Abstract

The relation between ethics and physics has actually existed since the ancient times, although in the Socratic theory they were perceived as independent of each other. As­suming (following Kant) that moral deeds are the ones which are based upon free will, the author examines the free will phenomenon and its place in the contradictory theories of indeterminism and determinism. Following indeterminism, there is no need to account for the ontological status of free will. If, however, the deterministic view is accepted, such an explanation is necessary and there are two types of it. According to the first one, free will is of a different "nature" than physical reality. Supporters of the other one perceive free will as a part of the organie world structure, basie upon the category of accident. Modern scien­ce (17th and 18th c.) tried to reject the theory of accident on the grounds of modern physics and the ideas it developed. Such a point of wiew refused to accept the free will phenome­non and made justification of morality impos­sible. The 20th c. brought along hopes for such justification, together with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and its indeterministic interpretation. This principle cannot, howe­ver, be treated as a "strong" argument sup­porting the free choice concept.

In such a situation, followers of ethics should wait for „stronger” arguments, or accept the thesis that in the Word governed by the law of causality reason is to guarantee our freedom, decisions and deeds. Reason – being element of the world  of  nature – is also  related to phisical reality and enables us to find arguments supporting the free will theory and, what follows, to make the moral sphere of human existence sensible.