The title of the article is a double paraphrase. It is a paraphrase of Alfred Tarski’s famous monograph The Concept of Truth in the Languages of the Deductive Sciences (1933) and of Adam Grobler’s article The Concept of Truth in Languages of Empirical Sciences (1995). It signals fundamental relationship of the article with works of both philosophers too. Like Tarski in formal sciences and Grobler in empirical sciences I attempt to research if (and under which conditions) classical theory of truth may be effectively applied in humanities (despite their all oddities). After reconstruction and investigation of Tarski’s theory I assume, that the concept of truth as a truth in model in logic and mathematics is
complete. However, in empirical sciences and humanities it is difficult to consider it as complete, because it does not ’’moves out us from a tree of language”. Researching on adequate model of reality with the use of rules of inference and rules of empirical verification of knowledge (Grobler’s proposal) seems a little
effective too. In humanities to confront model with reality (using traditional words, to confront reality with objective spirit and subjective spirit) it seems necessary to take into consideration rules of understanding. Otherwise the world of artifacts and values will be unavailable for science. That is why, our confrontation with the world with the use of different models - if it has to protect us against “blind” traveling around constellation of possible worlds (Grobler’s doubt) or threat of unfeeling naturalization (my doubt) - must be based on rules of understanding and rules of sense which enable us to disclose specific qualities for particular disciplines and units of sense and values.
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