Analysis of Institutions Interaction in Ukrainian Economy by Using Game Theory Models
This article is an attempt to analyse the functioning of the institutional environment through the prism of institutional interaction and cooperation between actors in the shadow and official economy. The authors suggest somewhat unusual mechanisms for understanding the most problematic current issues of interinstitutional cooperation in Ukraine. The investigation is based on current game theory, in particular an approach to interactions in the context of such models as “loyal business – opposition business”, “IMF – Ukraine”, “Ukrainian society – oligarchic groups”, which allow the sources, causes and consequences of the defacto functioning command system to be demonstrated. The research, which combined approaches to the innovative economy, the institutional economy and the theory of games is a good basis for explaining why a positive outcome, known as institutional cooperation, has not been achieved in the interaction between oligarchic groups and Ukrainian society as a result of a repetitive “game” for two decades. It is proposed to use Nash disequilibrium to disturb an ineffective economical system for receiving the effect similar to Josef Schumpeter’s creative destruction approach in entrepreneur role identification. In this way a synergy between game theory and innovation economics was implemented.
Słowa kluczowe:business game theory institutional theory interaction, institutions Nash equilibrium, Nash disequilibrium oligarchy, society Ukraine
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Inne teksty tego samego autora
- Ihor Hurnyak, Aleksandra Kordonska, Mechanisms of Effective Governance and Cooperation: Comparative Analysis of the European States , Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski: Tom 12 Nr 1 (2021): Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski