Published: 2018-09-031

Eduard von Hartmann and the Justification of the Transcendental Realism in the Light of the Epistemology of Kant

Dariusz Pakalski
Humanities and Natural Sciences
Section: Articles
https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.495

Abstract

The article deals with the problem of the objective reality of cognition in the conception of E. v. Hartmann. The author of The Philosophy of the Unconscious criticizes Kant’s theory contained in the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason due to the fact that the reality of the key notions, such as phenomenon, object, and transcendental subject is only subjective. This perspective allows Hartmann to define Kant’s standpoint as “illusionism” In his system Hartmann ascribes the objective reality to the representations arisen on the basis of the principle of causality which is transcendent but not transcendental. According to him such causality has at its basis will that creates representations that it can be aware of as of its content. Hartmann interprets such a will as Kantian thing in itself.

Keywords:

thing in itself, transcendentalism, experience, consciousness, will

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Citation rules

Pakalski, D. (2018). Eduard von Hartmann and the Justification of the Transcendental Realism in the Light of the Epistemology of Kant. Humanities and Natural Sciences, (20), 233–243. https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.495

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