Analysis of Institutions Interaction in Ukrainian Economy by Using Game Theory Models
Ihor Hurnyak
Ivan Franko National University of Lvivhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0926-2456
Aleksandra Kordonska
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztyniehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5316-9630
Abstract
This article is an attempt to analyse the functioning of the institutional environment through the prism of institutional interaction and cooperation between actors in the shadow and official economy. The authors suggest somewhat unusual mechanisms for understanding the most problematic current issues of interinstitutional cooperation in Ukraine. The investigation is based on current game theory, in particular an approach to interactions in the context of such models as “loyal business – opposition business”, “IMF – Ukraine”, “Ukrainian society – oligarchic groups”, which allow the sources, causes and consequences of the defacto functioning command system to be demonstrated. The research, which combined approaches to the innovative economy, the institutional economy and the theory of games is a good basis for explaining why a positive outcome, known as institutional cooperation, has not been achieved in the interaction between oligarchic groups and Ukrainian society as a result of a repetitive “game” for two decades. It is proposed to use Nash disequilibrium to disturb an ineffective economical system for receiving the effect similar to Josef Schumpeter’s creative destruction approach in entrepreneur role identification. In this way a synergy between game theory and innovation economics was implemented.
Keywords:
business game theory institutional theory interaction, institutions Nash equilibrium, Nash disequilibrium oligarchy, society UkraineReferences
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Grossman, S. J./Hart, O. D. (1986), The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. In: Journal of Political Economy. 94/4, 691–719.
Hart, O./Moore, J. (1990), Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. In: Journal of Political Economy. 98/6, 1119–1158.
Hurtado, C. (2015), A Version of the Folk Theorem. URL: http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~hrtdmrt2/Teaching/GT_2015_19/L13.pdf
Hurnyak, I./Kordonska, A. (2018), “Taste of Life” as a Mechanism of Corruption Overcoming. Comparative Economic Research. In: Central and Eastern Europe. 21(2), 69–80. URL: https://
doi.org/10.2478/cer-2018-0012.
Rodrik, D./Subramanian, A./Trebbi, F. (2002), Institutions Rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. In: NBER Working Paper, 9305, 47.
Rubinstein, A. (1982), Perfect equilibrium in a Bargaining model. In: Econometrica. 50/1, 97–109.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998), Towards a new paradigm for development: strategies, policies, and processes. In: Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, UNCTAD. URL: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/
Towards-a-New-Paradigm-for-Development-%3A-Strategies-Stiglitz/a0b93b3aeeb17cfce3c-8c4f2bd67beb8562f195a.
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Varian, H. R. (2010), Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach. New York.
Williamson, J. (2004), A short history of the Washington Consensus. Barcelona. URL: https://piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf
Williamson, O. E. (2002), The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives. 16/3, 171–195.
Hurnyak, I., & Kordonska, A. (2019). Analysis of Institutions Interaction in Ukrainian Economy by Using Game Theory Models. Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski, 10(1), 139–151. https://doi.org/10.31648/pw.4510
Aleksandra Kordonska
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5316-9630
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5316-9630
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