https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.501
The author argues that the range of reasonable limitations concerning the natural law and rational activities undertaken with the idea to meet one’s own interests that Hobbes assigns to individuals under the rule of the sovereign does not encompass all those behaviours that those individuals who create a political community will wish to get involved with. The author points to those activities that to some degree fall outside behaviours that are pure emanations of the individual’s nature on the one hand, and schemes of the reasoning will on the other, since they are not expressions of one’s concern with respect to one’s own interests or benefits. They are rooted in irrational attitudes, beliefs and feelings present in the individual’s mental sphere; additionally they reveal the desire for social peace. Hobbes attempts to reduce such activities to rational will. According to the author of this paper, Hobbes’s arguments allow one to assume that uncertainty regarding themeans to preserve life is rationalized, leading to coercion on the part of the sovereign. The argument of the author of Leviathan does not justify, however, the rationalization concerning the fear for one’s life to the extent of trusting the sovereign.
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