Komputacjonizm a materializm : czy krytyka obliczeniowej teorii umysłu implikuje krytykę materialnej jego natury?

Szymon Paweł Dziczek

doi:10.31648/hip.411

Published: 2018-08-181

No. 21 (2015)

Does the Critique of Computational Theory of Mind Imply the Negation of Its Material Nature?

Szymon Paweł Dziczek

Humanities and Natural Sciences

Section: Articles

https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.411

Abstract

The computational theory o f mind has a huge impact on the entire field of the philosophy o f mind. The possibility o f algorithmization o f human mental states has particular consequences both in a functional and semantic way. It also raises a question on the nature of those processes. The m ind-body problem, known from the modern philosophy, emerges again. A rejection o f Cartesian dualism led many cognitive scientists to a conviction that our mental states have their roots in the processes happening in the brain. The goal o f this paper is an attempt to analyse the core arguments against the computational theory, and the consequences o f its critique for the materialistic view towards the nature of the human mind.

Keywords:

brain, mind, computational theory, materialism, emergentism

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Dziczek, S. P. (2018). Does the Critique of Computational Theory of Mind Imply the Negation of Its Material Nature?. Humanities and Natural Sciences, (21), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.411

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