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Normalization Policy of Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the mid-1930s: Essence, Causes, and Preconditions

[Polityka normalizacji stosunków ukraińsko-polskich w połowie lat trzydziestych XX wieku – podstawy, przyczyny i założenia wstępnej]

Streszczenie: W artykule podjęto próbę analizy wydarzenia historycznego, jakim był proces normalizacji stosunków ukraińsko-polskich w połowie lat trzydziestych XX w. Przeanalizowano przesłanki, które doprowadziły do zawarcia umowy normalizacyjnej w 1935 r. między Ukraińskim Zjednoczeniem Narodowo-Demokratycznym (UNDO) – najbardziej wpływowym wówczas reprezentantem społecznym w środowisku ukraińskim na zachodnich terenach Ukrainy, a rządem Polski reprezentowanym przez przedstawicieli sanacji. Ponadto omówiono przyczyny, które sprzyjały polityce normalizacji. Zawarcie umowy było przełomowym krokiem. W zamian za deklarację lojalności i uznanie przez UNDO polskiej racji stanu rząd miał zrealizować wiele ukraińskich postulatów. Dla UNDO była to okazja do utworzenia reprezentacji parlamentarnej i zapewnienie możliwości funkcjonowania ukraińskich organizacji pozarządowych, a dla sanacji – szansa na uzyskanie sojusznika politycznego wśród Ukraińców w regionie oraz parlamencie RP. W ten sposób zaznaczono równorzędność obywatelską Ukraińców. Jednocześnie podkreślano zbieżność poglądów w wielu kwestiach, ale też wskazywano na sprawy, które powinny być rozwiązane i uporządkowane.

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Summary: The article attempts to analyse the historical event that was the process of normalisation of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the mid-1930s. It analyses the rationale that led to the conclusion of a normalisation agreement in 1935 between the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO) – the most influential social representative in the Ukrainian community in the western territories of Ukraine at the time – and the Polish government represented by representatives of the Sanation. In addition, the reasons that favoured the normalisation policy are discussed. The conclusion of the agreement was a landmark step. In exchange for a declaration of loyalty and the UNDO's recognition of the Polish *raison d'état*, the government was to implement many Ukrainian demands. For the UNDO, it was an opportunity to create parliamentary representation and ensure that Ukrainian NGOs were able to function, while for the Sanation, it was a chance to gain a political ally among Ukrainians in the region and the Polish parliament. In this way, the civic equality of Ukrainians was marked. At the same time, convergence of views on many issues was emphasised, but also issues that should be resolved and put in order were pointed out.

Słowa kluczowe: II Rzeczpospolita; Ukraińskie Zjednoczenie Narodowo-Demokratyczne (UNDO); reżim „rehabilitacyjny”; normalizacja stosunków polsko-ukraińskich; ZSRR.

Keywords: the Second Polish Republic; the UNDO; sanation regime; normalization of the Ukrainian-Polish relations; the USSR.

Introduction

Nowadays, the Ukrainian-Polish relations, which play the role of a strategic partnership, are an important factor in international security, both regional and global, which once again highlights the topicality of relations research between the nations in the past, in particular during the Second Polish Republic. In addition, this issue is relevant from the perspective of studying the attitude of the authorities to national minorities, the combination of domestic and foreign policy strategies, the study of the party-political system of Poland in the interwar period of the twentieth century.

The reference base of the work is based primarily on authentic sources, including archival materials, Ukrainian and Polish periodicals of the period under study, works, and memoirs of direct participants of the events. As for the historiography of the issue, some aspects of the policy of 'normalization' in one context or another are discovered in the works of such domestic scholars as O. Zaitsev (Зайцев О., 1993), (Зайцев О., 1994), L. Zashkilniak (Зашкільняк Л., 1996), V. Komar (Комар В., 2001), I. Soliar (Соляр І., 1995), I. Fedyk (Федик І., 1998).

The research aims to investigate the full range of domestic and foreign policy reasons that led to the policy of normalization of the Ukrainian-Po-

lish relations from the motivation perspective of the Ukrainian side in the face of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO) – the most influential representative of Ukrainian society in Western Ukraine as well as the Polish side represented by the ruling ‘sanation’ regime of the Second Polish Republic, and to analyze the content of the normalization agreement of 1935.

The reasons for the “normalization” policy

In the mid-1930s of the XXth century, the tactics of the activities of legal Ukrainian political parties in Western Ukraine to resolve the national question are undergoing certain changes. This transformation, which has led to a new page in the history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in the interwar period – the policy of resolving mutual disputes through a mutual agreement known as ‘normalization’ – has been induced for some reasons.

Changing the state system of Poland

Among the main factors influencing the correction of the political course of Ukrainian parties changed in the state system of Poland concerning the elimination of democratic parliamentarism. The new constitution of the Second Polish Republic, adopted in April 1935, concentrated power in the hands of the President, sharply limiting the powers of the Sejm, whose number was reduced by more than half. According to the Constitution, the President appointed the Prime Minister, and at the suggestion of the latter – the ministers, convened and dissolved the Sejm and Senate, was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, was given the prerogative to issue various acts without the prior consent of the Prime Minister and was responsible for his actions only “before God and history”.

The new election law (ordination) approved by the Sejm in June 1935 was also anti-democratic. According to Lviv historian Oleksandr Zaitsev, it has become the direct impetus for ‘normalization’ (Зайцев О., 1994, c. 19). After all, according to the new election legislation (elections were indirect), two ambassadors from four candidates were elected from each district to the Sejm. These four candidates were nominated at district election meetings, which included representatives of local authorities, chambers of commerce, trade unions, and delegates for every five hundred voters in the district. The president was given the right to appoint a third of

the senators, the rest were elected by boards of voters consisting of honored citizens (knights of the Polish Order, graduates of higher educational institutions, representatives of self-government bodies) (Громадський голос, 1935, 18 травня), (Czubinski A., 1987, s. 225). It is obvious that such legislation allowed the ruling circles to reject unwanted candidates for ambassadors and senators, thus depriving opposition parties, especially Ukrainian ones, of any chance to form a significant parliamentary representation. Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of the opposition's legal struggle was nullified.

Legal Ukrainian political parties have faced a dilemma: to lose the opportunity to run their representatives in parliament, and thus lose serious leverage over Ukrainian issues on a nationwide scale, or to form their parliamentary representation by negotiating with the Polish government camp. Based on these circumstances, the leadership of the most influential party in Western Ukraine – the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), for which parliamentary struggle was one of the main forms of activity, began to lean towards an agreement with the Poles.

Status of UNDO

Along with this, the positions of the UNDO were determined by the specifics of its place and role in the public life of Western Ukraine. After all, the UNDO, having accumulated significant forces of Ukrainians in the struggle to preserve national identity, became the most powerful Western Ukrainian political party, “a spokesman and recognized in the world as a representative of the whole region” (ЦДІАУЛІ, Ф. 359, спр. 209, арк. 83) had a predominant influence on all legal spheres of the political, economic and cultural and educational life of Ukrainians in Galicia. Mass cultural, educational, and public organizations operated under its patronage (Prosvita, Ridna Shkola, Soiuz Ukraïnok, Sokil); all Ukrainian trade and economic associations functioned under the auspices of the party (Tsentrsoiuz, Maslosoiuz, Dniester Credit and Support Society, Auditing Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives, Tsentrobank and others) (Історія суспільних рухів і політичних партій в Україні в ХХ ст. 1993, с. 79); (Політичні партії Західної України, 1991, с. 62]. At the same time, members of the governing bodies of the UNDO headed the majority of economic organizations (O. Lutskyi, Yu. Pavlykovskyi, and others).

The burden of responsibility for creating proper conditions for Ukrainian national life in the region required the UNDO to work diligently and routinely daily, “working and fighting for every, even the smallest position,

which should be included in the positive page of the Ukrainian national balance” (ЦДІАУЛ, Ф. 344, спр. 525, арк. 7). However, the normal functioning of various areas (especially economic) of the social life of Ukrainians in Western Ukraine was impossible without political stability and certainty. But in the context of the gradual elimination of liberal-democratic freedoms and the reduction of the role of parliament in the life of the Polish state, which was reflected in the provisions of the Constitution of 1935, the presence of even a large representation of Ukrainians in the Polish Sejm could not guarantee such stability. An agreement with the government camp would be a stronger guarantee of ensuring normal conditions for the social life of Ukrainians in the new political circumstances. The factor of the above-mentioned realities of the socio-political life of Western Ukraine and the Second Polish Republic as a whole was another reason that forced the UNDO to seek ways of understanding with the ruling circles of the ‘sanation’ regime.

The foreign policy factor

In the list of reasons that prompted the UNDO to ‘normalize’ policy, not the least is the foreign policy factor related to the peculiarities of the vision of political parties in Western Ukraine of the ways to resolve the national issue in the geopolitical dimension. It should be noted at once that Western Ukrainian politicians considered the national question, not on a regional but all-Ukrainian scale. This position is a common thread through the program documents of Ukrainian political parties in Western Ukraine, it is emphasized in speeches and publications by leading figures of Western Ukrainian politics.

In some articles, the UNDO Chairman V. Mudryi openly stated that the party he led had launched a “practical policy of normalizing Polish-Ukrainian relations in Poland given the great historical tasks of Ukrainians in the struggle for the restoration of Ukrainian statehood.” (ЦДІАУЛ, Ф. 344, спр. 525, арк. 6). V. Mudryi also emphasized the integrity of the Ukrainian national idea “as a matter of international significance” in his speeches at the session of the Sejm on December 6, 1935 (Мудрий В., 1936, с. 11); (Biuletyn polsko-ukrainski, 1935, N 50). Editor of the Dilo newspaper (one of the largest and most influential press publications in Western Ukraine, a semi-official UNDO body), one of the leading figures of the Ukrainian National Democracy Ivan Kedryn-Rudnytskyi wrote in his memoirs: “The central issue of relations in Western Ukraine in the 1920s–1930s was an all-Ukrainian problem, there was

a problem of Ukrainian statehood over Dnipro, not the territorial autonomy of Western Ukraine” (Кедрин І., 1976, с. 312).

Soviet Ukraine

It is clear that in this vision of the national question, Western Ukrainian parties adjusted the tactics of a political struggle depending on the situation of Ukrainians in all their ethnic territories, especially in the USSR. Thus, the success of Ukrainization in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s led to a strong Sovietophile orientation in Western Ukrainian politics. Even the UNDO for some time considered “Soviet Ukraine is a stage for the Conciliar Independent Ukrainian State, which will be realized under the pressure of the conscious masses of the entire Ukrainian people” (Соляр І., 1995, с. 50); (Діло, 1925, 15 липня). In 1927, the Ukrainian Labor Party, led by V. Budzynovskiy, separated from the UNDO, occupying Sovietophile positions.

However, in the early 1930s, the situation changed radically. The collapse of Ukrainization, the total attack on Ukrainian culture, mass repression, forced collectivization in the USSR cause a sharply negative reaction in Western Ukraine. The artificial famine of 1932–1933 finally buried Sovietophile orientations among the Western Ukrainian public. In 1933, the Committee for Aid to the Hungry of Ukraine was established in Lviv, which included leading figures of the UNDO (D. Levytskyi, V. Mudryi, M. Rudnytska, and others). The Dilo newspaper constantly ran columns called Hunger in Ukraine, Save Ukraine, Statistics of Starvation, in which materials dedicated to Holodomor were published. All this anti-Ukrainian terror in the Dnipro Ukraine region demanded that Galicians take responsibility for the fate of all Ukrainians and pushed them to find ways of understanding with Poles on anti-Soviet grounds. It is obvious that this “reckless policy of extermination of Ukrainians in the USSR”, which buried hope for the evolution of the USSR in the direction of national statehood, was one of the factors that prompted the UNDO to conclude a normalization agreement with Polish ruling circles (Діло, 1935, 22 квітня). Another argument in favor of understanding was the belief that the Ukrainian and Polish peoples had a common enemy in the face of the Soviet state and Russian imperialism.

International politics of a wide scale

Nevertheless, the following should be taken into account: the geopolitical vision of the national question by the political parties of Western Ukraine was not limited to the USSR – the Second Polish Republic axis. The conclusion of the same ‘normalization’ agreement, as the well-known Ukrainian historian Yuriy Slyvka, rightly points out, depended on a wide range of international policies, in particular, on “Polish-German rapprochement and simultaneous aggravation of Poland’s relations with the Soviet Union” (СЛИВКА Ю., 1985, с. 237). After all, the UNDO tried to “link the problem of the Polish-Ukrainian relations with the prospect of intervention against the USSR” (Зайцев О., 1994, с. 18). The party’s attitude toward various international forces depended “on the position of those forces toward Bilshovyk regime” (Діло, 1934, 17 вересня).

In case of a conflict between the West and the USSR (the probability of which was estimated as high at the time), the UNDO ideologists considered the Ukrainian issue would be put on the European policy agenda, and in case of the defeat and collapse of the USSR – there would be a real opportunity to create a Ukrainian state. One of the most likely potential rivals of the USSR was Germany. In addition, Germany, perhaps the only Western country, was interested in the collapse of the Versailles system, the system of treaties that consolidated and sanctioned the colonial position of the Ukrainian people in postwar Europe. This circumstance explains the German orientation of some Ukrainian political parties in the interwar period. The conclusion on January 26, 1934, of the Polish-German treaty “on the peaceful settlement of disputes”, which, as Dilo wrote, “goes far beyond the interests of the two neighboring states and may influence developments on the broadest international scale” (Діло, 1934, 31 січня); (Torzecki R., 1972, s. 134), and which meant, in essence, that in case of a conflict with the USSR, Poland would be on the side of the West, in particular, Germany. This was in line with the foreign policy doctrine of the ‘sanation’ regime. So being on the side of the West automatically meant being on the side of Poland. At least for a while, it was perceived that way. Thus, we see that the international factor also pushed the UNDO leadership to reach an agreement with the Polish authorities.

A number of the above-mentioned circumstances has led the UNDO governing bodies to consider the need to “bring about Polish-Ukrainian appeasement at the cost of creating Piedmont in the western Ukrainian lands for the needs of all Ukrainians” (Українська суспільно-політична думка в 20 столітті: Документи і матеріали, 1983, с. 376), that is, the base for the liberation struggles of the Dnipro Ukraine region.

It should be noted that the first attempt to find an agreement between the UNDO and the 'sanation' regime, which took place in 1930–1931, was unsuccessful.

At the same time, the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation based on the Prometheism doctrine (a concept designed to develop a strategy of the Polish government's attitude to national minorities, developed in the political environment of J. Pilsudski, which, in particular, determined the place of the Ukrainian issue in Polish domestic and foreign policy) could become a reality in case the country developed a political situation that would make an understanding from a tactical point of view beneficial to both parties. In the Second Polish Republic, this situation developed in 1935.

By the mid-1930s, the UNDO became completely disappointed in the effectiveness of opposition methods of struggle and concluded that it was necessary to reach an understanding with the authorities. The line of so-called 'real politics' won. The proof of this was the speech of D. Levytskyi, the chairman of the association in the Warsaw Sejm on February 5, 1935. In his speech, Levytskyi pointed to the need for the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in the name of creating a "common platform in the historic mission in Eastern Europe". Only the elimination of the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts, the head of the UNDO claimed, could be a guarantee of ridding Europe of the threat posed by the Soviet Russia. D. Levytskyi stated the readiness of his party to stop fighting the Polish government if it abandons the assimilation policy towards Ukrainians and agrees to create a base in Western Ukraine for the liberation struggle in the Dnipro Ukraine region. It was emphasized that reaching such a compromise would be in line with the strategic interests of both peoples (Діло, 1935, 7 лютого); (Громадський голос, 1935, 16 лютого).

Normalization agreement, its essence, requirements and motivation of the parties UNDO

The proposals of the head of the UNDO caused a wide resonance among the Western Ukrainian public. Other Ukrainian political parties have expressed dissatisfaction with the content, form, and venue of Levytskyi's speech. The press of the Ukrainian Social Radical Party gave a negative assessment of this speech (USRP), Front of National Unity (FNU), and Ukrainian People's Renewal (UPR) – Hromadskyi Holos, Batkivshchyna and Nova Zoria (Громадський голос, 1935). The officials in the Polish state also initially rejected the UNDO's proposals. The Mini-

ster of Internal Affairs M. Zyndram-Kostsiakovskyi reacted to D. Levytskyi's speech with a sharp anti-Ukrainian speech. After that, the UNDO, in need of political allies, tried to reach an agreement with the Polish 'democratic left' opposition. However, in a conversation with the representative of the UNDO I. Kedryn-Rudnytskyi, the leader of the 'democratic left' in the Sejm, S. Tuhut stated the impotence of the opposition and its inability to pass any law (Кедрин І., 1976, с. 207).

The UNDO has resumed its search for ways to cooperate with the government. The date of May 29, 1935, can be considered the beginning of 'normalization'. On this day, the leading members of the UNDO – V. Mudryi (Deputy Chairman of the Party), Volodymyr Tselevych, and Ostap Lutskyi (author of the term 'normalization') – were in the audience with Minister Zyndram-Kostsiakovskyi. Later, on July 8, 1935, a conversation between the UNDO leaders and the Minister of Internal Affairs took place in Lviv again (Кедрин І., 1976, с. 209). The above-mentioned meetings resulted in the conclusion of a 'normalization' agreement between the UNDO and the Polish government. The reasons that prompted the UNDO to come to terms with the 'sanation' regime are discussed in detail above. Why did the Polish ruling circles show readiness for reconciliation this time? To answer this question, we must first clarify the essence of the 'normalization' agreement.

The agreement on the normalization of the Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1935 was concluded only in words and not documented. That is, its future depended solely on the goodwill of both sides. The agreement was based on an electoral compromise. According to the agreement, in each of the 15 districts of Eastern Galicia in the elections scheduled for September 1935, one Ukrainian and one Pole were to be elected to the Sejm.

The government has pledged to provide support to Ukrainian candidates at election rallies. The UNDO, in turn, had to urge Ukrainian voters to vote for the first two candidates, both Ukrainian and Polish. The agreement also provided for the need for prior coordination of Ukrainian candidates with the authorities (Діло, 1936, 10 грудня).

Thus, the UNDO was able to form its parliamentary representation at the cost of certain concessions. However, this 'normalization' agreement did not end there. The condition for understanding was some mutual demands that the parties made to each other. In particular, the UNDO stated that the maximum goal of the party within the Second Polish Republic is the territorial autonomy of the western Ukrainian lands (ДАІФО, Ф. 68, спр. 387, арк. 4). Even after the Fourth Congress (1932), the UNDO, based on the needs of 'practical policy', declared the autonomist slogan

a transitional, temporary task. Some Soviet-era studies, in favor of ideological dogma, argued that as a result of the 'normalization' agreement, the National Democrats "excluded from their program and propaganda the thesis of the struggle for territorial autonomy of Western Ukraine" (История Польши: в 3-х томах., с. 395). Such allegations were a direct distortion of historical facts, as the UNDO went to the polls in 1935 demanding "broad territorial autonomy for all Ukrainian lands in Poland" (ЦДІАУЛ, Ф. 344, спр. 525, арк. 176). The need to grant autonomy to Ukrainian lands has been repeatedly emphasized in the Sejm speeches of the party's chairman Vasyl Mudryi and other members of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation. However, at the initial stage of 'normalization', the UNDO decided not to insist on the immediate implementation of this requirement, expressing hope that as a result of understanding the issue of autonomy will become for Poles "a real need of the internal life of the Polish state" (Мудрий В., 1936, с. 10).

At the same time, the National Democrats put forward a minimum program, some specific demands to the government that needed to be addressed immediately. These requirements concerned various aspects of the political, economic, and cultural life of Ukrainians in the Polish state. They were expressed in the form of so-called 'postulates', which consisted of 18 points.

In particular, it was a question of creating opportunities for Ukrainians to access positions in state institutions and local self-government bodies. Further, the UNDO demanded an end to the process of colonization, that is the settlement of the Polish 'settlers' on the Ukrainian lands. Colonization led to the polonization of Ukrainian ethnic territories in Poland, as well as causing economic damage to the Ukrainian peasantry. A separate item was the issue of amnesty for political prisoners of the Ukrainian nationality, who were mainly in the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp. The UNDO also demanded a change in government policy in the Lemko region. After all, the Polish government supported the Russophile movement, which sought to create a separate Lemko people. The case of the People's House was about returning this important foundation of the Ukrainian people under Ukrainian influence.

High importance was attached to the language issue. The UNDO demanded the official introduction of the term 'Ukrainian' instead of 'Ruthenian', the use of bilingual inscriptions on the signs of various institutions, expanding the scope of the Ukrainian language in the south-eastern lands of the Second Polish Republic. Some of the requirements concerned the scientific and educational spheres. It, first of all, concerning the abolition of the reactionary educational law in force in the Polish

state (Lex Grabski), on the release of the Ukrainian-language school textbooks, the resumption of the activities of closed Ukrainian gymnasiums. The UNDO called on the government to fulfill its promise to establish Ukrainian university and protested against the discriminatory treatment of Ukrainian youth studying at Lviv University. Requirements concerned the admission of Ukrainian specialists to administrative positions in the educational sphere, assistance from the authorities in the functioning of the Scientific Society named after T. Shevchenko and Prosvita society.

A number of the postulates concerning economic issues. In particular, they were about providing loans to Ukrainian financial institutions – Tsentrobank, Land Mortgage Bank, Dniester Mutual Security Company, as well as the creation of certain benefits for the activities of such economic institutions as the Auditing Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives, Tsentrosoiuz, Maslosoiuz, Silskyi Hospodar. Appropriate funds in the state budget should have been provided for the implementation of the above-mentioned postulates” (ДАЛЮ, Ф.1, спр. 491, арк. 3–26); (Biuletyn polsko-ukrainski, 1935, N 5). It should be noted that among the requirements of the UNDO, the “postulates” of economic nature were given importance. This is evidenced by a separate meeting of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Second Polish Republic Zyndram-Kostsialkovskiyi with the representatives of Ukrainian economic institutions, which took place in Lviv on May 9, 1935, on the eve of the ‘normalization’ agreement (Biuletyn polsko-ukrainski, 1935, N 28, s. 317).

The successful conclusion of the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations and the fulfillment by Ukrainian politicians of their duties to the government was facilitated by substantial support from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which used its press and controlled political and public organizations to influence Ukrainian voters (Федевич К., 2009, с.174).

The ‘sanation’ regime

The condition of the agreement was also several demands of the Polish authorities to the Ukrainian side. Firstly, the recognition of the autonomy of the western Ukrainian lands as the maximum goal within Poland, that is the agreement, at least temporarily, with the fact of the Polish domination in Western Ukraine (We will remind that till 1932 (IV Congress of the Party) the UNDO stood on positions of non-recognition of legitimacy of the Polish domination). After all, the Prometheism doctrine, based on which the Ukrainian-Polish understanding

took place, made such a recognition inevitable. Secondly, the Ukrainian parliamentarians elected to the Sejm as a result of an electoral compromise undertook to vote for the budget and other important bills proposed by the government, that is to take a pro-government position.

This time the Polish authorities, in contrast to the situation in 1931, actively responded to the normalization initiatives of the UNDO. The Pro-metheanism doctrine was the conceptual basis of attempts at the Ukrainian-Polish understanding in both 1931 and 1935. However, the political situation in the Second Polish Republic in 1935 made such an understanding beneficial not only for the Ukrainian but also for the Polish side.

The 'sanation' regime felt a certain weakness (especially after the death of Y. Pilsudskyy in May 1935) and needed political allies. After all, a significant part of the Polish public and politicians had a negative attitude towards the new constitution and the election law, intending to boycott the next elections. Under these conditions, the government could not neglect the electorate of Western Ukraine (electoral compromise provided for the active participation of Ukrainians in the elections). The 'sanation' regime also needed the support of future Ukrainian ambassadors and senators to vote on important government bills. In addition, the ruling circles were interested in the union of "national minorities with the Polish state" (ДАЖО, Ф. 1., спр. 491., арк. 65). Such an alliance was a guarantee of stable development of the Second Polish Republic and contributed to the formation of its image of a state that is tolerant of national minorities. After all, the international situation and the likelihood of armed conflicts that could lead to a reshaping of the political map of the world have fueled the problem of Ukrainian ethnic territories in Poland. The 'sanation' regime did not want to share control over the solution to this problem with anyone. We see that the Polish government was "inclined to an agreement no less than the UNDO" because "both sides benefited from the normalization of relations" (Torzecki R., 1972, s. 147).

Conclusions

So, in conclusion, we state that the policy of normalization of the Ukrainian-Polish relations was due to the following reasons. Firstly, the changes in the state system of Poland in the direction of the elimination of democratic parliamentarism, enshrined in the new constitution of the Second Polish Republic in 1935, which put legal Ukrainian political parties in a dilemma: to lose the opportunity to bring their representatives to parliament, or still achieve the formation of their parliamentary repre-

sentation at the cost of an agreement with the Polish government camp. Secondly, the position of the UNDO was determined by the specifics of its place and role in the public life of Western Ukraine, namely, the burden of responsibility for all legal spheres of political, economic, and cultural-educational life of Ukrainians. Thirdly, in the list of reasons for 'normalization' policy not the last is foreign policy factor related to the peculiarities of the vision of political parties in Western Ukraine ways to resolve the national question on a national scale, which took into account both the dimension of the USSR from a wide range of international politics.

Moreover, both the Ukrainian and Polish sides invested both tactical and conceptual components in the understanding. As for the tactical component, for the UNDO it was an opportunity to form a parliamentary representation and ensure the proper functioning of Ukrainian cultural, educational, and economic organizations; for the 'sanation' regime – an opportunity to get a political ally among Ukrainians both in the region and in parliament. The conceptual component of the 'normalization' agreement was based on the mutual conviction that the Ukrainian and Polish peoples have a common enemy in the face of the Soviet state and Russian imperialism, which was based on the presence of points of contact in the views on the international dimension of ways to solve the Ukrainian question in the concept of Galicia as Ukrainian Piedmont and the Prometheism doctrine.

Thus, the 'normalization' agreement was a reaction of the UNDO and the 'sanation' regime to the political situation. Despite the presence of elements of a common conceptual basis, 'normalization' was still more of a "tactical compromise rather than a principled agreement". The strategic goals of the parties remained different. This, in the end, became clear during the implementation of the 'normalization' agreements.

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Abbreviation

- UNDO – Ukrainian National Democratic Union
 USSR – Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
 USRP – Ukrainian Social Radical Party
 FNU – Front of National Unity
 UPR – Ukrainian People's Renewal