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## Co-existing with the Other in the Aspect of the Problem of Fluctuations of Personality in the Society

### [Współistnienie z Innym w aspekcie problemu fluktuacji osobowości w społeczeństwie]

**Streszczenie:** W niniejszym artykule wprowadzono analizę pojęcia Innego w kontekście zagadnienia „ja i Inny” oraz ukazano w kontekście filozofii fenomenologicznej drogi, jakimi przebiega proces identyfikacji osobowości w ramach współistnienia z Innym. Problem identyfikacji analizowany jest jako integralna część problemu Innego, gdyż jednostka zawsze działa w horyzoncie dziedzictwa intersubiektywnego. Człowiek rodzi się w określonej tradycji kulturowej, bez której intersubiektywny wymiar jego samoidentyfikacji jest niemożliwy. Przychodzi na świat, który jest już nasycony znaczeniami innych, dlatego zawsze istnieje potrzeba jego samoidentyfikacji, która nie może się dokonać bez aktywnego udziału Innego. Procesy globalizacji, informatyzacji i postindustrializacji wskazują, że we współczesnym świecie rzeczywistość społeczna jest konstruowana za pomocą zupełnie nowych algorytmów, co nie pozostaje bez wpływu na procesy socjalizacji i samoidentyfikacji, prowadząc do głębokich zmian osobowości, które uwidaczniają się w jej fluktuacjach.

**Summary:** In this article an analysis of the concept of the Other in the context of the issue of “I and the Other” is introduced, and the ways through which the process of identification of personality within the framework of coexistence with the Other are shown within the context of phenomenological philosophy. The problem of identification is analysed as an integral part of the problem of the Other, since an individual

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always acts within the horizon of the intersubjective heritage. A person is born in a certain cultural tradition, without the intersubjective dimension of which their self-identification is impossible. A person is born in a world which is already imbued with the meanings of others, therefore, there always exists a need for their self-identification, which cannot be done without active participation of the Other. The processes of globalization, informatisation and post-industrialisation indicate that in the modern world social reality is constructed through brand-new algorithms, which cannot but impact the processes of socialization and self-identification, and lead to personality's deep changes, which are made evident by its fluctuations.

**Słowa kluczowe:** osobowość twórcza; fluktuacje osobowości; identyfikacja; światło życia; etyka; kultura; egzystencjalizm.

**Keywords:** creative personality; personality fluctuations; identification; life light; ethics; culture; existentialism.

## Introduction

The problem of personality has always been of the key topics in philosophy, and this subject can never be exhausted, as, on the one hand, it cannot exist in isolation from society, which is constantly acquiring new characteristics, and, on the other hand, new ideas, theories and concepts arise, which introduce alternative ways to solve problems in their corresponding subject fields. The changes in the socio-cultural circumstances require new personality concepts. As it is known, Aristotle called human "Homo Politicus", and this is a very precise characterisation, because the essence of a person is formed and is shown only in a collective of their own kind. Social being is the process of actualization and development of individuals' essential skills in the context of co-existence with others, as well as the mutual exchange of these skills.

Why is the problem of identification so *au goût du jour* in our time? Why is it one of the central problems in phenomenology? It should be pointed out that nowadays the conflict between I and the Other became ever more problematic. We easily employ others' thoughts, meanings, concepts, making them our own, while at the same time, that which pertains to I, becomes ever more estranged from ourselves. The I is now found outside of ourselves, and the Other – within my own Self. It is clear that the Other helps the realization of one's own originality. However, at the same time juxtaposition of I and the Other can both encourage person's identity, as well as lead to its change and destruction. Therefore, there is always a danger of losing oneself inside the Other.

There is always an element of destruction in a creative personality: by overcoming the old, a creative personality obtains new horizons, which

become its more perfect forms of being. If the creative personality's purpose itself is to destroy, this is destructive creativity. Destructiveness is common for all human beings, and the main difference is in its object: whether it is other people or the person themselves. On the other hand, the concept of destructiveness means atypical behaviour, which comes in conflict with the societal norms, but at the same time, which is directed at the destruction of norms and stereotypes. In nature, it is more common that an organism which is more adapted to the environment, tries to oust the less adapted one. However in the society the power of natural selection weakens, and the competition takes forms which may not be directly associated with destruction as a violent form of decomposition. At the same time, the reality of the Other, as well as the other reality, by the mere fact of their existence prompt the necessity to ensure the sovereignty of the inner world in relation to the other worlds and the other Selves.

## Definitions

For the justification of the problem of identification from the point of phenomenology, we should refer to the philosophical ideas of E. Husserl, E. Levinas, P. Ricoeur. However, now we're going to be interested in solving the problem of self-identification within the framework of intersubjectivity and, in particular, what is the role of the Other in this process?

We start our research from the phenomenology of Husserl. According to him, life light exists in the acts of the life of the soul, the acts of consciousness, and subjectivity is the only meaningful instance of the world, the absolute source of its meaning. A person develops their life light by revealing and exposing in the sight of the common day their own values and preferences, interests and needs. Under the influence of the I, which earns to manifest itself, the outer reality loses its calm, gets rid of indifference, restructuring according to the meaningful values and leading motives.

According to Husserl, the intersubjective world cannot be a personal creation of the subject, but is involved in the fact of otherness, because for each particular person, it is their own "here-world", which is different from every other world. This intersubjective world is double-sided. On the one hand, for each there is their own world of subject-relative experience, and on the other hand, it exists in relation to all subjects that are able to cognise, and to their phenomena of the world. It lies at the basis of comprehension of the objective world. The stability in the intersubjective

process lies in relations with other I in terms of the experience of the Other. By directing all attention to this Other, the subject tries to find stability by dividing themselves into their own being and that which is alien to it, the characteristics which are not different, but alien, incomprehensible, dark.

The basis of identification according to Husserl is the idea that consciousness is limited by time. In his opinion, life is basically a concept tightly bound with the that of time. It is a flow, and its source is the actual perception or the “living present”, into which we step gradually. The meaning or the essence is born as an essential or meaningful identity of that, which is being experienced, in different experiences, which can be at the same time tied to the “living present”. “The Self is not an experience, but the one who experiences, not the act, but the one who commits this act, not a characteristic, but the one who possesses such, etc. The Self finds itself, finds its Self-experiences and allocation of spirit in time, and, at the same time, it is not just now that it knows itself as existing and possessing this and that; it also possesses memories, and in these memories it finds itself as the one, which is the same as the one who possessed these or those specific experiences just now or before, etc. All that which is owned and was owned, has its own temporal position, and it is exactly Self which is something identical in time and takes up a specific position in time” (Husserl, 1994, pp. 226–227). “Considered phenomenologically, I find myself as a pure Self and my stream of experiences, in which I find its space-time essence, that stretches out into the infinity, and I find this essence as the identical true meaning in the multiplicity of subjective phenomena and in the rule of intention of the further phenomena, as an idea, which stretches into the infinity, and the true essential meaning of which is found through coming closer to it, as well as from the point of view of probability”(Husserl, 1994, p. 360).

Another phenomenologist, M. Merleau-Ponty also talks about the temporal nature of consciousness and existence. He says the following about the qualities of space and time: “perception gives me a “field of presence” in the broad sense, which unfolds in two dimensions: in the dimension of “here-there” and in the dimension of “the past – the present – the future”. At the same time, it is the second dimension which helps me understand the first one, for both I myself, as well as the others, and the things of the world, are all temporal, however I can say and come from only one sort of temporality – the temporality of my own existence, the unfolding of which gives me the world.” The temporality of the existence is understood by M. Merleau-Ponty in the following manner: “it is an intentional transition from that what I have, to that what I aim at, from

that, what I am, to that, what I want to be (Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p. 281). In this manner, the subject, according to Merleau-Ponty, is inseparable from the its situation, it is “a specific probability of situations; that is, it can actualize its essence in no other way, other than being a body and coming into the light using its body” (Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p. 318).

According to Husserl, in order to understand what is human or what I myself am as a separate personality, I need to partake in the infinity of experience, in which I cognise myself from a different perspective, according to newer and newer qualities, and more and more perfect. The defining features of this experience are: temporality; such understanding of intentional consciousness that, as an experience of consciousness, is divided into the experience of I, myself and the experience of the Other. Experience of I, myself is a stream of my consciousness, universal structures of which make it a transcendental consciousness. “The pure Self”, according to Husserl, is totally empty – it has no essential components, it cannot be described. The pure Self acts as a sort of self-evident point. The Self is absolutely empty, which means that it is identical, because its emptiness guaranties that it can't be non-self-evident (Husserl, 2009, p. 126). The Self remains self-evident because it is empty, and constitutes a certain monad, which has no other attributes, apart from the defining self-evidence of identity, and due to which the other phenomena can be constituted – different intentional acts, experiences, and, accordingly, the world view. Therefore, the identity, or self-evidence-ness, is not problematized by Husserl, but is simply stated. The transcendental Self lies outside of the world, it is a source, that constitutes the meaning of this world and the meaning of the human's existence inside of it.

As we can see, the cognisance of the transcendental Self is unfolded only in a dialogue with oneself due to the ability to split in two parts: the one that watches, and the one that is being watched, – a Self, transcendent in relation to the world, and a Self, which is submerged in the world. The latter Self, as an inherent part of the world, plays the role of the Other. The consciousness of the transcendental Self becomes the source of its own meaning. The intersubjectivity is understood by Husserl as the structure of an object, through which I touch upon the experience of the Other. From here in his philosophy comes the concept of the living world as the world of culture, which encompasses an infinite number of human worlds, since an individual always acts within the framework of intersubjective heritage.

A person takes their place due to the fact that they act and live in the context of the meaningful connections, which allow to determine, according to the relevance, not only their own position, but also the position of all that surrounds them. This definition (identification) happens within

the limits of their own life situation: a person is always born in a certain language environment and cultural tradition. Tradition, according to Husserl, acts as a mechanism of social and cultural inheritance, which ensures the generational change, societal connection and interaction of individuals. It is in the context of traditions, that the process of formation of my personality is unfolding. If tradition is the cultural heritage of many generations, then its basis is intersubjective. It is the intersubjective dimension of tradition which opens up *Volksgeist* for us. Because there exists something that binds the generations. It is the territory which they live on, the language they speak, a certain world view, which is transmitted from one generation to the other. Therefore, they are all united by one national culture.

The concepts of “I can” and “I do” allow us to talk about not a formal, but a meaningful understanding of the Self. This “I can” is characterized by Husserl as the Identical Self, as a special unchanging style of Self and its unchanging personal character. This is what remains the same under the unstopping change of ideas and opinions, namely: my ability to have my own views and to make judgements, as well as to change them. And if an identity of a thing is a result of my work on identification of its meaning, this is only possible because at the basis of my own life lies the unconditional synthesis – the unity of Self and its “living reality”. On the basis of this unity arises the unity of personality, which, however, doesn’t exist in the context of constitution and self-torture, but in the context of relationships with other people.

A transitional form from the pure Self to a personality monad is the pure Self in the total concreteness, in the world around me. The Other, according to Husserl, acts as a new meaning of being, which goes beyond the bounds of a monadic ego in its lonely originality, which is also reflected in my monad. The presence of meaning of the other within the horizon of meanings is a prerequisite of thematisation and understanding of this meaning.

According to Husserl, pre-phenomenal, pre-empirical substance is the identical, the bearer of that, which changes, and of the stable, which brings together all temporal phases of the flow due to the unity of the common entity, according to the ancestral community, which, however, doesn’t appear in the abstract entity at all. Identity is the essence in the unstopping common flow, which is stored in its individuation (Husserl, 1998, pp. 297–298).

It would also be beneficial to compare these ideas of Husserl with the views of B. Waldenfels (Waldenfels, 1999). The being of subjectivity inevitably assumes the mode of existential lack of meaning and perceives

being in different constructs of foreignness. The processes of globalization, which are present in today's society, have led to the emergence of the phenomenon of slipping identity, which doesn't allow social individual to self-identify within the traditional framework of sociality. B. Waldenfels and E. Levinas believe that identification of objectivized essence in symbolic structures is set through the discourse of the lack of meaning with the effects of the lagging behind Self, where the discourse of the other is made into the basis of the discourse of subjectiveness. The subject is only capable of self-identification, which coincides with their own *raison d'être*. The field of identification unfolds as the distance between the I and the Other. The relations between the two open up to be an empty discourse of the I, told from an empty position on an individual. Since an individual does not possess a meaning, they are unable to endow with it any foreign discourse.

Waldenfels talks about the necessity and the possibility of a coming together with the Other, which is related to the subject's ability to change and the perception of that, which does not fall in line with the common order of things and meanings. The Other is something entirely new, something which changes the whole situation. The event of meeting with the Other is something which changes both the subject and the whole world. If the meeting with the Other is possible, then it is an experience of becoming, an experience of change of one's own identity, does it mean that we go back to the idea of interchangeability of identities? No. We can state that the state of being in a meeting with the Other, it, in a certain way, opens ourselves up to an I outside of our identity. The Other world stretches out, changes us, but it doesn't mean that it can be lived.

An interesting and fruitful application of phenomenological approach to the questions of ethics we may find in the works of a French philosopher E. Levinas (Levinas, 1997, 1999). His ideas have a very high importance for our research, because he is almost the very first person to directly put forward and study in detail the questions of personal identity's formation, and the process of individualization itself. He comes from the idea that "Self" is rooted in sensuality, in the feeling of pleasure from being in itself. The particular character of being is rooted in the initial consent, the consent to exist, the consent to be happy, and, in its turn, in the principle of individualization, which by itself can only be understood from within, through the means of the interior (Levinas, 1999, p. 55). Nevertheless, the reverse moment of such individualization on the sensual level is the oblivion of the past, separateness of the "Self", that is, limitless egoism. It is interesting that for Levinas such egoism is not something ethically negative. It is more of, if framed in Husserl's terms, is an inevitable step of



ego-genesis, a step due to which, the “Self” opens up and wakes up. But such self-control of course isn’t the true identity of the “Self”, because it is only the basis for the emergence of the idea of Infinity, in which the meeting with the Other must take place.

Sensual isolation of the “Self” should not be broken by the emergence of the Other, vice versa, it remains, but in such a way, as to not become a hindrance to letting out. It is needed that in a separate being the doors to the outside be both closed and open (Levinas, 1997, p. 86).

The contradiction in the relationship of the “Self” and the Other are expressed in the form of language. These relations, essentially are the process of studying, a school of going outside, into the infinity of the exterior, that is, ethics in the full sense of this word. Therefore language, which is always a gesture of relation, from the very beginning, carries a certain ethical colouration, a certain ethical attitude to the infinity of the exterior. On the other hand, this relation and this experience of the other are again not a simple confrontation of the “Self” and the Other. These relations are more akin to the relationship between a teacher and a student (Levinas, 1999, p. 119). It is in this teaching that the presence of infinity is elaborated, which breaks the loop of totality.

The relationship with the Other, the relationship to the Other exists not outside the world, it at the same time is greater than the world, it goes beyond its bounds in its ability to narrate. Word overcomes the particularity of a singular thing, giving it a universal character. This trend towards universalization is also undoubtedly ethical in its essence, but not in a sense that the particular must dissolve in the universal of ethical norm and instruction, no matter how kind and righteous those were. The universality makes the narration possible, which is always a gift, an ethical gesture towards the other. As a remark along the way, the definition of the ethical for Levinas has a very vast volume and is also ambivalent. Evil intention is also surprisingly considered an ethical relation and should be considered with all due rigour. However, the basic and the more important relation to the Other remains that, which makes the world of “I” and the world of Other a common one.

Levinas successfully implements ethical concepts of phenomenology that were laid down by Husserl and Heidegger, showing that ethical involvement of a person is not limited to adhering to the common models of behaviour, which are regulated by the external norms and rules. By elaborating on the connection between ethics and ontology, Levinas arrives at the problem of personal being and person’s identity confirmation. He shows that such identity is of course not a given, as it had been shown previously by Heidegger, but it also cannot be comprehended only coming



from one's own care about themselves. For Levinas identity is both ontologically and ethically grounded in dialogue, in a situation of a meeting and in a relationship with the Other. Therefore, it can be said, that according to Levinas, it is exactly ethics, especially in the broader sense of this term, that should be considered the "first philosophy", because it is impossible to think of such a being, which would not be grounded in ethical relations, relationships. As was later shown by P. Ricœur in his work "I – self as the other" (Ricœur, 2008), even one and the same person can be the Other for themselves. Thus, dialogical ethics is a necessary constructive moment of personal identity. But we should not forget that the inner dialogue is also in a sense a dialogue, and in relation to oneself – an ethical relation.

Therefore, Levinas considers the function of identity as one of the most important features of human nature. According to him, it is because of it that a person recognizes their otherness in relation to the world. But this function can sometimes become an attachment to oneself, which leads to a heightened sense of loneliness. It is in loneliness that Levinas sees the moment of subject's formation out of the anonymous existence. Loneliness is the lack of time. A subject deprived of temporality, manifesting themselves only as an incarnation, is shut within their identity and is deprived of the ability to change. Such a change should be understood as a possibility of existential renewal.

The problem of identity occupies a special place in philosophy of P. Ricœur. This philosopher sees the objective of his work as the development of a generalized concept of a 20<sup>th</sup> century person as well as its improvement, which would take into account the contributions of phenomenology, existentialism, personalism, psychoanalysis, etc. The philosophical constructs of P. Ricœur are based on the critical rethinking of Freud's psychoanalysis and Husserl's phenomenology. He strives to overcome the extremities of the both in order to create his own vision of person, which was to be based on the pluralism of those psychoanalytical, existentialist, phenomenological and hermeneutic ideas.

P. Ricœur is considered a representative of phenomenological hermeneutics. "Self as the Other" is his main work about the human, about person's ability to act, about how a word can be an answer to the question of "who am I?" In this work, as well as in the works of the previous philosophers, re-thinking of the problem of human existence takes place. The aim of Ricœur's philosophy is the creation of conditions for a person to come to terms with themselves, with their body and the world. He writes: "Personality is not a problem which is separate from history and memory, personality is a central concept. Personality in

history is a question of finding oneself in relation to the others and in relation to the past, and how a person projects themselves into the future is connected to that” (Ricœur, 2008, p. 130).

Ricœur shows the levels through which personality’s development goes: from personality to “Self”. He highlights three levels: linguistic, practical and ethical. On the first level we deal with the universal capabilities of our language, which become apparent in speech comprehension about people as personalities, and about the “Self”. In this case, a personality cannot yet be characterized as a “Self”, but something can already be said about it. Here we can differentiate one particular personality from all the others. It is a part of that what we call the identification. Here we can identify one given particularity only by relating it either to a class of bodies or to a class of personalities. The second level appears because of the transition from semantics to pragmatics, that is, to a situation, in which the meaning of sentences depends on the context of the dialogue. The third level is the ethical level. It is related to the concept of “ethical guidance”. It is contained in the judgements, which state that people are to supposed to take the responsibility for their actions. “An ethical intention is an intention of good will to live with the other and for the other, according to fair principles” (Ricœur, 2002b, p. 206).

An important moment in Ricœur’s philosophy is the emergence of the concepts of «idem» and «bononiae», where the first one means “identical” in a sense of “analogical”, the same as the one which contains some form, which is unchanging in time. The second concept, “ipse”, means “identical”, but it is related to the concept of Self, Oneself. It means that an individual is identical to themselves. The interpretation of Self plays a major role in the process of self-discovery. Personal identity can only be articulated properly in the temporal dimension of human existence. And it is in the process of forming one’s own life story, which basically means putting events into order, that a person acquires integrity and stability of their identity, where the narrative is its necessary aspect. At the same time, no person constructs their own identity, their own narrative is always intertwined with the narratives of the others about that person, about the world and the others’ stories.

Thus, the identity of I is inseparable form the identity of the Other, because they exist in a continuous interpretative relationship: one’s own narrative already contains fragments of the others’ narratives, and is itself included into them. This intersubjectivity serves as a basis for the transition from I to Myself. On the way of self-identification, there exists a danger of self-deception, and in their search for identity, a subject may come across the danger of losing one’s own identity as well as the lack of

Self. It is because, on the one hand, to be human means to be able to shift to a different perspective, and, on the other hand, a question arises: what will be happening to my own values when I will be trying to understand the values of another person, or other peoples'? The identity of I is an essential part of the identity of the Other, because they exist in a continuous interpretative relation, and one's own narrative already carries the fragments of others' narratives and is itself included into them. An ideal model of a relationship between I and the Other would be a social interaction which is to be understood as an exchange of symbols. Ricœur writes, "...we are united by means of the world of language. In reality there exist not only two persons, that are talking to each other, but a whole linguistic unity, which gives us instruments with which we are able to communicate" (Ricœur, 2008, p. 108). The relationship with the Other is always in one way or the other mediated through the system of symbolic exchange. Identity appears as my own story of life, which gets compared to the stories of the Others in an attempt to give it some integrity. I and the Other are not merely identities, but always also something else.

In Ricœur's philosophy the connection between I and the Other is considered to be a dialogue, and language is the mediator between the two. The attitude towards oneself and the attitude to the Other is based on the text, which was created by culture and human experience, and their interpretation gives us an understanding of ourselves, the Others and the meaning of the world. Therefore, the interaction between I and the Other is a symbolic exchange, and any human activity includes a component of understanding and interpretation.

This French thinker attempted to outline four major human abilities. First of all, the ability to talk, to interact with others by means of language. "I can speak". Secondly, the ability to interfere into the world by means of actions, efforts, to pave their own path in the physical world, so to speak. "I can act". Thirdly, the ability to narrate their life and to form their own identity through such narratives, using memories as a basis. "I can tell about myself". Fourthly, the ability to be a subject of an action, to consider oneself as the author of their own actions. Framing it this way, Ricœur empathises the always communal character of an individual subject.

Identification, according to Ricœur, is impossible without comprehension of subject's belonging to one or the other culture. The case is, the national culture acts as a sort of life generator, an orderer of the chaos of life, where the "national" represents a structured regime. Of course, national identification comes into being, first of all, through the statement of "I – the Other", by separating a certain cultural group from the others

according to the principle of “Self – the Other”. It is impossible to escape the delineation of the mine and the others’ because a person often lives among people of other cultures, and they realize that besides the world which is native to them, there exist other worlds, that are native to somebody else, however that are totally foreign to that original person. “Self”, “mine”, always need self-identification. However in the modern context this identification cannot be expressed by mere belonging to something. I am not myself because it needs to be related to a place, a time, a culture, that is, the elements of the Self.

In this context, new forms of identity gain special importance, which are more fluid and plastic, these are highly in contrast with the identities of the traditional society. Relatively recently (in the Western countries – starting in the 50s and 60s of the last century, and in Ukraine – a little bit later), new youth subcultures acquired popularity, and many of these were related to certain music styles. In the last two decades there appeared and gained popularity the so-called online communities, which are even easier to join, as compared to the “traditional” subcultures. Sometimes a “mishmash of identities” prompts the expulsion of some of society’s members (which is highly relevant for the youth) into marginality, which may instigate deviant behaviour. All these forms of expression of personal fluctuations in the social existence require special attention.

## Conclusions and discussion

Post-modernism actualized the problem of search for one’s own identity in a certain negative sense, which bears a certain similarity to the way the activities of Sophists prompted the emergence of the classical philosophical systems of Antiquity – first of all, Plato’s and Aristotle’s. What we mean is the certain therapeutic effect which came as a result of works of post-modernists, and which manifested in the desire of many western intellectuals to set some ontologically meaningful statements against the post-modernist sermon. Because if a person’s identity (including its cultural-historical identity) is dissolved in the arbitrarily accepted illusory ideologies, then the whole culture will dissolve, and personality along with it.

In the history of philosophical thought the historical sequence does not always correspond to the logical sequence. Phenomenology of Husserl and his followers can often answer the calls raised by post-modernism. Phenomenology tries to construct a framework in which a personality attains an ontological basis, however the phenomenological understanding

of ontology is fundamentally different from the classic one. While the classical systems of the past tried to find a transcendental ground for personality (akin to Hegel's Absolute Spirit), phenomenology transfers the discourse to the plane of the problem of bodily experience. This is the real area of different people's contiguity and communication, where their inner living worlds mutually open. The meaning of human existence lies in the existence of the Other, in the study of it, which manifests already at the stage of bodily experience. The human (cultural) world emerges when the system of "I – the Other" comes into being, when there emerges a certain inner relationship between mind-bodies of I and the Other, when the Other starts acting not as a part of the outer world, but as a mode of perception and a carrier of behaviour. The primary connection of a person with the world is done through perception, which is both the first manifestation of human subjectivity and the first step in creation of the world of culture. Therefore, an accurate perception of the outside world is impossible without the existence of the Other. The world as understood by phenomenology is a meaning which shines through the section of the experience of "Self" and the experience of the "Other", in their mutual interconnection.

Phenomenology states that it is highly important to find one's own place in this world and to clearly delineate the limits between the "Self" and the "Other", because stepping over this boundary may be dangerous for a personality.

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