Glosa krytyczna do uchwały Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 1 lipca 2019 r. (I OPS 3/18)

Tomasz Hankus

Wyższa Szkoła Prawa we Wrocławiu
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5908-2675

Abstrakt

The author critically refers to the resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court, in which it was considered that the only and excluded condition for stopping the driving license for exceeding the speed limit by more than 50 km/h in built-up areas is information obtained from an authorized entity.
He does not accept the literal interpretation of the provision of art. 7 item 1 point 2 of the Act on the amendment to the Penal Code. without the party’s
right to a fair trial, which also arises from international law. According to the author, the Supreme Administrative Court should make a pro-constitutional and pro-convention interpretation, and if necessary refuse to use it as a provision contrary to EU law.

Słowa kluczowe:

administrative decision, driving license retention, speeding by more than 50 km/h, right to court.