Balinski M., Young P., Fair Representation, Yale University Press, New Haven 1982
Penros, L. S., The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, “Journal of the Royal Statistical Society” 1946, Vol. 109
Banzhaf J. R., Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: a Mathematical Analysis, “Rutgers Law Review” 1965, no. 13
Felsenthal D. S., Machover M., The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing 1998
Felsenthal D.S., Machover M., The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting, “Social Choice and Welfare” 2001, no. 18
Felsenthal D.S., Machover M., Analysis of QM Rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe Proposed by the European Convention 2003, “Social Choice and Welfare” 2004, no. 23
Garman B., Kamien M. (The Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations), “Behavioral Science 13” 1968
Gelman A., Katz J. N. and Tuerlinckx, The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power, “Statistical Sciences” 2002, vol. 17, issue 4
Gelman A., Katz J. N., Bafumi J., Standard Voting Power Don’t Work: An Empirical Analysis, “British Journal of Political Sciences” 2004, no. 34
Feix, Lepelley, Merlin and Rouet (On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Member, “Social Choice and Welfare” 2007, no 2,
Straffin P.D., Homogeneity, Independence and Power Indices, “Public Choice” 1977, no. 30
Berg S., On Voting Power Indices and a Class of Probability Distributions: With Applications to EU Data, “Group Decision and Negotiation” 1999, no. 8
Gehrlein and Fishburn, Condorcet’s Paradox and Anonymous Preference Profiles, “Public Choice” 1976
Shapley L.S., Shubick M., A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, “American Political Science Review” 1954, no. 48
Felsenthal D.S., Machover M., Minimizing the Mean Majority Deficit: The Second Square-root Rule, “Mathematical Social Sciences” 1999, no. 37
Beisbart C., Bovens L., Hartmann S., A Utilitarian Assessment of Alternative Decision Rules in the Council of Minister, “European Union Politics” 2005, no. 6
Barbera S., Jackson M.O. , On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union, forthcoming in the “Journal of Political Economy” 2006, vol. 114
Feix M., Leppeley D., Merlin V., Rouet J.L., Vidu L., Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union, “Mimeo” 2006
Nurmi See H,, Voting Paradoxes, and how to deal with them?, “Springer” 1999
Feix M., Leppeley D., Merlin V., Rouet J. L., The Probability of US Presendential Type Election Paradoxes, “Economic Theory” 2004, no. 23
Aghion P., Alesina A., Trebbi F., Chossing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities, “Mimeo” March 2005; R. Renault, A. Trannoy, Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule, “Journal of Public Economic Theory” 2005, no. 7
Fishburn P.C., The Theory of Representative Majority Decision, “Econometrica” 1971, no. 39
Murakami Y., Logic and Social Choice, Dover, New York 1968
Chambers C., Consistent Representative Democracy, “Games and Economic Behavior” 2008 no. 62
Bervoets S., Merlin V., Gerrymander – Proof Representative Democracies, “International Journal of Game Theory” 2012, no. 41
Google Scholar