Critical gloss to the resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court’s of 1 July 2019 (I OPS 3/18)
Abstract
The author critically refers to the resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court, in which it was considered that the only and excluded condition for stopping the driving license for exceeding the speed limit by more than 50 km/h in built-up areas is information obtained from an authorized entity.
He does not accept the literal interpretation of the provision of art. 7 item 1 point 2 of the Act on the amendment to the Penal Code. without the party’s
right to a fair trial, which also arises from international law. According to the author, the Supreme Administrative Court should make a pro-constitutional and pro-convention interpretation, and if necessary refuse to use it as a provision contrary to EU law.
Keywords:
administrative decision, driving license retention, speeding by more than 50 km/h, right to court.References
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Stefański R.A., Glosa do wyroku WSA w Kielcach z dnia 26 stycznia 2017 r., sygn. akt II SA/Ke 289/16, OSP 2018/9/97.
Hankus, T. (2019). Critical gloss to the resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court’s of 1 July 2019 (I OPS 3/18). Studia Prawnoustrojowe, (46), 485–496. Retrieved from https://czasopisma.uwm.edu.pl/index.php/sp/article/view/5359
