Zagadnienie normatywnych podstaw zdolności kognitywnych człowieka w koncepcji Michaela Tomasello

Daniel Żuromski

doi:10.31648/hip.385

Published: 2018-08-181

No. 22 (2016)

The Question of the Normative Root of Human Cognitive Abilities in the Theory of Michael Tomasello

Daniel Żuromski

Humanities and Natural Sciences

Section: Articles

https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.385

Abstract

In today’s broad interdisciplinary discussions containing philosophy, psychology, biology, cognitive science and neuroscience, concerning the problems o f the origins of human cognitive abilities, one of the main standpoints is represented by Michael Tomasello. In the first step Tomasello distinguishes shared intentionality as a specifically human cognitive ability. Next, he indicates motivations for engaging in activities with shared intentionality, which finally leads to the question of why people cooperate at all? In the presented strategy, the question about the basic cognitive abilities - certain forms o f intentionality - boils down to questions about the foundation of morality and normativity

Keywords:

Michael Tomasello, shared intentionality, social cognition, collaboration, cultural learning, evolutionary psychology,, theory of mind

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Żuromski, D. (2018). The Question of the Normative Root of Human Cognitive Abilities in the Theory of Michael Tomasello. Humanities and Natural Sciences, (22), 149–161. https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.385

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