Formal power and real authority: the involvement of governance norms or principles

Emmanuel Picavet

doi:10.31648/hip.569

Pubblicato il: 2018-09-071

N. 19 (2013)

Formal power and real authority: the involvement of governance norms or principles

Emmanuel Picavet

Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo

Sezione: Articoli

https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.569

Abstract

In several avenues of contemporary research, much attention is devoted to the contrast between the real authority of institution and their formal power, in the analysis of institutional funtionings; also in the study of the relationships between institutions on the one hand, rules, principles or norms on the other hand. Such a contrast appears to be based on familiar observations: the capacity of institutions to get their preferred outcomes (their so-called „real authority”) is sometimes loosely connected with the hierarchical prerogatives of the considered institutions (their „formal power”). More particularly, current studies of the „migration authority” bring out possible shitts in real authority while there is no changein the formal structure of power. This article will partly consist in the explanation of recent results of common reaserch in project „Delicom”, in which a formal treatment of the distinction has been put foward. This approach will be set against the background of recent contributions in political science or economics (in the works of Ph. Aghion and J. Tirole, J. Backhaus, L. Thorlakson). The revelance of the problematic for the study of competence delegation among institutions will be stressed all along.

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Regole di citazione

Picavet, E. (2018). Formal power and real authority: the involvement of governance norms or principles. Humanistyka I Przyrodoznawstwo, (19), 107–127. https://doi.org/10.31648/hip.569

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Questo lavoro è fornito con la licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale 4.0 Internazionale.

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