup>11</sup> which can be found in Hutcheson's philosophy where the sense of morals and the sense of beauty are common senses, appurtenant to every human being. Hutcheson treats issues connected with ethics and aesthetics separately, which – as it is known – is related to identifying separate internal senses for those both spheres. In the ethic as well aesthetic spheres, according to Kant, transition from the phase of animality to that of sapience happens when my judgement becomes an intersubjective judgement. The difference between the judgement *the smell of a rose gives me pleasure* and the judge-

<sup>9</sup> As Jan Paweł Hudzik writes, it is about showing that "such a unity of consciousness is possible that is not organized by notions of a given object but by a feeling of blissfulness or resentment connected with it. [...] Showing the logics and judgements of such an object means constructing a theory for presentation of internal individuality of the object, which is a theory of 'feeling', a theory of reflective non-objective perception, a source axiology of empiric cognition" (Hudzik P.J., 1996, p. 23).

<sup>10</sup> Thus, as Hudzik puts it, unselfish and free liking [...] is somehow directed towards an object, which makes it 'objective' (Hudzik P.J., 1996, p. 47).

<sup>11</sup> "Agreeableness is also valid for nonrational animals; beauty is valid only for human beings, i.e., animal but also rational beings, but not merely as the latter (e.g., spirits), rather as beings who are at the same time animal; the good, however, is valid for every rational being in general" (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:210).

ment *that rose is beautiful* is that the former is related to my sensuality and is not a commonly important judgement, and the latter is exactly like that.

#### f. Disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience

The disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience is the next argument against subjectivity of judgements of taste is held by Kant and also borrowed from Shaftesbury by Hutcheson<sup>12</sup>. Both aesthetic values separated by Kant, beauty and sublime, are not related to any interest. The notion of *a beautiful rose* refers us to a direct object experienced by our senses. Thus, the feeling of beauty is evoked in us by an object that shows qualities making it possible for us to call it beautiful<sup>13</sup>. As for perception of beauty, we may speak of some kind of ‘self-interest’ resulting from the fact that the sole view of at beautiful object brings a sensual pleasure to us, the sublime – is totally deprived of the feeling of interest<sup>14</sup>.

With reference to an early dissertation by Kant entitled *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, the idea of beauty may be understood most generally “as unity, regularity, and order of relations within an object, as homogeneity of its usefulness, as its harmony” (Żelazny M., 1994, p. 68), that directs to Hutcheson’s idea of “uniformity amidst variety”.

<sup>12</sup> For Hutcheson, Disinterestedness of an aesthetic experience is a part of the conditions that the rule of uniformity amongst variety must comply to, in order to evoke a feeling of beauty in a perceiver. On the other hand, that rule of disinterestedness and a feeling of beauty may be seen as a necessity. It is possible to say that contentment and pleasure that originate from contemplating the beautiful are one and the same but the pleasure from observing the beautiful is, by its definition, a pleasure that we feel when contemplating disinterestedly. Thus, the real beauty provides pleasure and is disinterested (Hutcheson F., 1738, VI, 5, pp. 77–78). Disinterestedness excludes a possibility of something that may bring any future profits that could be related to any need of possession. He claimed that there is no uneasiness of appetite that could appear before the aesthetic perception. Hutcheson accepts, also following Shaftesbury, a division into the joy of beauty and, on the other hand, awareness of such joy that no longer is an aesthetic experience (Hutcheson F., 1728, p.101).

<sup>13</sup> “It is readily seen that to say that it is beautiful and to prove that I have taste what matters is what I make of this representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object. Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty in which there is mixed the least interest is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. One must not be in the least biased in favour of the existence of the thing but must be entirely indifferent in this respect in order to play the judge in matters of taste” (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:205).

<sup>14</sup> “The sublime is what pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of the senses. [...] The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest” (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:267).

### g. The purposiveness of beauty

The above considerations lead to the purposiveness of beauty. The significant category for Kant, identified in the nature as the internal natural purposiveness of the organism by itself and the external purposiveness. Perception of beauty indicates both, the internal purposiveness and the external ones, as for the feeling the sublime, it is possible to speak of external purposiveness only<sup>15</sup>. In the non-living nature, as Kant puts it further, there are cases in which beauty does not require the internal purposiveness, e.g. crystals are object governed only by the mechanic purposiveness. According to Kant, equalling beauty to life is not possible. Hutcheson already separated the external purposiveness connected with evoking the feeling of pleasure in the one who perceives a phenomenon of beauty. Hutcheson, however, does it in a more intuitive way while Kant fully justifies his separation of the external purposiveness and the natural internal purposiveness appertained to living beings. The reflective power of judgement in its aesthetic use refers to the judgements on beauty, and reflective power of judgement in theological use is responsible for the phenomenon of life.

### h. The kinds of beauty

Another one connection between Kant and Hutcheson is clearly visible. The division into the absolute beauty and the relative beauty that is a result of imitation made by Hutcheson in his *Inquiry*, made it possible for Kant to separate the free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) and the adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*), and thus to justify numerous discrepancies in aesthetic judgements.

The free beauty does not assume any notion for the beauty of an object, it is the beauty of a pure form, the beauty that exist for itself. The judgement passed on the free beauty is a pure judgement, independent from any notions, we do not have in us any notion of perfectness that we could refer our judgement to. The free beauty of the world includes

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<sup>15</sup> As Kant writes: "The beautiful formations in the realm of organized nature speak strongly in behalf of the realism of the aesthetic purposiveness of Nature [...] The flowers, the blossoms, indeed the shapes of whole plants; the delicacy of animal formations of all sorts of species, which is unnecessary for their own use but as if selected for our own taste; above all the manifold and harmonious composition of colours (in the pheasant, in crustaceans, insects, right down to the commonest flowers), which are so pleasant and charming to our eyes, which seem to have been aimed entirely at outer contemplation, since they concern merely the surface, and even in this do not concern the figure of the creature, which could still be requisite for its inner ends: all of these give great weight to the kind of explanation that involves the assumption of real ends of nature for our power of aesthetic judgment" (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:348).

flowers<sup>16</sup>. According to Hutcheson, the absolute beauty refers to natural objects, phenomena, theorems – everything that contains the rule of *uniformity amidst variety* and what seems beautiful to us with no reference to any prototype. Thus, the absolute beauty refers to the purposiveness of nature itself.

The adherent beauty, according to Kant, refers to a perfect notion of an object. It is a conditioned type of beauty falling into the notion of a defined purpose that sets what a given object has to be. The beauty of a human being is an example here, including the beauty of a man, a woman, or a child, or the beauty of a building of a specific design, such as a church, an arsenal, or a palace – that beauty assumes a perfect achievable goal that we refer to each time we assess it. As Hutcheson would define that, it is the beauty based on imitation, the aim of which is clearly defined. That aim is the feeling of pleasure that a perceiver should experience, so here it is possible to peak of the external purposiveness only.

The judgement on the adherent beauty is not a pure judgement<sup>17</sup>, as combination of an aesthetic judgement with an intellectual one occurs here, which may provide grounds for defining certain norms and rules of the adherent beauty. At the same time, as Kant notices, we should be aware that many disputes on beauty are based on a mistaken approach to the beauty itself, by not differentiating between the free beauty and the adherent one.

## Conclusions

Summing up the analyses above, I would like to stress that it is justified to perceive Hutcheson as one of many British philosophers who paved the way for modern aesthetic thinking (Krosmeyer 1979), the thinking that is to be crowned in Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy. The importance of the theory of beauty presented by Francis Hutcheson results not only from the fact of giving an epistemological meaning to an aesthetic ex-

<sup>16</sup> “Hardly anyone other than the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be; and even the botanist, who recognizes in it the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end if he judges the flower by means of taste” (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:348).

<sup>17</sup> “Now the satisfaction in the manifold in a thing in relation to the internal purpose that determines its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a concept; the satisfaction in beauty, however, is one that presupposes no concept, but is immediately combined with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). Now if the judgment of taste in regard to the latter is made dependent on the purpose in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, then it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste” (Kant I., 2002, KU, AA 05:230).

perience and accepting that it is conditioned by disinterestedness of perception. The general lesson I wish to draw from above analysis is the evolution of concept of 'the aesthetic', that took place in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and which has been aptly described by Endre Szécsényi "as a result of the interaction and interference of several discourses; this process was multidisciplinary, having to do with theology, moral philosophy, natural sciences, rhetoric, epistemology (psychology), philosophical anthropology, conversational literature, etc. Then, the historical process in which it was gradually rising cannot be confined to one 'discipline' or reduced to a mostly teleological history of one or two philosophical concepts which are to be found finally in Kant or Schopenhauer" (Szécsényi E., 2016a, p. 178).

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