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Brothers in Arms: Features of the Ukraine – NATO Partnership in the 1990s.

[Braterstwo broni: charakterystyka partnerstwa Ukraina – NATO w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX w.]

Streszczenie: Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie stosunków Ukraina – NATO w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX w. Podjęto próbę zdefiniowania głównych kierunków polityki zagranicznej Ukrainy po odzyskaniu niepodległości, aby na tej podstawie móc uznać wielowektorowe podejście kraju za historycznie zdeterminowaną konieczność w okresie jego transformacji. Pełna integracja ze strukturami euroatlantyckimi nie mogła być wówczas w pełni zrealizowana, ponieważ Ukraina pozostawała w polu interesów Rosji, która dążyła do przywrócenia swojej pozycji w przestrzeni postsowieckiej i stania się nowym ośrodkiem władzy. Ukraina była wówczas zmuszona manewrować między Wschodem a Zachodem, aby zaistnieć na arenie międzynarodowej i zająć odpowiednie miejsce w europejskiej architekturze bezpieczeństwa. W artykule przeanalizowano czynniki, które wpłynęły na proces nawiązywania współpracy między Ukrainą a NATO, w szczególności sytuację geopolityczną między Wschodem a Zachodem, brak woli politycznej oraz wewnętrzne problemy polityczne kraju. Można stwierdzić, że w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX w. stosunki Ukraina – NATO rozwijały się dość szybko, ale nie na tyle, by Ukraina mogła zostać członkiem NATO. Jednak ze względu na wyjątkową pozycję kraju, który otrzymał bezpośrednią granicę z państwami członkowskimi NATO, Ukrainie udało się uzyskać status specjalnego partnera, co dodatkowo przyczyniło się do pogłębienia stosunków dwustronnych.

Summary: The article is devoted to the study of Ukraine-NATO relations in the 90s. of the XX century. The author made an attempt to define the main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy after independence, to consider the multi-vector approach as a historically determined necessity in the transition period. Full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures could not be fully implemented at that time, as Ukraine remained in the field of interests of Russia, which sought to restore its position in the post-Soviet space and become a new center of power. Ukraine was forced to maneuver between East and West in order to establish itself in the international field and take

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its place in the European security architecture. The article analyzes the factors that
influenced the process of establishing cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, in
particular the geopolitical situation between East and West, lack of political will, and
internal political problems. It can be concluded that in the 1990s, Ukraine-NATO
relations developed quite rapidly, but not enough for Ukraine to become a member of
NATO. However, given the unique position of the country, which received a direct
border with NATO member countries, Ukraine was able to obtain the status of
a special partner, which further contributed to the deepening of bilateral relations.

Introduction

At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries, the world system experienced
global upheavals. In a relatively short period of time, drastic changes have
taken place in the sphere of international relations, the bipolar world has
been replaced by a multipolar one, and the world system of international
relations has moved from a bipolar confrontation to a polycentric model
and balance of power, which was facilitated by the collapse of one of the
centers of power – the USSR. The geopolitical changes that took place
during this period profoundly influenced the processes of European trans-
formation and integration. There was a redistribution of spheres of influ-
ence, which is especially pronounced on the European continent. The re-
gion of Central and Eastern Europe, which was under communist influence
for a long time, has undergone radical changes. These changes were in the
nature of the gradual spread of the Western (Euro-Atlantic) sphere of polit-
ical, legal, moral and ethical influence to the east of the continent.

Different countries have set themselves the same goal – to build de-
mocracy and a market economy. But first, it was necessary to solve a num-
ber of problems that communism left behind: to overcome the consequenc-
es of a planned economy, to raise the level of economic development that
was very low, to overcome such remnants as the lack of power, the under-
development of civil society, the lack of stable value orientations, and many
others. The transformation processes also concerned the political sphere,
the content of which was to democratize society, establish institutions, cre-
ate constitutions – as a guarantor of the protection and observance of citi-
zens' rights and freedoms, and form political trust and culture. As for the
changes in foreign policy, there was a reorientation and move away from

the center of power that was previously represented by the communist bloc. Post-communist countries declared their commitment to European values and set out to implement them. They were actively involved in the process of globalization, which provided for close cooperation in the military sphere, which took place under the significant influence and dominance of Euro-Atlantic Interstate communities.

The main security vector of foreign policy orientation of post-communist European countries can be defined as the desire to join the Western military and political organization-NATO, which has begun the political and military transformation of its structures. In July 1990, in a declaration approved at the summit entitled «London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance», the leaders of the Member States announced their intentions to adapt the Alliance to the new security situation.

In 1991, the contours of today's NATO began to appear after the presentation in the strategic concept adopted by the heads of NATO member states in Rome of common approaches to security based on dialogue, cooperation and preserving the potential of collective defense (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991). The main part of the Alliance's strategy is recognized as cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, reducing dependence on nuclear weapons and implementing radical changes in the NATO armed forces, in particular their significant reduction, strengthening mobility, flexibility and ability to adapt to various unforeseen situations, expanding the use of multinational formations and adapting the Alliance›s defense planning.

At the Rome summit, the heads of state and government of NATO member states also adopted the «Declaration on peace and cooperation», which defined the future tasks and policies of NATO regarding the overall institutional structure of future European security. (Rome Declaration of the NATO Council session, 1991). Three areas of the Alliance's activities should be identified: dialogue, cooperation and the ability to carry out collective defense. The Alliance has focused its work on strengthening stability and security in Europe and establishing broad contacts and partnerships to spread NATO's influence.

Ukraine found itself in a difficult situation at that time. After the declaration of independence, the young state had to build its own model of foreign relations with the countries of the former USSR and with European countries and organizations. This was not an easy question, as Ukraine was constantly in the field of interests of Moscow, which did not lose hope for the revival of the common union and perceived Ukraine's movement towards Euro-Atlantic partnership as a personal threat. It was this situation that had an impact on the further development of Ukraine's foreign

policy, which has echoes to this day. Therefore, it is important to study the stated issue in order to better understand the current situation in Ukraine and identify mistakes that need to be eliminated.

Multi-vector nature of Ukraine's foreign policy: bad choice or necessity?

The issue of the Euro-Atlantic direction of Ukraine's development arose immediately after independence on August 24, 1991, but for a long time it was relatively declarative in nature. Priorities and foreign policy strategy were not clearly outlined. Foreign policy was based on the concept of multi-vector and non-aligned nature. Thuson December 6, 1991 President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk signed the law of Ukraine "On defense of Ukraine", article 1 of which proclaimed that «Ukraine strives for neutrality and compliance with non-nuclear principles» (law of Ukraine "On defense of Ukraine" d.d. December 6, 1991 No. 1934-XII, P. 17). These principles are also laid down in the agreement "On the Commonwealth of Independent States" (CIS) d.d. December 8, 1991. In particular, Article 6 stated that: "The Member States of the Commonwealth will cooperate in ensuring international peace and security, implementing effective measures to reduce weapons and military expenditures. They seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament under strict international control. [...] The Member states of the Commonwealth will maintain a common military-strategic space, including unified control over nuclear weapons under joint command" (Treaty establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991).

Article 8 of the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of December 20, 1991 on the conclusion of the Treaty «On the Commonwealth of Independent States» emphasized that "Ukraine will seek to acquire the status of a nuclear-free state by destroying all nuclear arsenals under effective international control and on the basis of the Declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine will not be part of military blocs" (Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine d.d. December 20, 1991). President Leonid Kravchuk, who actively advocated a nuclear-free status, outlined his position in his book: "The missiles were aimed at NATO countries, they were stationed on our territory, and the »nuclear button« was located in Moscow. Under such conditions, Ukraine found itself in the position of a hostage" (Kravchuk L., 2002, p. 138). Such a fact was dangerous and contained the danger of losing independence. Therefore, the desire for a nuclear-free status was caused by objective realities.

Here is the opinion of the historian Oleksanrd Palii (Palii O., 2006, pp. 74–75), who notes that Russia, thanks to the organization of various integration initiatives, is trying to establish itself as an Integration Center in the post-soviet space, and it is very important for it to draw Ukraine into this – the largest territorial state in Europe, which has a key strategic location in relation to several regions at once (Black Sea, North Caucasus, Central European, Balkan). In addition, without Ukraine, Russia loses the status of the Eurasian empire.

Such aspirations on the part of Russia are emphasized by another researcher, Serhii Troian (Troian S., 2016, p. 26), who determines that Moscow tried to consider the entire post-soviet space as a zone of its "legitimate", vital interests. But Ukraine and Russia had diametrically opposed views on the CIS. Ukraine saw the Commonwealth as an organization in which Ukraine would remain only until further integration with the United Europe. That is, the CIS here acts as a mechanism for the "civilized divorce" of the republics of the former USSR. And Russia considered the CIS as an intermediate form of restoring the former imperial statehood. Therefore, once again assessing the issue of non-alignment of Ukraine, we see that this choice was caused by Russia's desire to draw Ukraine into a new union configuration.

The issue of non-alignment was also caused by the desire of the leadership from Moscow to create a unified armed forces of the CIS countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Ukraine at the summit of the CIS leaders in Minsk on February 15, 1992 stated that "it is an independent state and must develop its own army" (Kravchuk L., 2002, p. 143). Looking for ways to guarantee security, independent Ukraine has taken a cautious position of joining the European collective security system in the future. Active contacts between Ukraine and NATO began in 1992. However, in the military doctrine of Ukraine, which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on October 19, 1993, in Article 1, the status of non-alignment remained a priority: "Ukraine stands for the creation of comprehensive systems of universal and pan-European security and considers participation in them an important component of its national security. Adhering to the non-aligned status, Ukraine contributes to the creation of reliable international mechanisms and a pan-European security structure at the bilateral, regional and global levels in order to strengthen trust and partnership based on the principles of mutual understanding and openness in military-political activities" (Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "on the military doctrine of Ukraine", 1993).

The documented »non-aligned status« later became an argument against Ukraine's accession to NATO, which was used by opponents of the Euro-Atlantic integration course.

On February 22–23, 1992, NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner made his first visit to Kyiv. Werner was the seventh NATO Secretary General and the first German representative to serve as head of the Alliance. And it was this German politician, diplomat and military man who opened NATO for Ukraine and Ukraine for NATO. Werner's contemporaries consider him one of the most influential leaders of NATO, who initiated and outlined ways to transform the organization after the end of the Cold War. "He noted the three most important aspects of the policy he pursued on behalf of the alliance, in particular, the adaptation of NATO, which is related to the end of the Cold War; the conduct of a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and the awareness of the organization members of the importance of new missions outside the territory of the Alliance" (Jerj, 2012) at a time when there were opinions that the end of the Cold War would lead to the end of NATO, Werner promoted the idea of integrating the New Democratic states of Europe into the transatlantic community and emphasized the need for transformation of the organization. Werner officially invited Ukraine to participate in the RPA (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) and on March 10, 1992, it became a member, and on July 8, 1992. President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk paid a visit to the headquarters of the alliance in Brussels (NATO Handbook, 2001). By the way, this was a historic meeting, as it was the first time that the head of a post-Soviet state met with the leadership of NATO. But this fact was not accidental, since Ukraine was in the zone of interests of the Alliance on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

An important event in the development of relations between Ukraine and NATO was the opening in September 1992. The embassy of Ukraine in Brussels, which has become a contact platform between Ukraine and NATO. Further steps to determine the status of Ukraine are stipulated by the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "on the main directions of foreign policy of Ukraine" of July 2, 1993 (resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "on the main directions of foreign policy of Ukraine", 1993). This document declared that in ensuring national security, Ukraine supports the creation of comprehensive international systems of universal and pan-European security and considers participation in them to be a basic component of its national security. This fact can be considered the starting point when Ukraine tried to more boldly outline the vectors of its foreign policy direction.

We stated that "Ukraine focuses its foreign policy efforts on creating and developing reliable international security mechanisms at the bilateral, subregional, regional and global levels. Ukraine should develop broad cooperation with other states, in particular neighboring ones, and interna-

tional organizations, including military-political ones, in order to increase predictability and trust, mutual understanding and partnership, build comprehensive and effective regional security mechanisms in Europe and improve existing global security mechanisms within the UN" (resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "on the main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy", 1993). Ukraine also documented in the same resolution that «in the context of the disappearance of the bloc confrontation in Europe, the problem of creating a pan-European security structure based on existing international institutions, such as the NBSE, RPAS, NATO, becomes a priority. Ukraine's direct and full membership in such a structure will create the necessary external guarantees for its national security. Taking into account the drastic changes that took place after the collapse of the USSR and which determined the current geopolitical situation of Ukraine, the intention proclaimed by it at one time to become a neutral and non-aligned state in the future must be adapted to new conditions and cannot be considered an obstacle to its full-scale participation in the pan-European security structure» (resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "on the main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy", 1993).

Ukraine continued to emphasize the inadmissibility of nuclear war and the need for nuclear disarmament, and defined its military doctrine as defensive, which provides for the creation of "a mobile modern army armed with modern types of high-precision weapons, and the establishment of military-political cooperation with other, primarily neighboring states and international organizations, in particular NATO" (resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "on the main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy", 1993). Here we can trace the evolution of Ukraine's approach to cooperation with NATO. But it would be a mistake to assume that this document somehow determined the orientation of our state to join NATO. Here, rather, we can talk about the European security architecture. And Ukraine again cautiously stated that it is possible, if necessary and conditions change, to deepen cooperation in the field of security with various blocs. This decision was prompted by changes in the geopolitical situation. The Ukrainian authorities understood that the subjectivity of the state in the international arena depends on how and in what integration processes Ukraine will be involved. And given the fact that even an independent state was always in the circle of Moscow's interests, it was necessary to build its own individual path in such a way as not to lead to an escalation of relations with Russia, which would jeopardize the integrity of the state. The movement towards the Euro-Atlantic community was driven by the desire of the state leadership and the situation in the international arena.

Partnership for peace

Ukraine was one of the first CIS countries to support the idea of the Partnership for peace (PFP) program and joined this program by signing a framework document on February 8, 1994, which stated that: "the Member States of the North Atlantic alliance and other states that sign this document are determined to deepen their political and military ties and contribute to further strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic region, thereby establishing the Partnership for peace within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This partnership begins as an expression of the shared conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region can only be achieved through cooperation and joint action. The protection and maintenance of fundamental human rights and freedoms, ensuring freedom, justice and peace through democracy are common values that are fundamental to partnership" (Partnership for peace, 1994). After analyzing the document, we see that it has gone beyond the issue of peace and security, and countries that join the partnership program declare the preservation of democracy, ensuring human rights and freedoms.

Our country's cooperation with NATO within the framework of the PFP provided for the achievement of the following goals: "promoting openness in national defense planning and the formation of the military budget; ensuring democratic control over the armed forces; maintaining the ability and readiness to participate within the limits permitted by the constitution in operations conducted under the auspices of the UN and/or within the framework of the responsibility of the CSCE; developing relations of cooperation with NATO in the military sphere in order to implement joint planning, military training and training maneuvers designed to increase their ability to perform tasks related to peacekeeping, search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations and others that may later be agreed upon, the formation in the long term of such armed forces that will be able to better interact with the Armed Forces of the North Atlantic alliance member states" (Partnership for peace, 1994).

According to the then Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko, by approving the PFP program, Ukraine confirmed its fundamental political priorities and choice in favor of returning to Europe, from which it was artificially separated (Problems of Border Regions in the Context of NATO Enlargement, 2001, p. 60).

On March 3, 1994, direct consultations between Ukraine and NATO began in the "16+1" format in order to study the conditions for establishing special relations and establishing a "special partnership" between Ukraine and NATO. In April 1995, representatives of the international

military headquarters of the NATO command and the Partnership Coordination Center held consultations with Ukraine to help plan the forces that will be involved in PFP. To participate in the PFP events, the military leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine offered human resources: officers, military observers, military battalions, squadrons, brigades, transport helicopters, two ships, equipment for civilian emergencies; Yavoriv Poligon of Lviv region National Center of Civil Defense in the city of Kyiv, etc. (Poshedin, 2004, pp. 203–204)

The official approval ceremony of Ukraine and the highest body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council, for the Individual Partnership Program between Ukraine and NATO was held on September 14, 1995 at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Thus, formally, the procedure for Ukraine's accession to the PFP program ended with the adoption of an Individual Partnership Program between Ukraine and NATO a year and a half after the signing of the PFP Framework document.

But the process of special cooperation with NATO deepened outside the program. Thus, during the meeting of President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma with NATO Secretary General Willy Klaas in Brussels on June 1, 1995, an agreement in principle was reached on the establishment and development of an expanded and in-depth partnership between Ukraine and NATO. Already on September 14, 1995, a special meeting of the Alliance Council was held in the format of "16+1" with the participation of Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, as a result of which the Joint Statement of Ukraine and NATO for the press was approved, which proclaimed the beginning of expanded and in-depth relations between the two parties outside the NACC and PFP (Boiko O., 2001). Together with the Joint Press Statement of Ukraine and NATO, the Ukrainian party handed over the document "Basic parameters of the agreement on the establishment of a special partnership between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", which laid the foundation for an active dialogue between Ukraine and NATO (Khraban, 2003, p. 36).

Relations between Ukraine and NATO have become a significant fact of ensuring the stable development of the New Democratic state. Since Ukraine is an important geopolitical factor in the Central European region, since gaining independence, it has long faced the danger of becoming a kind of buffer between the West and the East. Joining the PFP program helped to overcome the threat that had arisen and determined the priority of State integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (Gritsai, 1999, p. 24).

The Partnership for Peace program contributed to the development of the European security and defense system itself, prevented conflicts and

strengthened transatlantic cooperation. Within this framework, NATO was assigned a number of such informal tasks:

– limiting the development of independent military capabilities within the EU. In particular, this concerns the Prevention of "nationalization" of military-political doctrines and strategic concepts of European countries, which can restore the impulses of distrust, military and geopolitical rivalry.

– maintaining an active military and political mechanism for potentially protecting the interests of industrialized states in crisis situations.

– creating a framework structure for military and political interaction between large integration associations, etc. (Tolstov, 1999, p. 15).

So, after the end of the Cold War, when there were changes in the security system, the question arose of a radical revision of the meaning and expediency of the existence of NATO. During the existence of bipolar confrontation, the role of NATO was to ensure the unity and protection of liberal democracies in the face of the threat of the USSR and its satellites. The collapse of the world system of socialism and the collapse of the USSR removed from the agenda the issue on which of the two poles of the world development turned out to be more effective and capable, but the question of what should be the fate of organizations generated and formed by the processes of block confrontation remained unresolved. In these circumstances, the feasibility of NATO's existence was discussed. There were three fundamental possibilities for the future of the organization, which was generated by the ideological, military and political rivalry of two superpowers, two polar worlds. The first option is to dissolve the Alliance immediately after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The second one is to try to transform it into a transatlantic pan-European security system, a kind of operational subsystem of the OSCE, a tool for collective security. The third one is to reform the Alliance's activities on the old "membership basis", but with fundamentally new tasks and functions. As you know, of all three scenarios, the last one won, in a slightly modified form.

The organization was neither dissolved, as would have been predicted by the logic of the end of the Cold War and the atmosphere that really prevailed in Europe after the dismantling of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the USSR, nor significantly modified. Instead, a strategy was chosen for its development and expansion of the organization at the expense of the most strategically desirable countries – new members (Problems of Border Regions in the Context of NATO Enlargement, 2001, p.16).

Thus, in the new peaceful conditions, NATO has managed to transform its activities and remain a guarantor of security and stability in the

entire Euro-Atlantic region. Moreover, the Alliance became an important forum for cooperation in the economic and political spheres and remained the only effective Euro-Atlantic institution. NATO has secured leadership in the modern system of international relations.

The Brussels Summit of 1994 and the PFP not only initiated the transformation of the Alliance, but also made it possible to create the conditions for its further expansion. The January decisions essentially opened the door for NATO to welcome new members from Central and Eastern Europe. The beginning of the process of expansion of the North Atlantic alliance was Madrid summit, which was held in July 1997. The first wave of expansion covered countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which later became members of NATO.

In the status of a special partner

Simultaneously with the decision to expand NATO, a Charter on a special partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine was signed in Madrid in July 1997. The Charter fixed political commitments of the parties at the highest level and identified the need to "expand and strengthen their cooperation and develop a special and effective partnership that will contribute to greater stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe" (Charter on a Special Partnership between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1997).

Ukraine has officially assigned a separate, though mostly passive, role in the European security system. Assessing the role of the Charter on Special Partnership and its impact on Ukraine's future foreign policy prospects, we should focus on the fact that the Charter should play an important positive role for Ukraine as a transitional mechanism and perform the functions of promoting military reform and facilitating military and technical adaptation to a higher level of cooperation with the Alliance. The Charter provided for a permanent consultation mechanism, which in certain circumstances, for example, in the event of a threat and through a convergence of interests, could be used to decide on political support, economic and military assistance. The scope of this support, depending on the nature of the threat and external circumstances, could, if the interests of the parties and the identity of the threats coincide, approach the level of allied commitments.

The Charter defined Ukraine as an integral part of the Central and Eastern European subregion. However, it also had its drawbacks. Regard-

ing possible shortcomings of NATO – Ukraine charter, experts often made the following comments: the initiative in interpreting the content of the Charter belonged to the leadership of the Alliance; Ukraine's acquisition of the status of a NATO partner did not open a direct path to the Alliance's collective defense system. At the same time, the Charter did not contain any provisions of a discriminatory nature that could serve as a reason for restricting Ukraine's participation in the events of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the expanded and in-depth PFP (Tolstov, 1999, p. 10).

This document showed the principled position of NATO to support the sovereignty of Ukraine, its independence, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, democratic development and economic prosperity as key factors of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region, recognition of Ukraine as an integral part of the CES, support for Ukraine's course of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures (Problems of Border Regions in the Context of NATO Enlargement, 2001, p. 60). The Madrid Charter has become a kind of framework document that defines the directions and ways of practical cooperation. A practical basis for cooperation was laid down in the form of such mechanisms as the Ukraine – NATO Commission and consultations with the NATO 19+1 Committees, joint working groups, high-level visits and exchange of experts, a crisis consultative mechanism for cases where Ukraine would perceive a direct threat to territorial integrity, independence or national security.

The need to develop close ties between Ukraine and NATO was recognized by both sides, since such cooperation was of great importance for regional security, given the constructive peacekeeping role that Ukraine played in resolving conflicts (Ukraine – NATO: Strategic Partnership, 2001, p.14). Thus, in order to improve awareness of NATO and mutual understanding between Ukraine and NATO, the NATO Information and Documentation Center was opened in Kyiv in 1997. The Center provides information, promotes research, and funds projects by Ukrainian citizens and organizations on topics related to NATO activities, as well as provides access to NATO documents and publications.

A new stage in cooperation between the Alliance and partner countries was initiated by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC in May 1997. The main goal of the EAPC was to improve the mechanism of NATO's multilateral policy consultations with partner states, providing them with greater opportunities to participate in the preparation and decision-making of operations and activities in which they participate. In fact, the task of the EAPC is to provide a common framework for consultations on political and security issues and for im-

proving cooperation in Partnership for peace. In December 1997 The EAPC adopted the action plan for 1998–2000. In response to the desire of its members to develop a more effective and practical partnership among themselves.

Most partner countries have opened diplomatic missions and liaison missions to NATO, which has significantly improved contacts in all spheres. Madrid summit fully demonstrated the seriousness with which the Alliance treats its internal and external transformation. This was indicated by further concrete and far-reaching steps in all key sectors: the opening of accession negotiations and the reaffirmation of an "open door" policy for new members to join in the future improvement of the Partnership for Peace and the creation of EAPC, which was a new means of further developing cooperation; opening a whole new phase in NATO – Russia relations; formalizing a partnership with Ukraine, which is developing rapidly; moving forward on the path of forming the actual European security and defense system within NATO.

The national report aptly (Euro-Atlantic vector of Ukraine: national report, 2019, pp. 218–219) highlights the periods of Ukraine – NATO relations in the 1990s.

The first period is "romantic" (1990–1994). Ukraine has taken steps towards international subjectivity by declaring its independence and supporting it with documents and diplomatic relations. The second period of "achievements and hopes" (1994–1997) is marked by the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine, the conclusion of a number of partnership and cooperation agreements with NATO and the EU. The third period of "fatigue and disillusionment" (1998–2000) where internal political problems, a course towards «economizing» foreign policy and continuing the policy of multi-vector approach.

The vector of development of Ukraine – NATO relations was also significantly influenced by propaganda and myth-making created and imposed by the northern neighbor and supporters of the "Russian world" in Ukraine. The image of NATO was portrayed as negative, aggressive, and destructive. (Meleshchenko, Stoian, Tsybukh, Karabardin, 2021, p. 30).

The idea of Ukraine's national security interests due to its status of neutrality gained ground in the early 1990s and began to lose it at the end of the decade. The goals of Ukrainian neutrality and non-alignment in the 1990s were: the struggle of some politicians against the expanding influence of the West and NATO, others – against the expanding influence of Russia and the presence of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory; attempts by Ukraine's uncertain position to increase interest in it of large states and international organizations; unpreparedness of society for

a single geopolitical choice; unwillingness of Ukrainian leadership to harm its relations with one of the parties in case of a single-valued geopolitical choice.

Conclusions

As we can see, the North Atlantic Alliance proved to be the most effective and capable alliance, proved its ability to guarantee the security of its members and adapt to new conditions. Moreover, even today this organization is the key to the development of military and political cooperation in the field of security in Europe and is expanding its political functions. In order to expand the stability zone, NATO has taken a course of expanding to the East in order to strengthen democracy in the CEE countries and promote the development of market relations. At the first stages, the Organization opened the door to entry for the most economically ready and geopolitically important countries. The result of this stage was the expansion of the Alliance by accepting new members in 1999. NATO thus acted as a motivator for changes and transformations in other countries that sought to join the Alliance.

The issue of the Euro-Atlantic vector of development of Ukraine arose almost immediately after the declaration of independence of our state in 1991. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, it was mostly declarative in nature, and was not conceptualized both at the level of foreign policy priorities and the National Implementation Strategy. The main rhetoric of the state's political leadership at that time was limited to cooperation and partnership with the EU and NATO. At the same time, the concept of non – alignment and multi-vector nature in foreign policy and the development of strategic partnership with its northern neighbor, the Russian Federation, dominated. As noted in the text, this policy was caused by the fact that Ukraine could not overcome the influence of Russia, since the latter saw Ukraine in the field of its influence and interest. Ukraine was perceived as a necessary component of the revival of the future imperial union. Also, Ukraine's rapprochement with Euro-Atlantic organizations was perceived by Russia as a personal threat, so it could not assume the existence of a common border with a country that is integrating into NATO. In such circumstances, Ukraine maneuvered between East and West in order not to lose its independence, preserve its integrity and find possible ways to cooperate with NATO. Analyzing the current situation, we can conclude that Ukraine has had significant achievements in the framework of cooperation with NATO, but not sufficient. Taking into ac-

count both foreign policy factors and the weak political will of the top leadership of the state, we can say that Ukraine has not been able to fully define its priorities in foreign policy and actively move towards gaining full membership in the North Atlantic alliance. However, it laid the foundations for future cooperation.

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