Opublikowane: 2025-09-09

The Kennedy–Khrushchev Vienna Summit (1961) in the perception of the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk and the Head of the USSR Department of the US and Canada, Anatoly Dobrynin

Mateusz Bogdanowicz
Echa Przeszłości
Dział: ARTYKUŁY I ROZPRAWY
https://doi.org/10.31648/ep.11735

Abstrakt

J.F. Kennedy’s presidency witnessed a series of confrontations between the USA and the USSR, which began during the Vienna Summit. Nikita Khrushchev saw JFK as a political dilettante and was hoping to test the American President during negotiations. The Vienna summit did not bring any meaningful results because the meeting was informal and the delegates had completely different goals. Khrushchev focused on the German Democratic Republic and the division of Berlin, whereas JFK was more concerned with the crisis in Laos and the nuclear test ban treaty. Kennedy did not yield under pressure from Khrushchev, but overestimated the Soviet leader’s threats of war. Khrushchev’s strategy backfired because Soviet threats intensified America’s preparations for war on a scale that – by 1988 – had bankrupted the USSR. From a historical perspective, America’s priorities were misplaced because the Cold War came to an end in Europe, and the compromise regarding Laos and the nuclear treaty proved to be short-lived. Before the Vienna summit, the USA had approved the Yalta agreements and was unwilling to change the existing balance of power in Europe. The memoirs of the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet delegation adviser Anatoly Dobrynin confirm these observations. Their accounts differ with regard to the meeting agenda and the progress made in the negotiations. Rusk and Dobrynin were highly competent and skilled diplomats, but they did not play a major role during the summit. Both delegations would have been well-served by more extensive consultations between their respective leaders and advisors. The analysis of the diplomats’ memoirs provides valuable insights into JFK’s and Khrushchev’s decision-making styles. The memoirs prove that individuals play a crucial role in politics and that their decisions can have a profound impact on global affairs.

Słowa kluczowe:

Germany, Berlin, Laos, Cold War, diplomacy, summit, international crisis

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Zasady cytowania

Bogdanowicz, M. (2025). The Kennedy–Khrushchev Vienna Summit (1961) in the perception of the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk and the Head of the USSR Department of the US and Canada, Anatoly Dobrynin. Echa Przeszłości, (XXVI/1), 175–196. https://doi.org/10.31648/ep.11735

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